The following is taken from the book, The Gettysburg Nobody Knows, edited by Gabor S. Boritt (Oxford University Press, New York, 1997). It is an anthology of contributing works on the Battle of Gettysburg from various authors. The excerpt quoted comes from the first chapter entitled, The Common Soldier's Gettysburg Campaign, by Joseph T. Glatthaar.
"A few weeks after the battle, tests undertaken by the Confederate Ordnance Department indictated some problems that may have been an influential factor in the outcome of the fight on July 3. Complaints of the premature expolsion of some shells during the Battle of Chancellorsville led to an investigation of ammunition produced at all Confederate arsenals. From mid-July through January the next year, disturbing results trickled in: there was a lack of regularity in the performance of artillery shells and fuses.
"When artillerists fired shells and case shot, they cut the fuses to a particular length. The blast that hurled the projectile forward also ignited the fuse, which burned down and caused the shell or case shot to explode over the enemy position. Fuses produced in Charleston, Atlanta, and Augusta, however, usually burned slower and performed more inconsistently than those made in Richmond. Confederate artillerists simply assumed a level of uniformity in manufacture, that all fuses burned at roughly the same rate.
"As experienced gunners, they had estimated the target distances correctly. Although some batteries may have cut the fuses a little bit longer, to protect themselves against premature explosions, in most instances they employed fuses for the proper length of shells manufactured in Richmond. But, because many of the shells and fuses had come from other arsenals in the aftermath of the Richmond Arsenal explosion, the fuses burned more unevenly--often slower--, and the explosive projectiles carried far beyond the Union line before they burst. Clouds of smoke and dirt obscured visual confirmation of the gunners' accuracy, but the explosion of Yankee caissons and damage to Federal guns by solid shot convinced them that they had determined the range properly."
There are obviously a few points in this addressment that might beg disagreement or additional comment. But the mention of the Richmond Arsenal explosion is something that I had not previously known.
The arsenal in question was the Brown's Island Confederate States Laboratory, the explosion occuring on March 13, 1863. It was labeled as the worst wartime disaster in Richmond during the war.
If Lee's artillerists had depended primarily upon munitions from Brown's Island prior to the explosion (indeed, why would they have not?), then following the December, 1862 Fredericksburg action, the ANV's caissons would have been replenished with some of the last available munitions from Brown's Island prior to the explosion. This ammunition, however, would have either in part of in full been used in the subsequent Battle of Chancellorsville in early May. Prior to that time the Confederate Ordnance Department would also have begun shipping non-Richmond munitions to the ANV while making repairs to Brown's Island.
So it seems quite possible that on July 3, 1863, Lee's gunners were coping more than usual with both the intrinsic vagaries of mixed munitions as well as obscurred visual observation of effect. Nothing but field experience might overcome the latter. But was there enough knowledge of the former to have mitigated and advised against Lee's decision to support Pickett's assault with "the greatest bombardment on the continent" seen up to that time?
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