Gentlemen <salute>
Was trolling about through the old topics and ran across this one. In the event General Hulinsky sneaks in a "peak" now and then, I offer this battle summary.
Gator Alley's strategy was pretty simple to begin the battle. Get our forces east and across the Monocacy River line as quickly as possible, as II Corps arrived on the east side and would need the support of the rest of the army. Orders to General Ewell were that he would retain command of any cavalry arriving on the east side of the river obstacle until such time that the rest of the army linked up, and he was to delay their entry until his corps had arrived to prevent the Yankee cavalry from decimating them prior.
I Corps was the first to arrive west of Emmitsburg, and General Longstreet's orders were to march east and force a crossing just to the west of the Harney P.O. These orders were later changed by General Lee himself who rode to the head of General McLaw's column and directed that McLaws divert south to the crossing just north of the Taneytown Pike. The Harney P.O. crossing offered excellent observation and fields of fire to the Yankees, while the southern crossing offered good concealment to approaching forces with superior terrain to position artillery in support. Once a brigade bridgehead was established, the Yankees would be in a pickle to prevent its expansion.
The Yankee strategy evolved as expected, with I Corps sent north to oppose General Ewell. Lutz Schmidt commanded I Corps, and his delaying fight was excellent. In the end, however, it was just I Corps against General Ewell and by the end of the first day the I Corps had been driven back after suffering tremendous casualties, enough so that they were not again involved in the battle.
The Yankee XI Corps was detailed to guarding crossings well to the south, and for the large part were not involved in the battle. Individual units were identified moving north once the seriousness of the situation in the north was recognized, however never in sufficient force to alter the course of the battle. Of note was von Gilsa, viewed moving past the major effort of McLaws to assume positions at the Harney P.O., and then reversing course to oppose McLaws who had forced a crossing by the time he arrived. This opened a second "front", and we may well have delayed for a lengthy period if he had instead moved to directly oppose McLaws.
I have no idea of the original mission for the Yankee XII Corps, however at least 1 division was diverted to engage McLaws after his crossing. The Yankee command seemed to be overly concerned with our intentions toward Manchester, well to the north of the exit hexes at the extreme southeastern corner of the map. Their cavalry was deployed primarily in defense of this and was never a factor in the battle.
Day 1 ended with our forces having forced a river crossing and seriously depleting I Corps and a portion of XII Corps. We anticipated that day 2 would find the Yankee line just to the east of Taneytown, however they instead decided to construct a defense along a portion of the historic "Pipe Creek Line".
Our day 2 advance found I Corps had been detailed to guard against an approach from the north (never considered), with XII Corps entrenching well north of the Taneytown Pike opposite our II Corps. General Ewell was directed to engage at distance with artillery and keep them occupied, but by no means launch an assault against fortified positions on superior ground.
By this time, I Corps was almost fully in place with III Corps directly behind them. General Longstreet was directed to advance east along the Taneytown Pike and maneuver to the north of the crossing, flanking any position established blocking the bridge and denying the Yankee forces the opportunity to delay the column along the unfordable portions of the creek. General Hill was directed to send his lead division in the direction of Uniontown and force a crossing, or at least tie up any opposition from assisting farther north, while the other 2 divisions would follow Longstreet.
In the end, the Yankee II Corps was the only unit facing both I Corps and III Corps. We had also identified a 1 mile gap between XII Corps to the north and II Corps, and couriers were dispatched to General Ewell to advance available forces to exploit that gap, denying any opportunity to assist.
With II Corps facing destruction and III Corps still well over an hour away from providing any help the Yankee command surrendered the battlefield in hope of establishing a defense of Washington D.C.
The final tally: Yankees suffered 17,263 infantry and 1,250 cavalry casualties Confederates suffered 7,902 infantry and 699 cavalry casualties.
Roger, thanks for giving us the opportunity. We miss you!
_________________ General Neal Hebert Edward C. Walthall Division (2nd aka "Gator Alley") II Corps, Army of the West CSA Cabinet Secretary
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