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PostPosted: Tue Mar 19, 2013 7:51 pm 
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Gentlemen <salute>

General Whitehead and I have exchanged a few posts in the "Forrest or Stonewall" thread, and I decided to play with the scenario editor a bit as a "what if" Ewell had either not dispatched Johnson's Division west or sent riders to recall him on the 29th. This obviously requires changing the reinforcement arrival times and locations with the scenario editor.

It's my understanding that General Johnson marched west with his division, the corps trains, and half of the corps artillery reserve. I assume the other half of the corps artillery remained with General Ewell and Rodes' Division, however when I went into the scenario editor to adjust arrival times and locations I noticed that the II Corps artillery never enters the scenario; only the division assets of Early and Rodes. The II Corps artillery reserve is still available for placement in the unit dialog box.

Was this an oversight or did these units in fact never arrive in the field? I suspect an oversight.

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary


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PostPosted: Tue Mar 19, 2013 10:28 pm 
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Hi,

According to Pfanz, Col Brown, the II Corps artillery commander, could find employment for only two battalions, those of Dance (reserve) and Andrews, during the afternoon of the 2nd. He wrote that Nelson, who commanded the other reserve battalion, awaited summons near the college. It said further that three of Dance's batteries were placed on Seminary Ridge on the morning of the 2nd.
The three day Gettysburg HPS scenario shows both Dance and Nelson entering the map at 5:20 PM and 5:40 PM respectively on the July 1st.

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MG Mike Mihalik
Forrest's Cavalry Corps
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PostPosted: Wed Mar 20, 2013 7:23 pm 
Does the scenario yall are playing bring Johnson on the board with Rodes and Early on the 1st north of town?

That could be interesting. But I still think Kennon will win the battle with the Yankee Army. He will get hurt bad on day one but he will come roaring back on day two and three. Keep us updated from time to time.


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PostPosted: Thu Mar 21, 2013 8:27 am 
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Based on the map on page 335 of "The Gettysburg Companion" Johnson would have probably followed Early into the battle. On the small scenario map this could cause the Union a real problem because it would give Ewell the force needed to turn the Union right and possibly cut the Baltimore Pike. In the big map scenarios (7) the Union has a bit more flexibility to absorb the blow and come back late in the afternoon of the second day.

An interesting thing about the page 335 map is the question what would Lee have done if he had Stuart between his army and the AoP and new that Meade was spread out from Emmitsburg to Manchester? At the very least he would have ordered his whole army to Gettysburg. This would have put Ewell coming down the Harrisburg road with all three divisions. But the more important change would be due to the I Corps really only being a few miles further down the road than III Corps. Six divisions should have been moving down the Chambersburg road one behind the other during the first day. The whole ANV should have been in Gettysburg by late afternoon. That scenario the Union wouldn't have a chance against.

And for an even more speculative thought. Would Lee have gone to Gettysburg knowing this or instead attack the Union left at Emmitsburg? With Ewell at Gettysburg to fix their attention and attack by Hill and Longstreet against the left as they moved toward Gettysburg could allow Lee to turn Meade's left and get behind the AoP (between them and Washington). The great move that Longstreet wanted so bad. Stuart's decision to turn right and around the Union army instead of left sends ripples through time.

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PostPosted: Thu Mar 21, 2013 5:25 pm 
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Gentlemen <salute>

I found the II Corps artillery exactly where General Mihalik posted they would be; don't know how I missed them but suspect I was looking at the working file and not the "Historical" scenario.

I've pieced it together so far, however since Rodes and Johnson were near each other with Ewell I have Johnson arriving behind Rodes at the same time Early makes his appearance farther east (1:20pm). I see that General Whitehead posted Johnson would probably appear behind Early, however.

Based on Johnson not being on the Chambersburg Pike, I've advanced the arrival time of McLaws up to 4:20pm instead of 9pm, the I Corps artillery up to 9pm and 9:20pm instead of 4am and 4:20am, and Hood's arrival up to 4am instead of 8am. I believe Pickett's Division was being held at Chambersburg awaiting the arrival of Imboden's Cavalry, so his arrival will remain the same (4:20pm day two).

I was going to use the larger map from scenario .007, however noticed that the units and unit strengths were not the same as the "Historical" battle. Perhaps if it plays well enough I will transfer to the larger map with the "Historical" OOB and strengths.

Historically, I believe Johnson's Division gives Ewell the forces he needs to secure Culp's Hill (wasn't he waiting for Johnson to arrive?) and the AotP deployment to the battlefield may have been altered somewhat; maybe not. Knowing that few actually fight the scenario in the same manner as was actually seen from the AotP (primarily cavalry) it may still prove interesting to play. I've sent to a couple of CSA officers to see if they're interested in play-testing it.

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary


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PostPosted: Fri Mar 22, 2013 9:45 am 
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Depends on what your assumption of the situation is on the morning of the first day. Ewell didn't receive the orders to move to Gettysburg specifically until that morning. By then Rodes had already moved past the road that Early took so came by the shortest way without have to march back to the other road. It would probably be a good assumption of Johnson had received orders to move by the same road as Rodes did instead of continuing west of South Mountain that his division would be behind Rodes. However this would place him still on or close to the Harrisburg Road. I am really not sure which divisions would reach Heidlersburg first. Johnson following Rodes or Early coming from York.

To actually change their entry Ewell would have had to receive orders on the 29th to move to Gettysburg area instead of Chambersburg. At that time Rodes was at Carlisle, Early at York, and Johnson was SW of Carlisle. This would have put all three divisions concentrated around Heidlesburg by the morning of July 1.

Which leads to two other interesting questions:

Based on the original orders why did Rodes even move to Heidlesburg instead of following Johnson?

And, why once there, which was apparently by late July 30th and receiving the orders to go to Gettysburg, why did they sit around most of morning before marching to Gettysburg just five miles away?

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)


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PostPosted: Fri Mar 22, 2013 2:52 pm 
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Robert Frost created a scenario for Corinth 1.01 that covered the discussion on the arrival of Ewell's II Corps, the scenario was called Gettysburg- Change of Plans and included changes in the Union arrivals that also might have happened. Here's is a brief description of the changes that was included with the download.

CONFEDERATE OOA:

• Ewell orders Johnson to countermarch to Carlisle and then follow Rodes. On the morning of July 1st, Johnson’s column is 3 ½ to 4 hours behind marching via the Carlisle Pike. Units are subject to random arrival.
• McLaws, followed by Hood, begins his march to Gettysburg unimpeded by Johnson. They would have encountered Hill’s train, however, so the road is not entirely clear. These divisions begin arriving 9-10 hours sooner than they did historically. Arrival times are random.

UNION OOA:

• Birney’s division of the III Corps is occupying the position held historically by Doubleday’s. They are protecting the Union left flank from an attack via Fairfield. This was a concern of Reynolds and this same anxiety extends to this scenario. Humphreys’ division is to occupy the position along the Emmittsburg Road that will be vacated by the I and XI Corps and will be in support. Sickles has been ordered by Reynolds to these positions and will advance as the battle is joined. A rear guard will be left at Emmittsburg as per the historical situation. The arrival of the III Corps is random.
• The entire I Corps is moving to Gettysburg via the Emmittsburg Road. Marching in its wake, the XI Corps detours to the Taneytown Road and advances in parallel. These arrival times are fixed, not random. Both corps are just off the south edge of the board, and the lines of march have been agreed upon by consultation of the commanders.
• The alternative Slocum exhibits some interest in what is happening up the road. Williams’ division is sent to Gettysburg, beginning a random arrival at 1300. Slocum receives word at 1400 that a major battle has been joined and orders the rest of XII Corps to the field. It will begin randomly appearing at 1600.

All other units arrive at their historical times/places.

If you're interested in his calculations of arrival times you can find the scenario at Brett Schulte's site http://www.brettschulte.net/ACWCGDC/index.html under Scenarios - 1863 East - Norris-Frost - Change of Plans

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PostPosted: Fri Mar 22, 2013 7:46 pm 
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General Miller <salute>

Sounds interesting, however the course of events on the Union side were based on the encounter at Gettysburg. I don't believe the Union was aware that Johnson wouldn't be with Ewell when he appeared, although I suppose there may be information to prove otherwise.

I'm trying to create a "what if" based solely on the premise that Johnson's Division has countermarched and is part of the II Corps attack on 1 July. The AotP deployments and arrivals would remain the same. Historically, this would have probably resulted in a major victory for the ANV.

Game-wise, a different story. Experience shows the Yanks will not sit still with their cavalry to fight a delaying action; they'll seek to hit the flanks of the III Corps advance to slow the march while their infantry moves forward. Your strategy gets a bit more complicated with CSA infantry arriving sooner, I think.

Highest regards,

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary


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PostPosted: Sat Mar 23, 2013 8:10 am 
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Actually Meade's intelligence on the ANV was quite good. The advantage of fighting on friendly territory, general improvement in military intelligence started by Hooker, and the fact that Union cavalry was dominating the situation. Meade had the exact location of every division in the ANV during the days before the battle. Unlike Lee he was not issuing orders in the dark.

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Chatham Grays
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PostPosted: Sat Mar 23, 2013 4:32 pm 
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General Whitehead <salute>

I don't know exactly how good Meade's information was on specific locations, however regardless of this the AotP was still spread over a 20-30 mile front. I might see the fist headed for my face, but if my hands are behind my back there's not much I can do to stop it.

Either way, I'm tinkering with the scenario and hope to have it playtesting soon.

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General Neal Hebert
Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley")
II Corps, Army of the West
CSA Cabinet Secretary


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