American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

Have to disagree with your conclusions. Except for use of cavalry Hooker had a solid plan and two to one odds which should have made it succeed regardless of how successful the Rebels were in any single action. All the bad decisions that Hooker made after crossing the river were due to Lee's domination of the initative and the situation. Lee lost more as a percentage of his force since he had to overcome impossible odds. But in terms of actual casualties it favored the South more than any other of Lee's battle but maybe Federicksburg.

Lee and Jackson's tactics in the face of overwhelming numbers is generally considered my millitary historians a brilliant example of using a smaller force to overcome a larger. In the larger strategic picture failure at Chancellorsville would have put Lee back into the Richmond trenches in early 63 instead of late 64.

And Longstreet was critical of a lot things Lee did. However, it was mostly to cover up for how poorly Longstreet did especially when Lee wasn't around to keep him from screwing up. At Seven Pines he should have been dismissed from the army for what he did.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

Perhaps Longstreet's worst sin was pulling political strings to keep his independent command in southeast Virginia when Lee needed him back with the ANV in time for Hooker's spring campaign. His criticism of Lee was probably intended to preempt criticism of himself.

I always thought that maybe Lee should have fallen back to the North Anna river and unite with Longstreet before facing Hooker, but I don't know all of the myriad things Lee had to consider, such as protecting his supply train, morale, terrain, etc. Certainly the terrain
around Chancellorsville neutralized the Union artillery advantage and concealed the weakness of his army, if nothing else.

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MG Mike Mihalik
Forrest's Cavalry Corps
AoWest/CSA

Longstreet did far worse than that at Seven Pines. He not only disobeyed explicit orders but in so doing destroyed the whole attack plan. But even worse was that after the battle he lied to place the blame on subordinates and other division commanders destroying a number of them's military careers. He did the same thing again when his independent western command failed. He couldn't attack Lee directly so he did it indirectly. I never saw what Lee saw in him. I think there were a number of other CSA generals as capable of handling a Corps on defense as he and they certainly could handle a Corps on offense better.

It is difficult to say if Lee could haven't fallen back on the North Anna. That would depend on timing and how quickly Hooker moved. I am not sure how the numbers would come out once Longstreet came up but they were still pretty bad odds. But it probably would have given Hooker the confidence he needed to defeat Lee.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

Chancellorsville is an example of a smaller force overcoming a larger force handicapped by incompetent leadership.

For Lee's plan to work, several things had to happen:
1) Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected.
2) Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive.
3) Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there.
4) when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.

Based on the above, I would say Lee got lucky - very lucky - at Chancellorsville. Despite being in a potentially favorable situation on May 1st, Hooker halted his brief offensive. His actions demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling large formations for the first time. Hooker's subordinates were surprised and outraged by his decision to withdraw to defensive lines around Chancellorsville. What's worse, Hooker left his right flank (XI Corps) "in the air." Significant contributors to the Union disaster was the incompetent performance of XI Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Howard failed to make any provision for defending against a surprise attack, even though Hooker had ordered him to do so. Union cavalry commander Stoneman was a disappointment in the strategic role. During the entire battle, Stoneman accomplished little and Hooker considered him one of the principal reasons for the Union defeat at Chancellorsville.

I would categorize Lee at Chancellorsville as being audacious, bold, daring and his deployments as very risky. Lee violated one of the generally accepted principles of war and divided his force in the face of a superior enemy. I do not consider Lee's decisions as "briliant" because the Confederate victory was in large part due to dismal Union leadership. Lee, with a significant loss of 22% of his force, did not succeeded in destroying the AotP as a fighting entity, merely foiled Hooker's plans. It is doubtful anyone could have performed worse than Hooker at Chancellorsville. Aggressive and confident Union commanders like Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, Thomas.. would certainly have done much better.



I don't necessarily agree with Longstreet's criticism of Leet at Chancellorsville. It cannot be denied that Lee gambled heavily at Chancellorsville and won. As I said, I don't know what alternative - if any - Longstreet recommended or suggested. Another defensive battle like Fredericksburg? However, Longstreet's criticism of Lee at Gettysburg certainly had some merit.[background=][/background]

Here is another quote from Sherman:



It is easy to be an armchair general with 20/20 hindsight, but leaders like Sherman ascribed Grant to be are pretty rare.

I believe Lee took a lot of risks during the war based on the personalities of the generals he faced, not because he wanted to but because he felt he had to. Seems he was pretty good at reading his opponents, because he served with many of them before the war. I doubt there would have been a battle at Antietam if Lee hadn't had the bad luck on McClellan obtaining a copy of his orders.

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MG Mike Mihalik
Forrest's Cavalry Corps
AoWest/CSA

affirmative. That's what made Lee an excellent commander - he was aggressive, and unlike Joe Johnston, not afraid to take risks. His personal integrity cannot be questioned. He was not an egomaniac driven by vanity or seeking personal glory, Lee took responsibilty for his actions, did not look for scapegoats to blame. I doubt if anyone could have done better, given the limited manpower and material resources he had to work with. However, All circumstances being equal - and the Union soldier was always equal to the Confederate soldier - then in the long run the larger (i.e. stronger) force SHOULD win! If it doesn't, as was the case at Chancellorsville, then it can only be due to faulty leadership.

Lee made his luck. We see it with 20/20 hindsight as luck but at the time it was accurate estimation of how his opponent would react to his aggressiveness. That they did exactly what he wanted them to do is a measure of how well he knew his enemy, not luck. Willingness to take a risk to turn a stalemate into a victory. It is what makes the difference be a Johnson and a Lee. It works most of the time. When it doesn't work you get a Gettysburg.

And as for Longstreet, his handling of his Corps is one of the reason Lee had such poor choices for his attacks. His basic criticism is that because he dragged his feet and didn't get into position for the attack so there would be enough daylight for it to suceed, he made me attack anyway. Although in the case of Gettysburg I put more blame on Stuart than any other general. All of his Corps commanders failed one way or another. Lee has to take blame for not realizing those failure had undermined any chance of success and he needed to cut his loses.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

General Whitehead <salute>

Suh, my compliments!

I'm curious to know exactly how General Stuart deserves the most blame for Gettysburg. I do not present this as opposition of your thoughts, only to learn as you are probably better versed in the campaign than I am.

From what I've read, General Stuart's route was approved in advance by General Lee. General Stuart's difficulty with rejoining the army lay not in "getting his name in the papers" (from "Gettysburg"), but primarily with the Yank Army not cooperating by advancing far more swiftly than had been previously seen; they lay between him and rejoining the army. General Lee also had the remainder of the Confederate cavalry available to him, they were just not well-employed. This could have been due to General Stuart being away, perhaps another officer should have been appointed to coordinate the cavalry movements since it was known that Stuart would be away?

I look forward to your reply,

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary

Stuart's primary duty in the campaign was to keep Lee informed about the movements of the Union army. Everything else was secondary. Stuart completely failed in this duty regardless of the reason he used for basically taking his command out of the campaign. Lee gave him options but only if he could carry out his primary duty.

The reason I say it was the determining factor in the campaign is almost every decision Lee made was effected by a of lack of information about where the enemy was. He could not concentrate quickly or attack early on the first day because he didn't know what he faced or how close his own troops were. Cavalry should have been leading the way to Gettysburg not infantry. His decissions on day two all were based on almost no information about what he faced, where they were positioned and what forces we still not on the field. Another function of cavalry.

To illustrate the difference between cavalry doing its job and Stuart, look at Meade. On the day before the battle Meade had the correct location of every division in Lee's army. And he had a division of cavalry screening his lead formations at Gettysburg. This allowed Meade to start on the day before moving his scattered army toward the right place. Lee spent that day in basically uncoordinated moves that caused one division to end up heading to Gettysburg to get shoes. While three division move west just north of it unknowing that they needed to be headed there.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

General Whitehead <salute>

Suh, my compliments!

I did some reading today of different articles, some by researchers and some published by officers in the CSA, and it is interesting reading to say the least. General Lee's orders to Stuart seem to have been join the right of Ewell's Corps with the three brigades, regardless of the route actually taken. The route taken was approved by General Lee under certain conditions, and General Longstreet seems to have seen some benefit in the route as well. Perhaps worthy of additional reading and research.

One argument I saw by Colonel Moseby, disputed by others for his defense of Stuart's actions, placed the blame for the Battle of Gettysburg squarely on General Hill for initiating a general engagement by his actions on day 1 despite orders from General Lee that this was not to occur. I did find his argument persuasive and would be interested to hear your thoughts on that subject.

Highest regards

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary

For what it's worth, the Confederate government wanted Lee to reduce Union pressure threatening their garrison at Vicksburg, Mississippi, but he declined their suggestions to send troops to provide direct aid, arguing for the value of a concentrated blow in the Northeast.

Gettysburg Campaign:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettysburg_Campaign

The following is based on Wert's biography of Stuart, "Cavalryman of the Lost Cause".

Longstreet forwarded the following orders from Lee along with a postscript:

"If you find that he [the enemy] is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flanks, keep him informed to the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army."

Longstreet's postscript to orders were"

"I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in the rear of the enemy."

Lee in response to this sent a second letter on June 23 5PM:

"If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown the next day, and move over to Fredericktown [Frederick, Maryland]."

This is the order Stuart disobeyed. There isn't any doubt in the above passage what Lee wanted. However, Lee made the fatal mistake of adding his usual discretionary wording in the next paragraph of the orders:

"You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and crossing the river east of the mountains. ..."

Stuart jumped on the second part and ignored the first part even after it was obvious from the fact he almost immediately ran into a Union Corps marching north that "remains inactive" wasn't true.

Lee final report on the campaign included the words:

"it was left to his [Stuart's] descretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward."

On the morning of June 25th Stuart moved through White Plains and entered Glascock's Gap in the Bull Run Mountains. When he approached Haymarket he found the road filled with the Union II Corps marching north. Blocking the route he had chosen for his ride.

At this point Stuart disobeyed all orders given to him.

If he had obeyed orders Wert says "he could have joined Lee at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania no later the June 28th". And, totally changed the campaign.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

General Whitehead <salute>

Suh, my compliments!

The wording of the orders is where the waters "get muddy", so to speak, in my opinion. I am no historian or expert on the matter, however I hope you will indulge my thoughts.

You state the instance where General Stuart "disobeyed" his orders, however also point out that General Lee left it to his descretion to determine whether he could move around the AotP "without hindrance". General Stuart determined he could and continued his operations as he had been given that descretion, so it doesn't seem he so much disobeyed orders as much as overestimated his chances of success within the guidance given him. Overly ambitious? Yes.

I don't believe this is the only instance of General Lee's giving orders with descretion that have been brought forward, namely his instructions to General Ewell to take Culp's Hill (?) if practicle. There is no shortage of critism of General Ewell for not doing so, and comparison to what General Jackson might have done had he been there. Was it possible, and how might that have changed the battle? Had it been done, General Meade would probably have withdrawn to his "Pipe Creek Line" had the day gone that badly.

The Army of Northern Virginia was directed to avoid bringing on a major engagement until the army was assembled, yet Heth's Division went headlong into action upon contact with Buford's Cavalry, followed by Pender's Division. General Reynolds committed to the engagement and things escalated beyond control before General Lee arrived to my understanding. Technically, didn't General Hill's actions disregard the orders given by General Lee? The ANV was to assemble at Cashtown, not Gettysburg, and the excursion to Gettysburg is what created the scenario to follow. Things had grown into a situation such that General Lee had no choice but to follow-up on.

General Lee knew from "Harrison" that the AotP was on the march at least a couple of days before the 1st day of the battle, which is why he ordered the ANV to concentrate at Cashtown. He may have had no information from General Stuart, but he did have information. In addition, General Ewell's corps had been operating in Pennsylvania for at least a few days; did he think that the north would not have noticed this? Had Heth's Division not advanced as aggressively as it did, resulting in General Reynolds moving I Corps to support Buford, the AotP likely would have continued its movements to the "Pipe Creek Line". General Stuart did not cause this to happen, General Hill or some other III Corps officer brought on the engagement General Lee was not looking for.

Do I have this correctly?

Highest regards,

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary

Longstreet and Hill were near Chambersburg. Who ordered Ewell and Early to advance to the Susquehanna River in the first place? Things did not really go badly for the ANV on Day 1. It was AFTER they concentrated at Gettysburg that their attacks on Day 2 and Day 3 did not go as planned. So whose fault is that ? Could Lee not have pulled back to Cashtown or Chambersburg instead of attacking on Day 2 & 3 at Gettysburg? By the time the ANV had concentrated, the AotP had also assembled, right? I don't understand this "if only Lee had been able to concentrate" argument.

It isn't that things didn't go that badly on day 1 but that Lee had no control over events. If Stuart had been doing his job Lee would have known what was at Gettysburg rather than letting one of his division blunder into it. He would have been able to order his whole army to concentrate at Gettysburg on the day before. The I and XI Corps would have been fighting at least six divisions during the morning instead of four in the late afternoon. Lee would have had a chance to destroy a third of the Union army before any support could arrive. This would have been decisive.

Lee did fail to realize it was to late to save the situation on Day 2 and should have retreated but that was not his nature. He also had been pretty successful on Day 1 in spite of everything and had no reason to suspect that every one of his Corps commanders and many of his division commanders would repeatedly fail to execute their duties on that day. Again though, Stuart on the field would have changed the situation. Lee would know where the Union left was. Lee would probably know what Union Corps were on the field and about when others would arrive. He would probably have had better knowlege of the terrain and hopefully could have gotten the I Corps into position much earlier. Longstreet might have had all his divisions instead of having one delegated to guard wagons which was a cavalry duty.

There is no way to really predict how having Stuart screening the army would have affected Lee's decissions but I suspect it would have totally changed all the movements of his army. Just finding out that Meade was in command and the AoP was near cause a drastic change in the ANV movements. This would have probably occurred days earlier and in completely different directions had Lee known what the AoP's movements were during his advance.

That is why I consider Stuart's failure to be the greatest of the many failures that occurred during the campaign. It was the largest and most far reaching of the failures in a campaign that seemed to pile one failure of command after another on the ANV after it crossed the Potomac. The defeat at Gettysburg wasn't due to just one command failure but a whole series of command failures at almost every level of command in the ANV. Each magnifying the one before it but Stuart's was the key one that set the rest in motion.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)