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PostPosted: Sun Oct 30, 2005 2:52 pm 
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http://www.brettschulte.net/ACWBooks/atlanta.htm

<i>The Battle of Resaca: Atlanta Campaign 1864</i>. Philip L. Secrist. Mercer University Press (May, 1998). 102 pp. 13 maps.

This is a review and summary of Philip Secrist’s book <i>The Battle of Resaca: Atlanta Campaign 1864</i>. As I usually point out in cases like this, Mr. Secrist’s book is the only one to focus specifically on the Battle of Resaca, fought on May 14 and 15, 1864. In this early fight of the Atlanta Campaign, Secrist believes Sherman had a great chance to trap and destroy Johnston’s Army of Tennessee, thus ending the campaign before it had hardly begun. Instead, says Secrist, Sherman failed and doomed his Army to a long journey before they reached Atlanta. The book is rather thin at 102 pages, especially when one considers that only Part I (the first 65 pages of the book) is a narrative of the battle. Secrist originally wrote Part I as an article in the Spring 1978 issue of <i>Atlanta Historical Society Journal</i> entitled <u>Resaca: For Sherman a Moment of Truth</u>. Part II consists of the Battlefield from the end of the battle through today, with an emphasis on relic hunting and preservation efforts. The maps are average. On the plus side we have topographical lines on the standard maps, but these maps are of the Resaca area today. However, since the land has changed so little since 1864 (aside from the construction of I-75 directly through it!), this is not necessarily a large minus. The troop positions leave something to be desired on the standard maps. Sherman’s and Johnston’s lines are drawn as one large line, with Corps (and sometimes Divisions) marked off in a vague manner. Secrist does include other maps taken from the Official Records Atlas, but these are pretty small and a little difficult to read. On a lot of pages, text ends early, so this book is really even shorter than the listed 102 pages. On the plus side, Secrist is well-qualified to write the book. He has been studying the Resaca Battlefield since 1958, and is a noted relic hunter. I enjoyed his writing style. The book was definitely not a tedious read. All in all, though, <i>The Battle of Resaca</i> was too short for my taste. It just did not contain enough detail, and only whetted my appetite for more detailed discussion. Sadly, a more detailed discussion does not exist.

Part I of Resaca covers the events leading up to the battle and the Battle of Resaca itself. Sherman wanted a decisive battle somewhere north of Rome, Georgia in order to destroy Johnston’s Army, and he then hoped to enter Atlanta against minimal opposition. Secrist believes Sherman squandered this chance at the Battle of Resaca. Things started off well enough for the Yankees. Sherman sent James B. McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee through Snake Creek Gap, inexplicably left undefended on Johnston’s left flank. McPherson then approached Resaca, a town along Johnston’s supply line, and was expected to cut the Western & Atlantic Railroad in order to force Johnston to retreat. At this point, Johnston would be cut off from Atlanta and would have to retreat through rough terrain. McPherson, given some leeway by Sherman’s order, decided to retreat west to Snake Creek Gap. Sherman believed McPherson had lost a golden opportunity, but he rushed his armies through Snake Creek Gap and formed west of Resaca on May 13. Johnston was there waiting for him.

The battle started on May 14 with an attack on the confederate lines near where Hood’s and Hardee’s Corps came together by the two XXIII Corps Divisions of Cox and Judah, along with some assistance by Carlin’s Brigade of Palmer’s XIV Corps. These attacks went badly, especially on Judah’s front, and he was sacked a few days later for his ineptness. Secrist was not surprised by this failure, saying "All things considered, the limited success of Sherman's brigadiers at the forks of the creek that day was not especially surprising."

As this attack was going on, Hood’s Corps finished coming up on the Confederate right, and Howard’s IV Corps, Army of the Cumberland extended the Union left facing Hood. However, Howard had not been able to anchor his left flank, and Hood launched the divisions of Stewart and Stevenson to try to roll up this flank. The attack went poorly, however. Stewart got lost in the woods, attacked due north, and hence was east of Howard’s flank. Stevenson initially had success, but was stopped by the 5th Indiana Artillery and Robinson’s Brigade of the First Division, XX Corps. Secrist believes this "effort was too feeble to pose a decisive threat", concluding that nightfall, a poorly coordinated Confederate attack, and a generous measure of good luck saved the Union left.

The last piece of fighting on May 14 occurred in the south on what Mr. Secrist refers to as “Polk’s Battlefieldâ€


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