Bit've a book, but here goes!
The missing Marshalls.
After Marmont (le Raguser), Napoleon had reason not to fully trust his Marshalls. This was obvious.
Davout, the policeman, was the loyalist of the loyals - he never accepted the Restoration, nor had he sworn any allegiance to Louis XVIII. He was the only one who could be trusted back in Paris (and maintain control). The pity of it is that Davout also never lost a battle! The other Marshalls were all scared fo him and would abey with alacrity - he would've been very handy at Waterloo.
Suchet could be trusted with independent command. Someone had to stop the Austrians.
Augereau & Massena were more interested in counting their loot, (they'd earned it, and some, and were probably too cunning to jump ship from the Burbons while there was still doubt). They hadn't stirred from the South of France when Napoleon landed and while they maintained the Southern borders, were quite content for those in the North to sort out who was boss.
Poor Berthier had died from a fall while watching the Prussians march to the border (apparently it was an accident).
The others were either dead, in retirement, too old or like Macdonald & Moncey, had left the country, remaining true to their oaths of loyalty to the King (they weren't rewarded for it).
The Marshalls Present
Soult had at least held independent command, but as a CoS he left a lot to be desired. Of them all, Grouchy, possibly, could have performed the CoS duties but I reckon he would've been worse than Soult.
D'Erlon wasn't a Marshall yet (I think that he did get to be), but was subject to Ney in any event.
Ney was so obviously suffering from shell-shock it wasn't funny. He should have been in hospital rather than commanding an army (or part of one). He certainly was employed incorrectly; but then, how does one shuffle a Corps to the left while shuffling another to the right...
Mistakes, there were a few...
Not all were French. In fact the Allies' mistakes were legion and with Napoleon's luck on the day would have been just as damning. For a start, why set up on a field without a line of retreat? Wellington did - the only way out was a defile through a forest. OK, see below, they had agreed to meet and they would, but if Blucher had sent word of a retreat from Ligny, Wellington would've been OUTTA there!
A British Heavy Cavalry charge destroyed an early French attack, but was in turn, destroyed by a french counter-charge. The French foot eventually rallied and participated in the action later. the British Cavalry did not. Mind you, they were considered a "throw away" weapon by Wellington (throw 'em in and forget 'em; they're not coming back, win or lose!) What could Wellington have done with some decent Cavalry during the Cuirassier charges of the late afternoon...
Marshall "Vorwarts" was determined, against all military logic, to come to Wellington's aid. That he prevailed spoke volumes. He very nearly didn't make it: Scharnorst and Gniesenau didn't want to go in that direction, that's for sure. It they'd got their way, the Prussians would have retreated. The Prussians did stuff up by attacking piecemeal, but you cannot deny the Young Guard's courage to hold them off as long as they did.
French errors
The first was possibly the most significant error: the artillery deploymet and use. Rain had ruined the battlefield: the artillery commanders had reckoned to delay the battle to the afternoon to allow them to deploy their cannon and the ground to dry out to allow the "bounce" of the cannon balls. Actually, it was more likely incorrect fusing of shell that reduced the effect of the French Artillery - but they all couldn't have been wrong, could they? Some should have gone forward in the attacks and been in action in close range (like at Wagram).
Another significant error: splitting the army. One third is a large number when the whole is outnumbered.
Wellington and Blucher were adhering to a prearranged plan: combine forces; join together and present the largest target possible. Napoleon wouldn't have missed it for the world; he almost did and was a day early! What a difference a day makes: imagine a battle at Ligny-Quatre Bras where the Allies and Prussians are already linked and in place...and can be outmanoeuvred (maybe).
Napoleon did the opposite to the Wellington and Blucher and split his forces after Ligny-Quatre Bras when it would have favoured him otherwise. In the past, he favoured interior lines of action when outnumbered and kept his corps close together so that he could combine their weight against a portion of the enemy's line. His command control was loose, too, with his "open" orders to Grouchy.
Grouchy at least heard the guns (unlike Bernadotte's famous excuse in 1806), but neither of them ordered a march to the battlefield, preferring to "Obey the Emperor".
To finish, and for a contrast, the cammanders on the day acted true to form. Wellington and Blucher operated on the day in the 'old' way: they were in command and did not allow subordinates any independent action. They pointed them and let the arrow loose. Whether it hit or missed was the subordinate's concern.
Napoleon did the opposite and allowed "independent" action, much to his cost.
General de Division Baron Mark Oakford
2e Brigade, 3e Division de Cavalerie,
IIIe Corps d'Armee, L'Armee du Nord
2e Fusilier Chasseurs,
Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde
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