American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

It's about time the U.S. Army named a tank after Thomas...lol...but I suppose there is no going there now with Thomas the Tank.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Phil Driscoll</i>
But what is a fact is that the man who had a need to preserve his 'smaller' army, on more than one occasion '<i>substituted brute force for tactics</i>' and threw his troops into frontal assaults relying on his superior troops to win the day. Malvern Hill, Picket's Charge-shall we go on.[}:)]
As for the conjecture of swapping Lee and Grant it is hard to predict what would have happened. At the time Grant took command the AOP was a battleax-capable of doing a lot of damage but hard to wield. Ponderous, slow to move and react-incapable of traveling light or reacting quickly-in otherwords McClellan trained.[:I] It is hard to see Lee wielding it like he did the ANV. [:)]JMHO

Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

The idea that if the South had fought more of a Joe Johnston type war, conserving its strength for the long haul, is an error. One that Lee saw. He did not think the South could survive a protracted war. The South didn't lose because of lack of manpower but the inability to feed what they had. Lee's view was that the South needed a decisive victory and he entered every battle with that intention. Unfortunately for him, he didn't have the resources to deliver it but he still tried leading to things like Pickett's charge. But saying he was a bad general due to that one overriding mistake to to ignore how often he succeeded. Malvern Hill wasn't an attack he wanted to make as it was made. It was caused by a series of command failures by subordinates. While at Gaines Mill a similiar attack against the Union center broke Porter's Corps.

As a commander in the Seven Days he had more than 100,000 troops under his direction. And, in spite of being still out numbered and poorly lead he cam close to destroying the Union army. Saying his tactics caused heavy casualties is true but if he had succeeded no one would be mentioning that now.

But for comparing generals all we can look at is what they had to work with and how successful they were with it. Lee took a small army with a lot of very eccentric commanders and defended a theater in which he was out numbered by two sometimes three to one for the duration of the war. Grant commanded an army or armies two to three times the size of his opponents with superiority in mobility both due to railroads and river/sea and had to win by starving the enemy out. Grant when stymied like at Vicksburg could show some tactical creativity but he didn't often.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">He did not think the South could survive a protracted war. <font color="red"><b>The South didn't lose because of lack of manpower but the inability to feed what they had.</b></font id="red"> Lee's view was that the South needed a decisive victory and he entered every battle with that intention. Unfortunately for him, he didn't have the resources to deliver it but he still tried leading to things like Pickett's charge.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote"> As Kennon said in that one sentence summed up the war.

And WHO caused the devastation to not only crops, manufacturing, but the infrastructure of the South? W.T. Sherman.

Geo. Thomas was a classmate and a room mate of Sherman at West Point Class of 1842. (Other classmates were R.S. Ewell and Bushrod Johnson, CSA)

Sherman entrusted Thomas with (something like)20000 to 30000 troops to move back up into Tennessee to deal with John Bell HOOD. Then Sherman took his remaining troops (60000+) and continued to devastate Georgia and then moved on to the Carolinas.

<b><font color="gold">Ernie Sands
General, Commanding, Army of Ohio

ACWGC Cabinet Member
ACWGC Records Site Administrator
</b></font id="gold">

Nathan Bedford Forest anyone?

Col. Brad Slepetz
3/1/III/AoG

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by KWhitehead</i>
<br /><blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Phil Driscoll</i>
But what is a fact is that the man who had a need to preserve his 'smaller' army, on more than one occasion '<i>substituted brute force for tactics</i>' and threw his troops into frontal assaults relying on his superior troops to win the day. Malvern Hill, Picket's Charge-shall we go on.[}:)]
As for the conjecture of swapping Lee and Grant it is hard to predict what would have happened. At the time Grant took command the AOP was a battleax-capable of doing a lot of damage but hard to wield. Ponderous, slow to move and react-incapable of traveling light or reacting quickly-in otherwords McClellan trained.[:I] It is hard to see Lee wielding it like he did the ANV. [:)]JMHO

Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

The idea that if the South had fought more of a Joe Johnston type war, conserving its strength for the long haul, is an error. One that Lee saw. He did not think the South could survive a protracted war. The South didn't lose because of lack of manpower but the inability to feed what they had. Lee's view was that the South needed a decisive victory and he entered every battle with that intention. Unfortunately for him, he didn't have the resources to deliver it but he still tried leading to things like Pickett's charge. But saying he was a bad general due to that one overriding mistake to to ignore how often he succeeded. Malvern Hill wasn't an attack he wanted to make as it was made. It was caused by a series of command failures by subordinates. While at Gaines Mill a similiar attack against the Union center broke Porter's Corps.

As a commander in the Seven Days he had more than 100,000 troops under his direction. And, in spite of being still out numbered and poorly lead he cam close to destroying the Union army. Saying his tactics caused heavy casualties is true but if he had succeeded no one would be mentioning that now.

But for comparing generals all we can look at is what they had to work with and how successful they were with it. Lee took a small army with a lot of very eccentric commanders and defended a theater in which he was out numbered by two sometimes three to one for the duration of the war. Grant commanded an army or armies two to three times the size of his opponents with superiority in mobility both due to railroads and river/sea and had to win by starving the enemy out. Grant when stymied like at Vicksburg could show some tactical creativity but he didn't often.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

First, my hat's off to General Whitehead for apparently being the only Confederate officer to stand up and defend General Lee. I can remember the day when I would have said that and the chairs and whiskey bottles would have been flying. Now most of this thread is taken up by Union officers debating which Union General was the best. What a sad state of affairs our foe has reached. [:(]
Now to dispute General Whitehead's arguments. The first thing that struck me as odd was his claim about how outnumbererd Lee was and what a numerical superiority that Grant had in their battles. I did a quick search, of Wikipedia I must admit but I think the numbers should be fairly close, of the number of troops involved in each General's battles. Here is what I found with the attackers ratio to defenders listed.

Peninsula: ANV=90,000 AoP=105,000 .86 to 1
2nd Bull Run: ANV=55,000 AoP=77,000 .72 to 1
Antietam: ANV=45,000 AoP=87,000 1.94 to 1
Fredericksburg: ANV=72,000 AoP=87,00 1.21 to 1
Gettysburg: ANV=72,000 AoP=94,000 .77 to 1
Wilderness: ANV=61,000 AoP=102,000 1.68 to 1
Spotsylvania: ANV=52,000 AOP=100,000 1.93 to 1
Cold Harbor: ANV=62,000 AoP=108,000 1.75 to 1
Fort Donelson: CSA=16,000 USA=25,000 1.57 to 1
Shiloh: CSA=45,000 USA=49,000 .92 to 1
Vicksburg: CSA=36,000 USA=72,000 2 to 1
Chattanooga: CSA=44,000 USA=56,000 1.28 to 1

Once again these numbers may not be exact but they should provide a close enough approximation to see tha only one time did Grant achieve a 2 to 1 superiority and never a 3 to 1. Conversely Lee was never outnumbered 2 or 3 to 1. Now consider that in several of Lee's victories he was attacked while occupying prepared defenses (Cold Harbor, Antietam, Fredricksburg) where conventional wisdom dictates that the attacker have a 3 to 1 advantage, which they didn't achieve. You could also argue that neither one faced the first team of the other until the Overland Campaign of 1864. Once again the Union is on the attack in this campaign without that 3 to 1 advantage. Lee and Grant fought that campaign to amounted to a series of bloody draws until Grant outmaneuvered Lee which led to the siege of Petersburg. This is where the crumbling economy and transportation system of the Confederacy let Lee down and the Union superiority in logistics and finally numbers began to tell. If you look at Lee's campaigns he only once made an attack that was a clear victory, but not decisive (2nd Bull Run) and even that did not decide the campaign. Grant meanwhile, managed to force the surrender of two Confederate Armies and shatter a third. If you examine the Vicksburg campaign, which has to be recognized as one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, Grant won through maneuver, not decisive numbers. The CSA is operating on interior lines while Grant has to cut his supply line to operate in hostile territory with CSA forces on both sides of him. The fact that he forced Pemberton's hand and really gave him little choice but to defend Vicksburg, even if he had wanted to abandon it, was outstanding. I think if you put Grant in McClellan's shoes on several occasions the war is over much sooner...or at the very least Richmond falls much sooner.

General Mark Nelms
6/3/IX/AoO
"Blackhawk Brigade"
Union Military Academy Instructor
Union Cabinet Secretary

The generals mentioned also would have been much better if their subordinates would have carried out their orders instead of sitting on their rear ends and not attacking. It's amazing to read how many times a battle would have been different if one general would have listened to their boss and attacked or held a postion that they were ordered to do. Too many instances to even mention, as most of you know.

Nathan Bedford Forrest struck fear in Sherman and Grant (and the north in general). Sherman himself wrote in his autobiography that Forrest could have killed him when he broke thru the union lines, but Forrest ran out of ammo and got shot and still made it back to his lines and survived to fight another day. Maybe someone will correct me, but from my memory, indicates that he won almost every battle outnumbered and deep into enemy territory. He was a fighting machine.

On the blue side, I would have to pick Grant. He seemed to know what it was going to take to beat the rebs and did it his way. It did cost a lot of yanks their lives, but his goal was reached. He also picked the generals who could carry out his orders, ie... Sherman, Sheridan and Meade.





Col. Seger
4/3/VIII, AoS

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">Peninsula: ANV=90,000 AoP=105,000 .86 to 1
2nd Bull Run: ANV=55,000 AoP=77,000 .72 to 1
Antietam: ANV=45,000 AoP=87,000 1.94 to 1
Fredericksburg: ANV=72,000 AoP=87,00 1.21 to 1
Gettysburg: ANV=72,000 AoP=94,000 .77 to 1
Wilderness: ANV=61,000 AoP=102,000 1.68 to 1
Spotsylvania: ANV=52,000 AOP=100,000 1.93 to 1
Cold Harbor: ANV=62,000 AoP=108,000 1.75 to 1
Fort Donelson: CSA=16,000 USA=25,000 1.57 to 1
Shiloh: CSA=45,000 USA=49,000 .92 to 1
Vicksburg: CSA=36,000 USA=72,000 2 to 1
Chattanooga: CSA=44,000 USA=56,000 1.28 to 1<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I was referring to Theater odds not battles. The mark of a great general is that in spite of being out numbered he manages to bring more men into the point of contact than the enemy. The 1862 campaign is a good example. The Union had more than 200,000 troops in the Virginia theater to the Lee's 100,000 (approximatations). Lee through Jackson first neutralized one group and drew off another to defend Washington. He then turned on the main Army (McClellan) who still out numbered him. But at the point of contact Lee attempted to have overwhelming numbers. It failed for various reasons but it showed he throughly understood his profession. He then turned on the now separated and smaller force of Pope and repeated the maneuver with much more success.

If you review all his campaigns the forces Lee had available were significantly less than the Unions but he repeatedly brought more to the point of contact than the enemy. Few of his attacks were successful because of lack of numbers. His failures stand out mostly because of how few they were compared to his successes.



LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by MSeger</i>
<br />

The generals mentioned also would have been much better if their subordinates would have carried out their orders instead of sitting on their rear ends and not attacking. It's amazing to read how many times a battle would have been different if one general would have listened to their boss and attacked or held a postion that they were ordered to do. Too many instances to even mention, as most of you know.

Nathan Bedford Forrest struck fear in Sherman and Grant (and the north in general). Sherman himself wrote in his autobiography that Forrest could have killed him when he broke thru the union lines, but Forrest ran out of ammo and got shot and still made it back to his lines and survived to fight another day. Maybe someone will correct me, but from my memory, indicates that he won almost every battle outnumbered and deep into enemy territory. He was a fighting machine.

On the blue side, I would have to pick Grant. He seemed to know what it was going to take to beat the rebs and did it his way. It did cost a lot of yanks their lives, but his goal was reached. He also picked the generals who could carry out his orders, ie... Sherman, Sheridan and Meade.

Col. Seger
4/3/VIII, AoS
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Forest was one of those natural born warriors. He just never commanded a large enough force to judge how he would have done as an overal commander. A great general has to also understand and know how to get results from subordinates and maintain his army (logistics). The South's western armies seem to degenerate into personalities and bickering making them ineffective. The AoP suffered similar problems.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

As a football fan there is a saying I like: "Players, not plays."

Were the Patriots the best team in recent years because of their coach of because of the players and supporting cast? To hear many people it was the coach, but this year you take away just ONE of their best players (Tom Brady) and suddenly the team is no longer invincible. Coach is still the same, most of the other players are still the same, but the team is not as good.

So it goes with armies. A commanding general is only as good as A) his subbordinate officers and B) the troops he is commanding.

As such, you can only look at each one in isolation and not truly or fairly compare one to the other unless they have identical circumstances (numbers, arms, logistical support, terrain, subordinates, etc.) As such, there is no true way to accurately rank them.

As for Lee, if you have studied him at all you know that he was always an outstanding student in school and at West Point (2nd in his class), was raved about by commanding officers before the Civil War, including his time in Mexico, and was considered a very good engineer and model officer and citizen. What's not to like about any of that? He is mentioned as being extremely well organized, punctual, and efficient. All good traits for an army commander coordinating the efforts of others, which is the army commander's main responsibility.

The South's only hope was a major victory that would cause the North to accept peace, and the quicker the better. Jackson understood that fact. So did Lee. I think so did Scott and Lincoln for the North early in the war, as did Grant later - avoid the big mistake and grind the South down and they will fall no matter what else happens. Lee was able to get a few big victories but never a knockout blow because of numbers and logistics, but he certainly tried.

Would Sherman have been a winner if his role with Johnston was reversed? Give Johnston three armies, better supplies, and better weapons and leave Sherman in the weaker position and I'm guessing he would't have been so successful. Put Grant up against a competent opponent in Mississippi with roughly equal forces and maybe Vicksburg doesn't fall - took long enough to capture as it was. Give Rosecrans better subordinates and maybe he is the great victor of the West instead of Grand/Sherman. Have AS Johnson not listed to Beauregards disjointed plan of attack at Shiloh and maybe Grant is just another failed drunk. We can play "what if" forever, but in the end we never know.

All we can truly ask is did the officer do the best they could with the hand they were dealt?

Lee - yes
Grant - in the end, yes, by recognizing his strength and opponent's great weakness (numbers and supplies)
Sherman - yes
Thomas - certainly
Forrest - yes
McClellan - no
Hood - no
Johnston - maybe
Rosecrans - sometimes, in the end no
Pope - no
Meade - depends on if you count him as being in command of the AoP after Grant's arrival; survived Gettysburg more so that won it
Jackson - yes
Banks - no
Sheridan - yes


Regards,

Lt. Gen. Alan Lynn
CSA Chief of Staff
3rd Bgde, 3rd Cav Div, II Corps, AoA

God Bless <><

Alan,

Playing the "What If" game is what we're all about![:D]


General Jeff Laub
Union Chief of the Army
ACWGC Cabinet Member
http://www.geocities.com/laubster22/UnionHQ/

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by ALynn</i>
<br />As a football fan there is a saying I like: "Players, not plays."

Were the Patriots the best team in recent years because of their coach of because of the players and supporting cast? To hear many people it was the coach, but this year you take away just ONE of their best players (Tom Brady) and suddenly the team is no longer invincible. Coach is still the same, most of the other players are still the same, but the team is not as good.

So it goes with armies. A commanding general is only as good as A) his subbordinate officers and B) the troops he is commanding.

As such, you can only look at each one in isolation and not truly or fairly compare one to the other unless they have identical circumstances (numbers, arms, logistical support, terrain, subordinates, etc.) As such, there is no true way to accurately rank them.

As for Lee, if you have studied him at all you know that he was always an outstanding student in school and at West Point (2nd in his class), was raved about by commanding officers before the Civil War, including his time in Mexico, and was considered a very good engineer and model officer and citizen. What's not to like about any of that? He is mentioned as being extremely well organized, punctual, and efficient. All good traits for an army commander coordinating the efforts of others, which is the army commander's main responsibility.

The South's only hope was a major victory that would cause the North to accept peace, and the quicker the better. Jackson understood that fact. So did Lee. I think so did Scott and Lincoln for the North early in the war, as did Grant later - avoid the big mistake and grind the South down and they will fall no matter what else happens. Lee was able to get a few big victories but never a knockout blow because of numbers and logistics, but he certainly tried.

Would Sherman have been a winner if his role with Johnston was reversed? Give Johnston three armies, better supplies, and better weapons and leave Sherman in the weaker position and I'm guessing he would't have been so successful. Put Grant up against a competent opponent in Mississippi with roughly equal forces and maybe Vicksburg doesn't fall - took long enough to capture as it was. Give Rosecrans better subordinates and maybe he is the great victor of the West instead of Grand/Sherman. Have AS Johnson not listed to Beauregards disjointed plan of attack at Shiloh and maybe Grant is just another failed drunk. We can play "what if" forever, but in the end we never know.

All we can truly ask is did the officer do the best they could with the hand they were dealt?

Lee - yes
Grant - in the end, yes, by recognizing his strength and opponent's great weakness (numbers and supplies)
Sherman - yes
Thomas - certainly
Forrest - yes
McClellan - no
Hood - no
Johnston - maybe
Rosecrans - sometimes, in the end no
Pope - no
Meade - depends on if you count him as being in command of the AoP after Grant's arrival; survived Gettysburg more so that won it
Jackson - yes
Banks - no
Sheridan - yes


Regards,

Lt. Gen. Alan Lynn
CSA Chief of Staff
3rd Bgde, 3rd Cav Div, II Corps, AoA

God Bless <><
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Again I have to say, the same applies to 'Bobby Lee'. What success would he have had if he faced a 'competent' opponent?
And what success would he have had without 'Old Blue Light' and his foot cavalry? What might have been if he and Jackson had not faced a string of 'incompetent' army commanders and political generals in the first part of the war. Might Petersburg and Richmond have fallen much sooner if Grant had been able to dismiss the incompetent generals
he was saddled with? What success did Lee have after the fall of Jackson and he was forced to implement his plans with lesser mortals?
What success did Grant achieve even with lesser mortals?
I know it seems I am knocking Bobby Lee but I am not. I am a great admirer of his and if you haven't guessed US Grant. But I refuse to deify one and on the other hand damn the other for the same things. All I know is this. Grant succeeeded where others failed. He used the resources he had, engaged Lee and his army where ever he found it and seized the initiative and never gave it up and this was the downfall of the ANV.
And this was Lee's failure if you can even call it that. He had finally come up against a general who would not 'dance to his tune'. He was unable to ever gain the initiative and freedom of maneuver that had highlighted some of his great campaigns and without Jackson (and without Banks, Millroy, Freemont, Siegel in charge) the last Valley Campaign and hope of the Confederacy ended in unmitigated disaster.




Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP

Interesting discussion. Here's my take.

I think Lee still has to be the finest General of the war. Grant is close behind though. Were the roles reversed and it was Grant defending Richmond in 1864 he would still have failed as did Lee as by then the Confederacy had already reached exhaustion point.

Hood was the worst Army Commander of the war. He achieved no success at all.

Devil's Advocate time!

Could not some of the Union Generals be forgiven for not holding the trust of Abe Lincoln? By 1864 Grant and Sherman had that confidence but could the same not be said for others. Take McDowell as an example. He didn't want to fight at 1st Bull Run but was forced to it, again McDowell did not want to chase after ghosts in the Valley. But he was ordered to and as a result, lost his Corps. I am not saying that McDowell was a great Union General, but in Virginia, Lincoln and Stanton's policies caused more harm than good in 1862 and a lot of Union Generals suffered accordingly.

Still, getting lost in the woods in time for 2nd Manassas was a bit of a howler!





Col P. Kenney
3rd Division
Cavalry Corps
Army of the Mississippi, CSA

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Phil Driscoll</i>
Again I have to say, the same applies to 'Bobby Lee'. What success would he have had if he faced a 'competent' opponent?
And what success would he have had without 'Old Blue Light' and his foot cavalry? What might have been if he and Jackson had not faced a string of 'incompetent' army commanders and political generals in the first part of the war. Might Petersburg and Richmond have fallen much sooner if Grant had been able to dismiss the incompetent generals he was saddled with? What success did Lee have after the fall of Jackson and he was forced to implement his plans with lesser mortals?
What success did Grant achieve even with lesser mortals?
I know it seems I am knocking Bobby Lee but I am not. I am a great admirer of his and if you haven't guessed US Grant. But I refuse to deify one and on the other hand damn the other for the same things. All I know is this. Grant succeeeded where others failed. He used the resources he had, engaged Lee and his army where ever he found it and seized the initiative and never gave it up and this was the downfall of the ANV.
And this was Lee's failure if you can even call it that. He had finally come up against a general who would not 'dance to his tune'. He was unable to ever gain the initiative and freedom of maneuver that had highlighted some of his great campaigns and without Jackson (and without Banks, Millroy, Freemont, Siegel in charge) the last Valley Campaign and hope of the Confederacy ended in unmitigated disaster.

Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

If we were looking at the last part of the Vicksburg Campaign I would say Grant showed great abilities. In that campaign he showed flexibility and handled his troops well getting them to the right spot at the right time. However, in the Overland Campaign he showed little of this. He demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of how cavalry should support an army rendering it almost useless throughout the campaign. He poorly handled the deployment of the forces under his command. He poorly coordinated the operations of the officers under his command. In almost every battle he didn't he visit the front to see what he was ordering to be done or to see if it was being done. He basically ran the campaign as if he were in Washington. While Lee was everywhere both to inspire but also to make up for the poor quality of the lieutenants he now had, Grant seldom was close enough to hear the firing. Every book I have read detailing the Overland Campaign has commented on his lack of oversight and poor judgement of how far his troops could move resulting poorly coordinated attacks and how poorly planned these operations were. His lack of performance during 64 makes you wonder if he left all his tactical judgement in the West.

As to being stuck with poor officers, Lincoln gave Grant full authority to remove anyone he wanted to including Meade.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by KWhitehead</i>
<br /><blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Phil Driscoll</i>
Again I have to say, the same applies to 'Bobby Lee'. What success would he have had if he faced a 'competent' opponent?
And what success would he have had without 'Old Blue Light' and his foot cavalry? What might have been if he and Jackson had not faced a string of 'incompetent' army commanders and political generals in the first part of the war. Might Petersburg and Richmond have fallen much sooner if Grant had been able to dismiss the incompetent generals he was saddled with? What success did Lee have after the fall of Jackson and he was forced to implement his plans with lesser mortals?
What success did Grant achieve even with lesser mortals?
I know it seems I am knocking Bobby Lee but I am not. I am a great admirer of his and if you haven't guessed US Grant. But I refuse to deify one and on the other hand damn the other for the same things. All I know is this. Grant succeeeded where others failed. He used the resources he had, engaged Lee and his army where ever he found it and seized the initiative and never gave it up and this was the downfall of the ANV.
And this was Lee's failure if you can even call it that. He had finally come up against a general who would not 'dance to his tune'. He was unable to ever gain the initiative and freedom of maneuver that had highlighted some of his great campaigns and without Jackson (and without Banks, Millroy, Freemont, Siegel in charge) the last Valley Campaign and hope of the Confederacy ended in unmitigated disaster.

Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

If we were looking at the last part of the Vicksburg Campaign I would say Grant showed great abilities. In that campaign he showed flexibility and handled his troops well getting them to the right spot at the right time. However, in the Overland Campaign he showed little of this. He demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of how cavalry should support an army rendering it almost useless throughout the campaign. He poorly handled the deployment of the forces under his command. He poorly coordinated the operations of the officers under his command. In almost every battle he didn't he visit the front to see what he was ordering to be done or to see if it was being done. He basically ran the campaign as if he were in Washington. While Lee was everywhere both to inspire but also to make up for the poor quality of the lieutenants he now had, Grant seldom was close enough to hear the firing. Every book I have read detailing the Overland Campaign has commented on his lack of oversight and poor judgement of how far his troops could move resulting poorly coordinated attacks and how poorly planned these operations were. His lack of performance during 64 makes you wonder if he left all his tactical judgement in the West.

As to being stuck with poor officers, Lincoln gave Grant full authority to remove anyone he wanted to including Meade.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

First of all, Grant was not the Commander of the Army of the Potomac and was not responsible for the tactical disposition of it in the Overland Campaign. He was Commander of all the Union Armies and responsible for the strategic direction of the War. His orders were given to Meade(and his Corps Commanders to carry out) and the other Armies. On the otherhand Lee was responsible for the disposition of his forces at Gettysburg (and in the Antietam Campaign) and Lee did/failed to do all of the things that you accuse Grant of being cupable of. It was only the complete vacillation of McClellan even when he knew Bobby's plan that saved the ANV from destruction at Antietam.
And talk about poor judgement-the 2nd day and Picket's charge was a direct result of his failure to accurately judge his own troops ability and his own infexibility and failure to oversee the disposition of the troops. If you are going to blame Grant for expecting to much out of his commanders and the AOP, then you have to do the same for Lee. And Lee had had the Army for years and Grant
had only a few short months.




Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Phil Driscoll</i>
First of all, Grant was not the Commander of the Army of the Potomac and was not responsible for the tactical disposition of it in the Overland Campaign. He was Commander of all the Union Armies and responsible for the strategic direction of the War. His orders were given to Meade(and his Corps Commanders to carry out) and the other Armies. On the otherhand Lee was responsible for the disposition of his forces at Gettysburg (and in the Antietam Campaign) and Lee did/failed to do all of the things that you accuse Grant of being cupable of. It was only the complete vacillation of McClellan even when he knew Bobby's plan that saved the ANV from destruction at Antietam.
And talk about poor judgement-the 2nd day and Picket's charge was a direct result of his failure to accurately judge his own troops ability and his own infexibility and failure to oversee the disposition of the troops. If you are going to blame Grant for expecting to much out of his commanders and the AOP, then you have to do the same for Lee. And Lee had had the Army for years and Grant
had only a few short months.

Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Grant's position relative to the AoP was a technicality. In practice Meade acted more as an aide than as a commander. Grant still was the one that planned the operations and assigned the objectives for each Corps of the armies. His failure was in giving objectives that could not be met by any army and failing to ammend his plans when the failure became obvious.

Lee did fail at Gettysburg to exert control over his army. He failed to recognize the the commanders he had were not even close to what he thought he had. At the beginning of the campaign all had performed if anything better than he could have hoped for. He just failed to see the almost total command failure coming that hit him at Gettysburg. He learned from his mistake though and tried not to repeat it. Grant repeated.

I am not saying that Grant was incompentent but that among the blind the one-eyed man is king. Compared to the other commanders in the North he was far superior but he wasn't the equal of Lee. Take away his numbers and he would have performed poorly against Lee. Better than a Hooker or McClellan but he would have been bested.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)