American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

Hey all, let me start by apologizing if this post is in the wrong forum. If a moderator feels it better placed in the "Smoking Room" feel free to move it. It just seemed, to me, the best place to gain adequate readership and, hopefully, a few excellent answers.

Ok, that said on to my query. I am currently reading a very interesting book by Ernest B. Furgurson, titled "Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor 1864. I've been impressed by the author's research, presentation, and writing style. In short, I'd recommend the book to anyone who enjoys this period of history. One of this most interesting aspects of Furgurson's story is of the relationship between Meade and Grant. Now I consider myself fairly well read not only on this period of history but on this particular campaign as well. Still, the author (Furgurson)brings to light details I've not heard discussed before.

In trying to keep the post brief I'll state my question this way qualifying that there's more information time isn't permitting me to make note of. The author of this book suggests that General Meade played a much larger, and frankly significant role, than history has traditionally given him credit for. He also suggests that Grant, perhaps indirectly, and his supporters (Washbourne[sp], Rawlins, etc), directly, have [had]much to do with how Meade has traditionally been presented. In effect he argues, as I understand it, that Meade in many ways was unfairly and wrongfully presented to the public at large. Can any of you offer more to this story whether to confirm or refute it?

I know there's more that needs to be brought into the story but, as I previously mentioned, I wanted to be as brief as possible. I guess I'm also asking if this just presents a certain bias on the part of the author? Or, even if I have misinterpreted the author's work? Any other pertinent thoughts, information, etc would be appreciated as I try to get a better understanding of this particular campaign and its participants.

I thank y'all in advance for your contributions!

Maj.Gen. Mike Smith
3rd Bde, 1st Div
II Corps
Army of Georgia
[url="http://convolutedmuse.com"]ConvolutedMuse[/url]

I've never come across this particular spin, so it's hard for me to say much about it one way or the other.

My understanding has always been that Meade's "problems" with reputation come from two things mostly. After the failure to follow up after Gettysburg, Lincoln's estimation of him plummeted. More importantly perhaps, is that Meade's relationship with the Press Corps was only marginally better than Sherman's, which led to a great deal of rather negative press about him coming out.

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA

Mike, I think Gary hit the nail on the head with his comments, but just to amplify a bit further here is my understanding. Initially Grant took a hands off approach in the management of the Army of the Potomac and pretty much left all the operational decisions to Meade. After the Wilderness, due to severe Union command failures (not all of which were Meades fault) that changed. Following Wilderness Grant became much more involved in the operations of the AoP and made the decsions which resulted in the Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. I think history was initially unkind to Meade due to his perceived slowness in following up the victory at Gettysburg and his apparent ineptness (again unfair) at Wilderness. I think as time has passed this is changing and his image has revived somewhat.

Lt. Gen. Ed Blackburn
I/I/VI/AoS

"Forward Bucktails"

Well i recently read a book on Chancellorsvile Campaign and till that time i always had the impression that Joe Hooker was another incompetent leader who was to blame for the Union defeat there... and after i read that book i started to think tha Hooker was extremly competent commander capable of designing a complex and good plan and executing it. Now my impression that ones to blame for that crushing defeat were people like: Stoneman , Avrell , Sedgwick , Howard , Couch and appart from that Hooker had really bad luck with his communication and with that Reb Cannonball hiting one of the Pillars of Chancellor family house when he got wounded.[:D]


Lt.Col. Przemek Niedzielski
4th Brigade
3rd Division
2nd Corps
Army of the Missisipi

I still think the best understanding of Hooker is still his old Army rep:

"The Best Poker Player in the Army, until there's serious money on the table"

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA

Well i think this is not unfair judging from his actions he did not broke after Howards Corps was smashed by Jacksons asault he send reserves to path up his Flank and on the following day he skilfuly used reserevs to stop Stuart's attacks but then he got knocked out by this pice of pillar hiting him in the head... so he was semiconcius regaining and losing his tuch with reality. At this point Gen. Couch should take command but he didn't do it so reserves stoped comeing and the rebels prevailed. You can blame Hooker for not attacking Lee when Jackson begun his flanking move but i think Joe was determined to fight a defensive battle after what he saw at Fredericksburg


Lt.Col. Przemek Niedzielski
4th Brigade
3rd Division
2nd Corps
Army of the Missisipi

Even beyond "not attacking while Jackson was on the march", what was he still doing in the Wilderness to begin with? That's the biggest question of them all. The rebs couldn't have stopped Hooker from coming out of the woods, the march he'd stolen on Lee was more than enough to ensure that.

Hooker could have had the Army of the Potomic clear of the Wilderness, in good order, ready to fight Lee on good ground, forcing him to abandon the fortifications at Fredericksburg, but he didn't?

Why not? Because he decided to call a halt at the absolute worst possible time.

Fighting a defensive battle is one thing, dithering around while your enemy is given a free run to counter your moves is another.

Yes, the command structure of the AoP was broken, yes he was badly served by Howard and Stoneman, but ultimately, the blame for the loss has to land squarely on "Fighting Joe".

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA

Well from what i understand Hookers Plan:

- Sedgwick will Demonstrate in front of Fredericksburg impresing preparetions for an attack so Lee will stand there and defend the fortifications.
- Stoneman will cut Lee's LOC forcing him to fall back out of his fortifications twards Richmond.
-Hooker will manover onto Lee Flank and when Lee will be faling back he will move to Richmond forcing Lee to attack him.

So Hooker did not have to leave Wilderness and attack Lee he was sure that Stoneman will cut Lee LOC and force him to move away or face his army starve to death. Yes Hooker made coupple of mistakes like abandoning Hazel Grove(?) but in overall he lost the battle due failure of carrying his commands and bad luck.


Lt.Col. Przemek Niedzielski
4th Brigade
3rd Division
2nd Corps
Army of the Missisipi

Even if Stoneman failed in his mission (which, frankly, considering the "quality" of Union Cav to that point should have been expected) it was still better for Hooker to get out of those woods. The woods drastically cut the strength of his army, including on his precious defensive. There were limited fields of fire for artillery, it was far more difficult to move troops laterally to reinforce threatened areas, which minimized the Union advantages in numbers and firepower.

Also, just by leaving the woods, it was enough to force Lee out of the fortifications.

If all else fails, remember one little thing. Chancellorsville was no more decisisve a victory for the CSA than the Wilderness would be the next year, and ended in much the same positions.

Lee did not beat the AoP, he beat Joe Hooker. He didn't beat Grant, because Grant wasn't willing to give up.

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA

Hello all,

Thanks for the replies. An interesting point Furgurson was making too was that Meade originally felt Grant was behind much of the negative publicity against him via his regular dispatches to Washington. Meade later discovered, "by accident", this was not the case, at least specifically, because most of the information going to HQ was from Dana and not Grant who reported directly to Halleck, at least in terms of submitting reports. Stanton, on the other hand, seems to have censored a lot of information as it was a reelection year and he had no use for Meade personally. Now, that still begs the question, as the author asserts, whether Grant purposefully allowed this to continue? It is inconceivable he could not be aware of the slights being directed towards Meade. --Note-- By slights I mean the praise going exclusively to Grant and only AoP fault towards Meade.

In assessing the primary problem for the debacle at Cold Harbor the author concludes this period of slights against Meade and Meade's continual frustration at not being duly recognized, along with Grant's refusal to rectify the situation so long as the praise for him continued (bolstering his own Presidential hopes)proved the underlying cause for such drastic losses. Grant left all the details to Meade who, tired of being ignored save for negatives, threw everything back to Grant. The result the, as one might imagine, a mess. Corps commanders while ordered to reconnoiter their fronts well before the attack to a man failed to do so nor to inform HQ of what they were facing. Grant, on the other hand, had no clue what he was ordering evidenced by his desire for the army to press the attack even after horrific losses. The men of course knew as they steadfastly refused to make another charge.

One last note from this book I found rather interesting. In the scrapes leading up to this devastating defeat, Cold Harbor, countless garrison troops were brought in from Washington and other locations to replenish the huge troop loss to date. In several cases these green troops were used to spearhead that fateful assault almost guaranteeing problems. The personal rift between these two commanders played a large role in allowing this to happen. Lastly, the author maintains that either Grant, as supreme commander, should have left the field to Meade (in effect issued the general orders for the campaign while staying well out of the way) or removed Meade to another position. By having, essentially, two army commanders confusion resulted as well as delays in communication which proved quite costly.

There's much more but that's plenty for now. My fingers are sore from typing, lol.

Maj.Gen. Mike Smith
3rd Bde, 1st Div
II Corps
Army of Georgia
[url="http://convolutedmuse.com"]ConvolutedMuse[/url]

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Gary McClellan</i>
<br />Even if Stoneman failed in his mission (which, frankly, considering the "quality" of Union Cav to that point should have been expected) it was still better for Hooker to get out of those woods. The woods drastically cut the strength of his army, including on his precious defensive. There were limited fields of fire for artillery, it was far more difficult to move troops laterally to reinforce threatened areas, which minimized the Union advantages in numbers and firepower.

Also, just by leaving the woods, it was enough to force Lee out of the fortifications.

If all else fails, remember one little thing. Chancellorsville was no more decisisve a victory for the CSA than the Wilderness would be the next year, and ended in much the same positions.

Lee did not beat the AoP, he beat Joe Hooker. He didn't beat Grant, because Grant wasn't willing to give up.

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

The AoP had already turned east its advance elements were nearly clear of the Wilderness when Joe Hooker lost confidence in himself and called a halt. One reason was that Longstreet's Corps was unaccounted for and Hooker feared the unknown. He was beginning to pick up prisoners from a 1st Corps Division (can't remember which one) and feared that Longstreet had rejoined the ANV. In the face of this perceived threat, Hooker "turtled up" and decided to fight defensively. He handed over the initiative to Lee and Jackson -- how do you spell "defeat"? The blame is all Hooker's.

Meade should get a great deal of credit for handling the operational aspects of the 1864 campaign but all of the major decisions were Grant's. Grant deserves the blame for Cold Harbor, although Meade is not blameless. Neither of them did their homework.

BG Ken 'Muddy' Jones
1/1/XXIII Army of Ohio
USA

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">Grant deserves the blame for Cold Harbor, although Meade is not blameless. Neither of them did their homework.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Exactly, that is precisely what the author spends a great deal of time elaborating on. He goes on further to assert the extremely heavy losses in the campaign up to and including Cold Harbor had a detrimental affect upon the army as well. Corps commanders making poor decisions, such as not scouting directly in front of their lines prior to an attack, during the Cold Harbor debacle and even immediately after. The author illustrates the Petersburg fiasco as evidence. The position could have easily been taken had the officers in charge been as efficient as they usually were, Hancock and Smith. Instead, the delay allowed the entrenchments around the city to be filled with troops delaying the war's end by many months. Quite an interesting read.

Maj.Gen. Mike Smith
3rd Bde, 1st Div
II Corps
Army of Georgia
[url="http://convolutedmuse.com"]ConvolutedMuse[/url]

Intersting timing on this, there was an article in CWT by Jeffrey Wert on Grant and Meade's relationship. One of the things mentioned was that when Lincoln asked for an army to be sent to the Shenandoah to put down Early Grant proposed sending Meade to command it but this was nixed by Lincoln. It seems Lincoln had been under pressure to remove Meade and he felt if Meade was sent to the Shenandoah it would be viewed that Lincoln disapproved of his performance, so Sheridan got the job. Meade thought Grant had passed him over for the job and didn't discover what really happened until after the war.

As to Cold Harbor, Grant himself later stated the second attack at Cold Harbor was one action he regretted.

The comments about Dana are interesting as I just recently completed a book on Chickamauga that pointed out that Dana and Garfield both sent reports to Stanton and Lincoln putting down Rosecrans behaviour before, during and after the battle as well as criticizing McCook and Crittenden. It appears to me Dana was Stanton's hatchet man being sent to discover facts that supported Stanton's personal likes and dislikes. I seem to recall he was also sent to check out Grant's drinking problem earlier in the war.

Gen. Ken Miller



Army of the Shenandoah

<pre id="code"><font face="courier" size="3" id="code">The comments about Dana are interesting as I just recently completed a book on Chickamauga that pointed out that Dana and Garfield both sent reports to Stanton and Lincoln putting down Rosecrans behaviour before, during and after the battle as well as criticizing McCook and Crittenden. It appears to me Dana was Stanton's hatchet man being sent to discover facts that supported Stanton's personal likes and dislikes. I seem to recall he was also sent to check out Grant's drinking problem earlier in the war.</font id="code"></pre id="code">

Hi Ken,

Yes, excellent observations there as they mirror much of what this book's author had to say. Much of this is "news to me", you might say but still quite interesting. The author, Furgurson, asserts, as you've stated, that Dana was indeed Stanton's informer. As to Grant's drinking, the author credits Rawlins for keeping Grant sober during the critical times or when press, etc were present. What did the book you read have to say about Garfield in relation to Stanton and these reports?

Maj.Gen. Mike Smith
3rd Bde, 1st Div
II Corps
Army of Georgia
[url="http://convolutedmuse.com"]ConvolutedMuse[/url]






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I don't know why the last post's font got so screwy. I even tried editing it but to no avail. Sorry about that fellas.

Maj.Gen. Mike Smith
3rd Bde, 1st Div
II Corps
Army of Georgia
[url="http://convolutedmuse.com"]ConvolutedMuse[/url]