American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

Since it occasionally comes up as to why the high VP cost of artillery and is it simulated properly in HPS, I pose the question of in the Civil War was artillery all that effective against infantry considering its cost in matterials, men and horses to maintain?

Artillery is pretty useless at long ranges against infantry unless the infantry cooperates by allowing it to fire down the line or they bunch up in columns. The combination of not having real sights, no means to reposition the gun in exactly the same spot after it fires, and ammunition of questionable value against distant targets.

But at short range where canister could be used the guns were deadly oversized shotguns. But applying some trig to the problem some interesting things come up. It turns out that the maximum effectiveness of canister is at around 100 yards. Closer the spread is enough so a smaller section of the line is hit. Further the spread is so great that most of the balls go over or under the target. One hundred yards turns out to be the sweet spot. The math shows that 6.4 of the 27 balls in a canister round will hit the infantry line at that distance. Since a typical infantry line is two rank you would expect about 13 men would get ripped appart by that pattern.

So our first number is 13 casualties for one napoleon at 100 yards.

A gun requires about 25 men to fully crew it, both men who fire and men who support it. So our infantry comparison would be how many casualties could those 25 men do if given rifles and they fired at a line 100 yards away. Unfortunately, this is a hard one to answer. Tests on a firing range would indicate they would easily hit 90% of the time. Throw in penetration and they could easily cause 25 casualties. However, in battlefield conditions the odds of hitting fall off dramatically.

Infantry starts look a lot better as distances close. Artillery's ball pattern shrinks linearly as you go from 100 yards to 0. Eventually the only person it can kill is the man foolish enough to run toward the gun looking down the barrel. The infantry on the other had gets steadily better until they are hitting 100% of the time when they fire. Since the rate of fire is about the same, once per 30 seconds, the infantry wins hands down over artillery.

Not taking the morale effect of artillery into account it would appear the the cheaper to maintain infantry wins hands down over artillery.

_________________
General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

Hi, General,

That is an interesting question.

I believe I read somewhere that artillery was directly responsible for only 10% of the casualties in the Civil War. Yet you read accounts of battles where artillery was decisive, particularly when massed. Most famous I guess was Malvern Hill, but other battles where it had a major impact was Fredricksburg at Marye's Heights, Murfreesboro, where a massed battery decimated Breckinridge's men when they tried to cross the river, and Prairie Grove, where the effectiveness of the Union batteries practically won the battle. I haven't tried to do the math though. Possibly the true effectiveness of artillery was in preventing infantry from trying things more than destroying them when they did try.

I think the modelling of artillery in the HPS games is one of their strengths as far as effectiveness goes. I am not so sure about the point system though, but both sides placed a high value on capturing artillery on the battlefield, even when it could be readily replaced. And the ammo supply system sucks, imho.

_________________
MG Mike Mihalik
Forrest's Cavalry Corps
AoWest/CSA

The 10% number is more or less the average but varied considerably from battle to battle. Unfortunately, only the Union Surgent General commissioned studies and only late in the war when the fighting was rapidly changing. Battles like the Wilderness had almost no casualties from artillery fire. The terrain had to fit the weapon. Fights like Pickett's Charge and Malvern Hill were ideal for artillery. While most of the rest of these battles artillery had limited use. Eye witness accounts are very miss leading since artillery when it does hit makes a big impression.

The artillery duel between Benner's Hill and Cemtery Hill is a good example. The descriptions indicate terrible fire being taken by both sides but the end result was only one gun permanently disabled on the Confederate side.

The Victory Points used in the HPS game for infantry, cavalry and artillery are very close to the relative cost of fielding such units. The expense of artillery wasn't just the gun but all the limbers and horses required to support that gun. Whether the VP value properly reflects the relative value of the guns to victory on the battlefield is arguable.

I think the HPS game system over rates artillery in terms of its long range effectiveness and its ability to maintain fire at short ranges. There are a lot of examples of hitting small targets at long range but overall at long ranges they had almost no chance of hitting man or beast. Without sights, range finders, and ability to return to the same firing position after the recoil, they were basically blindly fired. Probably the most dangereous place to be was near where they were aiming. Who they were aiming at was probably far safer.

The reason I mentioned "ability to maintain fire at short ranges" is that the guns did not carry many canister rounds and the rest of the ammo was useless at ranges less than 300 yards. The typical gun had about 12 rounds of canister which means they had about six minutes worth of fire. Artillery doctrine at the time emphasized their use as a long range weapon not a close range defensive weapon. Since the HPS system doesn't track ammo either by type or gun, we fire for hours at short ranges. The reality was that the guns fired briefly then with drew living the infantry to take care of things.

_________________
General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

Hi, General,

Hope this doesn't stay a two-party conversation.

It is true that artillery had to be lucky to hit what it was aiming for at long range, but the rounds had to go somewhere, and often hit some other target. In "Culps Hill & Cemetery Hill" by Pfanz, it recounts how some of the rounds fired during the prep cannonade for Pickett's Charge, hit the troops around Culp's Hill, 1000 yds away from the target, and even blew up an ammo wagon there. I think range was a bigger problem than deviation though.

In "The Long Arm of Lee", Wise recounts the frustration of battery commanders at not being able to range their guns because the fuses were faulty. This was firing from Hazel Grove at the Union batteries at Fairview, but I'm sure it was universal, at least for the Confederates. Apparently, if the shell exploded as it was supposed to, it would help gunners calculate the proper range. Wise believed properly placed artillery was essential to breaking up charges.

In "Arms and Equipment of the Civil War", Coggins says there were 32 rounds in a Napoleon ammo chest, but doesn't say what the composition of the chest was. But Bigelow, the battery commander of the 9th Mass Bty at Gettysburg, said he fired 3 tons of ammo, including 92 rounds of cannister. That works out to 23 cannister rounds per gun, out of about 100 rds per gun. That would be about two caissons and a limbers' worth. That is about twice the cannister as you mentioned, but I'm sure different terrain led to different ammo configurations.

Actually, in reading about artillery fire, it seems caissons blew up more than guns during an artillery duel, but that is just an impression and not based on any particular research. But there is no allowance for this or for killing horses in the game. Also, no allowance for killing crew except all or none. In fact, Bigelow's Battery lost only 8 killed and 18 wounded even though they lost (temporarily) all 4 guns.

On the other hand, the 21st Miss, against which Bigelow's Battery largely expended their ammo, have losses listed at 18 killed and 85 wounded out of 424 men. And Bigelow's Battery wasn't the only resistance they met, although to be fair Bigelow's battery probably affected other formations as well as the 21st Miss. So the actual damage to the regiment wasn't that great, but the fire probably convinced some of the regiment to take a break, which is a phenomenon that I believe is probably underemphasized in battle accounts.

_________________
MG Mike Mihalik
Forrest's Cavalry Corps
AoWest/CSA

It would be nice to have some additional input. Wish we had some re-enactors who have actually worked with field pieces giving input. Critical variables like how much spread do you get from a canister round determine what range and how effective they are.

As to the number of canister rounds with a battery it varied during the war and also could change depending on what the battery commander thought was the best load out. The U.S. 1864 Field Artillery Tactics manual lists 112 canister round for a 6 gun 12 pounder battery (based on 4 12 pounders and 2 24 pound howitzers). That would give them 18 rounds per gun. Still not great but better. But when you have a quote like Bigalow's it confirms that he could have 92 rounds to fire without having to resupply from the artillery ammo wagons in the rear. For the Union army the army trains contained enough ammo to replace all the ammo chests in the battery once. But in a single short engagement they had to make do with what they had in their own chests.

What makes determining what they had is the difficulty of knowing which gun type they were talking about. The U.S. Artillery manual refers to a 12 pounder in a number of different ways. There was a 12 pound gun, howitzer and light. Somewhere in there is a Napoleon which is also referred to as a gun-howitzer. Depending on which it is an ammo chest contained 6, 8 or 10 rounds of canister. Since a typical battery had one ammo chest on the limber and two on the casson, this gave them 18, 24 or 30 rounds. They could fire a gun every 20 seconds if they pushed it giving them enough short range ammo to last 6 to 10 minutes.

Case are even tougher to determine their effectiveness because they had three variables. The round had to be shot at the target accurately, at the right height to make it effective and the fuse set so it exploded at the right distance in front of the target. When it was on target it was a more devastating weapon than canister. With 76 balls in it instead of 27 it rained death upon the enemy. With bad fuses they were little more than solid shot. For the Union they were the preferred ammo being good against infantry or artillery at 300 to 1200 yards. Against an attack like Pickett's which had depth they were the primary killing weapon. Some battery commanders had Case substituted for solid since it was just as good with a percussion fuse.

The problem is figuring how effective the Case round was. A battlefield is actually a rather empty place except well behind the lines where the wagon parks are. Where the men are deployed their ranks are only two deep. If there are multiple lines they usually kept them well spaced out with a few hundred yards between unless executing an assault. A Case round must be the right height and distance in front the enemy when it explodes for the cone of shot to hit the line. Since it is falling on the troops the shotgun like spread means that most of the balls hit in front and behind the enemy line. Because their are more balls than cannister there will be more hits within the kill zone. But canister is almost fire point blank (100 yards) so the gunner can't miss. In the case of Case there is plenty of room for miss. Normally the gunners would watch the bursts to walk the rounds in but in a battle with maybe a hundred guns from both sides doing the same thing there is little chance they can correct a bad choice of fuse length or firing their gun at the right height.

You combine all these problems with the need for a position suitable to deploy the gun and you wonder just how effective they were.

_________________
General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

This is the 1861/62 specs for the ammo of Union artillary, it shows 27 balls for 12 pounders, 148 for 12 pound howitzer and 154 balls for 3 inch rifled. It also shows the # of rounds per cassion. These are army regs but I'm sure individule units would modify the load. This is per Civi Wa Artillary.com
If this is accurate, it would seem the rifled guns would be much more effective than a Napoleon at close range. Sorry chart didn't line-up perfectly but I think you can still figure it out.


Summary of the Ammunition for Field and Mountain Service
Smooth-bore gun Howitzer Rifle-guns
12-pounder, bronze 12-pounder mountain-howitzer 3inch iron 3.5-inch iron
Shell Case Shot Canister Shell Case Canister Shell Case Canister Shell Case Canister
Number of Shot…." .. 27 ….. ….. 148 ….. ….. 154 ….. ….. na. …..
Weight…………..lbs ….. 14.2 ….. ….. 14.2 ….. ….. 10.75 ….. ….. 17

Packing box
Number of rounds…… 8 8 8 8 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 9 9 ….. …..
Number of primers….. 10 10 10 10 18 18 18 18 18 18 14 14 14 ….. …..

What you are reporting are the number of musket balls in Case or Shrapnell shells which were much higher because they used a smaller caliber ball. The Rifle guns do better with this type because the shape of the shell allows more balls to be packed into them. For some reason that I haven't found Canister used cast-iron shot of much larger diameter. According to the 1864 manual the typical gun (which their category for rifled) had 27 balls in it and a howitzer had 48. This would reflect the relative fire power of rifled versus smooth at closer ranges as depected in the HPS fire tables. They gave a complete table for Case but not for Canister. For Case the numbers are:

32 pdr - 245 balls
24 pdr - 175 balls
12 pdr - 76 balls
6 pdr - 37 balls

Still looking for a table for canister.

_________________
General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

Oddly the high values placed on the guns forces us to keep the guns off the front lines.In a retreating situation it is often incombent to keep the guns back on high ground to use them as support yet not risk their capture. Same applies to the offense as getting them unlimbered in the front can result in nasty losses due to a counter attack.

Now, despite many tales of desperate fights involving guns at the front it is my sense that the guns indeed were set up on high ground behind the lines.In this sense the Battle usage of the guns seems realistic.

As to the high long range casualties caused by the guns. I do have some qualms.

_________________
Lt Col Tony Best
3rd Brigade "Tony`s Best"
AoC

The guns using canister are very effective but alone they will be overrun.

I like putting the 9 and 13 range guns up front with the others behind can as close as possible to maximize the canister shots. You need to make sure you have surviable stacks about 600 plus 2 to 4 guns. Very difficult to break. If you add breastworks it is nigh impossible. At least it will make the assault too costly.

_________________
Best Regards,

General Pierre D.

5th Bde, IV Cavalry Corps
Army of Northern Virginia
ACWGC President 1997 - 2006, 2012
ACWGC Forum Administrator

I read somewhere that troops (especially Confederate) did not like gunners shooting over their heads because of misfires. I would think that cannon in the front ranks or behind breastworks would be more historical.

_________________
Gen. Drex Ringbloom,
AotS ,Commanding

I have had trouble pinning this one down. On one hand a cannon fires more than just a round ball. There are all kinds of loose junk used to hold the powder and ball in place. All this extra doesn't travel far and tends to hit the soldiers in fornt of you in the back of the head even if the cannonball is being fired over them at distant targets.

But then I read Priest's Antietam and there is considerable close range artillery fire going on over the heads of the troops in and around the Cornfield. He describes troops laying down so artillery on both sides could fire over them. Some of this fire was shell at quite close range with vary little elevation between the guns and the men in front. Throw in missfires and unreliable fuses and it looks like it would be difficult.

I just can't find anything documenting the tactic and how they could do it without demoralizing their own men more than the enemy.

_________________
General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

Another frontline tactic was to mask (hide) the batteries until the enemy advanced close then move the guns up to add surprise to the destruction. You can approximate this in the game by placing units in the hex in front of the battery to hide it until the enemy closed, then move the troops back to allow the guns to fire.

_________________
Gen. Drex Ringbloom,
AotS ,Commanding

I have the Maps of Gettysburg book, and it shows guns deployed every which way, except you don't have infantry and guns intermixed. Part of the problem with the igo-ugo format is that enemy infantry can advance up to 720 yards, or twice canister range, without any reaction except perhaps opportunity fire (if you are playing single phase). Historically, when you read about infantry supporting artillery, it did not mean they were intermixed. It meant the supporting infantry was close enough to intervene if enemy troops got too close. That isn't really possible in HPS games.

I read in another Gettysburg book (I think it was Codington's) that a Reb commander threatened to charge his own supporting artillery if they fired over the heads of his men because of a history of shells exploding prematurely and causing friendly casualties. This could be demoralizing.

I think where possible artillery preferred clear fields of fire to their front, especially on level ground, but weren't averse to firing over friendly troops from higher ground. I can't imagine they would try to fire canister over the heads of their own men though, as happens in our games.

_________________
MG Mike Mihalik
Forrest's Cavalry Corps
AoWest/CSA