American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

"We are being conquered by the splendor of our own victories!"

So wrote a member of Longstreet's staff to his wife shortly after the terrible actions fought in the vicinity of Spotsylvania Court House. In the twelve days ending with the sharp action of May 19, 1864, the Army of Northern Virginia repelled all of Grant's attempts, inflicting roughly 18,500 casualties at the cost of slightly more than half of that, with several general officers killed or badly wounded. Simply put, Grant was bleeding the smaller ANV to death.

But as Confederate organizations became smaller because of losses, did they also not became more manageable? At least that is my question on this period of the war. Confederate divisions were being reduced by then to around 2,000 to 3,000 men, figures that two years previously would have equalled those of brigades! And while both sides underwent this winnowing from combat losses, it seems as if it were the Confederate forces that reaped a better effect in command management, even though they were losing valuable, experienced commanders in proportion. The ANV certainly became a smaller force, but did it not also become a more reactive and cohesive instrument of war as a result. As the huge Northern bear lumbered about, looking to hug the Southern badger to death, did not the wily, quick instincts of the badger prove an even more formidable obstacle at this time relative to the earlier periods of the war in the East.

Who among us would have then exercised the outrageous choice of sending one third of the ANV's force, Jubal Early's II Corps, against Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley in mid-June of that year? No doubt there were a number of valid strategic, operational and logistical reasons to take such a dangerous gamble. But did not Lee, as he pondered the possibilities, also take note of the higher ratio of command influence within his formations, believing in part that Northern numbers could be offset with a smaller, quicker reacting and combat savvy force? Do you believe that such intangibles were actually in play for both sides during this particular time?

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General Jos. C. Meyer, ACWGC
Union Army Chief of Staff
Commander, Army of the Shenandoah
Commander, Army of the Tennessee
(2011-2014 UA CoA/GinC)

There is the Good, the Bad and the Ugly to what was happening to both armies.

For the Union they could replace their losses and continue to grind down Lee's army until nothing remained. The Bad was that the men filling in the ranks were worthless draftees. The Ugly was the casualty rolls that could cost Lincoln re-election.

For the South yes they became a smaller more manageable force with veterans to the man. The Bad is they became a smaller force with no reserves to exploit any localize victory they made. The ugly was these veterans were being fought beyond their endurance. The best leaders had long since been killed in the meat grinder the war had become. Those who remained were becoming more oriented toward merely surviving.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)

I recently picked up "A Stillness at Appomatox" by Bruce Catton, as well as other good reads on the fierce, desperate fighting of 1864. It is a year I am not as familiar with but I hope to soon remedy that. From what I have read, Rebels had certain advantages, principally the hardened veterans of Lee's Army and experienced commanders to be sure but the excellent engineering dept of the ANV as well. Another thing to look at is the limitations of the era as far as in coordinating assaults. Many of the 1864 battles occured in heavily wooded areas, and the command burdens of coordinating 100,000+ in an offensive was enormous. Armies of that scale were much more difficult to move and maneuver than 50,000 in a defensive posture behind strong fortifications. Lee could keep a small reserve and shore up any breakthrough in this fashion.
I kind of see it as a sort of law of diminishing returns once the Federal Army reach a certain size. You gained very little extra offensive punch in the jump from say 80,000 to 100,000. Those extra 20,000 mainly were just held in reserve and did little to further assaults. They were handy in bleeding an army dry though.
The departure of II Corps under Early was certainly bold. One last chance to regain an initiative anywhere he could at that stage I believe.

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Lt. Col Joe R. Matthews
6th Brigade/3/III
Army of Northern VA