American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

The following was posted by British military historian Gervase Phillips on the academic discussion list H-War (http://www.h-net.org/~war/) in an ongoing debate on battle tactics in the Civil War. I thought it worth sharing in the view of the persistent assumption that artillery was singularly ineffective in Civil War battles (which usually is based solely on the much abused and misunderstood statistics on the percentage of casualties caused by artillery as compared to smallarms ammo in the war).

In his post Phillips compiles a series of reports from the OR where artillery was used with much effect at close ranges on the *attack*--think for yourself what that means for its effectiveness on the defensive. (And then ask yourself if this can be simulated in the HPS games.)

Phillips says:

"Gun crews operating within musketry range did indeed take casualties; inadequately supported batteries were forced to retire. However, the vulnerability of batteries should not be overstated, nor should the capacity of artillery to render effective battlefield service be downplayed. Civil War artillery sometimes fought well forward, in the musketry line, and fighting from 300 yards or less was far from 'virtually impossible.' Even a brief survey of the _Official Records_ quickly throws up examples (note that in all these examples, the artillery is being used offensively).

"Captain McDowell, with the Twenty-Sixth Pennsylvannia Light Battery without works, placed a section of his battery within 250 yards of the enemy's works, and assisted very materially in driving the enemy from General Kimball's right front." (OR: May 1-September 8, 1864, The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign No.78 Report of Capt.Lyman Bridges, Illinois Light Artillery).

"To the right of our army, I took 300 men and a section of artillery and advanced on the Howell and Green's Ferry road to a point where it crossed the main Sandtown road. There I found a breast-works occupied by infantry of the enemy. I got my artillery within 300 yards of their works, and opened with good effect. I made no effort to take the breast-works and withdrew at my leisure." (OR: May 1-September 8 - The Atlanta Georgia Campaign. No.380 -Reports of Brig.Gen. Edward M.McCrook, US Army)

"Battery I, First New York Artillery, advanced with our lines, taking position about 200 yards from the enemy." (OR: January 1 April 26, 1865, The Campaign of the Carolinas No.205 -Report of Maj. John A.Reynolds, 1st New York Light Artillery.)

"The rebels met us on the north side of the river in large force; drove them to the river and across. The section of artillery advanced within 30 yards of the crossing, opening up on the rebels on the opposite side with canister and shell, they being concealed behind a fence and by thick bushes, driving them from the ford up the hill, which was very commanding on their side." (OR: June 23 - July 7, 1863, The Middle Tenessee or Tullahoma Campaign, No.85 -Report of Capt. James H.Stokes, Stokes Illinois Battery.)

"We now came under General Bragg's immediate orders, and our infantry were being hard pressed by the enemy. Advancing the battery in a gallop on a road bringing us on the enemy's left, we came into battery, discharging canister from our six pieces at a distance of 40 or 50 yards, checking his advance and driving him back in the thicket, our troops rallying again. We ramained in this position, using canister freely, until recalled by General Bragg to some other position." (OR: April 6-7, 1862 - Battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, Tenn. No.185 - Report of Capt. William H.Ketchum, Alabama Battery).

"I formed in battery on your extreme left, in the avenue of the camp, and commenced firing with canister from four guns into the tents of the enemy, only some 50 yards off. It was at this point I suffered most. The skirmishers of the enemy, lying in their tents only a stone's throw from us, cut holes through their tents near the ground, and ... played a deadly fire in among my cannoneers, killing 3 men, wounding 7 or 8, besides killing some of my most valuable horses, mine among the rest. As soon as we were well formed in battery and got well to work we saw them creeping from their tents and making for the wood..." (OR: April 6-7, -Battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, Tenn. No.179- Reports of Capt.W.Irving Hodgson, Fifth Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery.)

"The enemy's loss was very heavy in killed and wounded, as as we had the field and saw them piled up and around the fences had a good opportunity of judging their loss. We gave them grape and canister from our guns at 300 yards, and as they fell back through the woods their loss was terrible." (OR: December 15, 1862 - Forrest's expedition into West Tennessee. NO.20 Reports of Brig.Gen., Nathan Forrest C.S.Army)"

As an aside, he seems to have a much better search system for the OR than I have found anywhere. [8)]

Gen. Walter, USA
<i>The Blue Blitz</i>
Reserve Artillery, AoS

There were many instances of artillery being used offensively and effectively. One of the best know examples was Major Pelham's two gun battery delaying Burnside's left at Fredericksburg. The problem is these were exceptions not the rule. The artillery operated under a lot of constraints that limited its use on Civil War battlefield, tactical doctrine not being the least of these.

There vulnerability wasn't the crews but the horses. Artillery would not deploy if they didn't have a place behind the battery for their limbers to be placed that was safe from direct fire. They also had to have clear access for movement of the limbers from the rear to the battery. And, of course the position would have to allow them clear fields of fire to the enemy and probably over their own men. This is why you seldom see the guns deployed but instead sitting limbered up somewhere in the rear of the main line. It wasn't easy to find terrain in America that would meet all the criteria for deploying a battery. Only if they had time to prepare positions could they deploy near or in the battle line like at Fredericksburg and Antietam.

Also, it didn't help that the artillery arm was not given the command structure that would make it effective in either army although the Union did better at this. They were pretty much subject to whatever infantry officer told them to do since they had such low ranks.

The net result in most battles they would have caused more enemy casualties if they had been armed with rifles and put in the line. This is based on Nosworthy's numbers showing the artillery arm had about 10% of the manpower of the army and in the battles he had figures on caused less than 10% of the casualties. In battles like the Wilderness this number falls to less than 3% of the casualties.

Unfortunately, our games don't present terrain in such a way that reflects the problems artillery had. On the game scale there is no way for a hex to indicate that it is good or bad for artillery deployment. Most of the game restrictions to keep you from using artillery as little tanks are artificial like crew kills, disruption, and change of formation costs.

There is no way the HPS system can reproduce the fight on Henry House Hill where both sides deployed their guns in front of their infantry. Jackson's whole fight was a struggle between his men and the Union over who would control these guns and both sides repeatedly lost their artillery and then regained them. But I think both sides also learned a lesson and rarely deployed their guns like this again.

BG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
III Corps, AoM (CSA)

Artillery could be very effective under the right circumstances, such as Malvern Hill, Fredricksburg and Pickett's Charge. But I think the real value of artillery was more in terms of morale than actual effect. I think the reason that artillery caused such a small percentage of casualties overall in the war is that the infantry tended to avoid it as much as possible. Also, a lot of the fighting was done in terrain not conducive to the deployment of artillery, such as the Wilderness and Chickamauga. I believe that artillery effectiveness is one thing HPS got right in most of their games. But I play multiphase with all options. If you play single phase, I can see where you might find artillery to be more of a liability than an asset.

MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by mihalik</i>
<br />I think the reason that artillery caused such a small percentage of casualties overall in the war is that the infantry tended to avoid it as much as possible. <hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Exactly, as I have said over and over on these pages. I have suffered more injuries bumping into other pedestrians than from bumping into vehicles <u>because I stay well away from vehicles</u>, not because pedestrians are more dangerous. Those stats are bogus in that they are not comparable.

Lt Gen Mike Kaulbars
3rd "Freiheit" Division
VIII/AoS

I largely agree with General Whitehead regarding the reasons for the apparantely* small contribution artillery made to victory in the ACW. Artillery was used in penny packets or not at all; the ground often prevented its deployment and proper use; and even if employed, gunner officers often wasted their ammo on barrages at extreme ranges, even on shelling woods on the mere assumption that Rebels might be hiding in there. (HHH often complained about this practice.)

All that however does not mean that the individual battery was ineffective. There is plenty of evidence that artillery, correctly used, could cause nasty casualties and have an even higher moral effect on the targets. Not just massed artillery could make a major contribution; even individual batteries could make superior infantry forces turn and run.

So the artillery was potentially an effective arm, but misused or not used at all. It rather reminds me of a colleague at my former university who constantly called IT support complaining that her printer didn't work when she had forgotten to switch it on.

It would then appear that we are faced, in the games, with the old bane of wargames--an unhistorical shortcut (making the individual battery ineffective)--to a historical overall result (making the contribution of artillery to victory negligible). It's rather like the Reb supermen in the BG games who should ensure the possibility of a Reb victory in the face of enormous Federal superiority, when historically it was higher leadership on the Federal side that messed up things.

But shouldn't in a wargame that gives the player control of the tactical level down to battalions and batteries the proper use of these tools also reap the proper reward? The misuse/non-use of artillery happened on the level that we control, the higher command. Is it already unhistorical when we start using our available tools correctly? Maybe other ways could be found to ensure an incentive for not over-using our artillery? Fixing them in place for periods? (That's possible in the PzC engine.) Limiting ammo supply drastically? Adding a cumbersome artillery train without which the guns run out?

The present solution makes the historical portrayal of all instances of proper artillery use in the ACW (Malvern Hill is only the extreme example) rather impossible. And that I cannot find a good solution.

___

* I am leaving aside for a moment that casualty statistics are notoriously unreliable and that an arm's contribution to victory must not necessarily come from killing men.

Gen. Walter, USA
<i>The Blue Blitz</i>
Reserve Artillery, AoS

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by D.S. Walter</i>
<br />Maybe other ways could be found to ensure an incentive for not over-using our artillery? Fixing them in place for periods? (That's possible in the PzC engine.) Limiting ammo supply drastically? Adding a cumbersome artillery train without which the guns run out<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">Accumulation of fatigue each time a gun section fires (in addition to the fatigue hits incurred when fired upon) might work. We do now have night marching fatigue. The principle is similar so presumably do-able within the current engine. Then you would have to think carefully about where and when you deployed your guns and would be forced to limber them up and rest them to the rear for extended periods. They could then potentially play a decisive role at certain times and in certain places (and be given devastating short range firepower) but still a small role over the whole battle because of periods of inactivity.

[url="http://homepage.ntlworld.com/a.r.barlow/acw/acw.htm"]General Antony Barlow[/url]
[url="http://homepage.ntlworld.com/a.r.barlow/aoc/XXAoC.htm"]Army of the Cumberland[/url]

The following features would certainly be useful:

1./ A gun capture / recrew / recapture feature - this will be more logical than having meleed guns just disappear and it could mean that players will spend several turns fighting over guns.

2./ A proper artillery supply system (like infantry) with the amount of available ammo limited both at the battery level and overall and this ammo sorted according to calibre, etc. This would mean that guns could only fire if the correct ammo was available nearby. No point in having the wrong type of ammo. Also this might mean that a battery might use up all its solid shot and still have cannister left or vice versa. This would force players to withdraw batteries that had run out of ammo, so it's the sort of feature that we really need.

3./ Artillery deployment - the WW2 engine has a feature that prevents guns from firing indirectly immediately after deploying. Surely this could be carried over into this engine and applied to <i>any</i> firing when the guns have unlimbered and are deploying? In unobstructed open terrain this could be say 90%, but a lower probability according to crew training or more awkward terrain.

4./ Crew & horses represented separately from the guns - if these are taken out then the battery would become immobile or need recrewing with infantry/cavalry. Of course the guns would still be worth victory points at the end of the battle. This will discourage players from redeploying in close proximity to the enemy, although the choice will still be there.

5./ Perhaps unlimbered artillery represented by two units - guns and, in the hex behind, the limbers. This would create more clutter to be sure but it would mean that there'll need to be sufficient space for the limbers. Also maybe guns should be capable of indirect fire, with the possibility of limbers getting hit and exploding, resulting in potentially heavy casualties to nearby units.

Col. Rich White
3 Brig. Phantom Cav Div
III Corps ANV

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">The present solution makes the historical portrayal of all instances of proper artillery use in the ACW (Malvern Hill is only the extreme example) rather impossible. And that I cannot find a good solution.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">
Actually, I think the whole game system consists of a bunch of compromises, or solutions, as General Walter puts it, to make it playable. Were the system to truly reflect Civil War tactics, you wouldn't have 1000 men or 20 guns firing out of a 125 x 125 yd hex. After a sustained firefight, nobody involved would be able to see anything in the next hex. Artillery would not be able to shoot at the enemy a mile off when their own men are 100 yards away, or fire cannister over their heads. And the shells they did fire would go somewhere. I was recently reading Pfanz's description of shells from the bombardment preceding Pickett's Charge causing casualties on Culp's Hill 1000 yds behind Cemetery Ridge! I also read awhile back that a Confederate colonel at Gettysburg threatened to attack friendly guns if they fired over his regiment because Confederate shells were so unreliable they often detonated early. I read elsewhere that about half didn't detonate at all. Ernie Sands recently pointed out that skirmishers aren't doing what skirmishers did historically, and he is right. The problem is that you're dealing with an igo-ugo system that operates in 20-minute increments and 16000 sq yd hexes with regimental units of wildly varying sizes. That requires a lot of fudging to make it work. I think the system could be improved in myriad ways, and in fact is being improved slowly but surely. But given the inherent limitations of size and scale, I think the system is doing a pretty good job of generally representing Civil War battlefield operations while still being fun to play.


MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA

Union Col. Wise on the effect of Artillery
"We often hear the sneering criticism that at such and such a battle but 1 or 2 per cent of the enemy's loss was due to the fire of artillery. Any such test is entirely erroneous. Not only do the guns exert a tremendous moral effect in support of their infantry, and adverse to the enemy, but they do far more. They often actually preclude heavy damage from the enemy by preventing him from essaying an assault against the position the guns occupy. Then, again, by forcing the enemy to seek cover, they eliminate their antagonists to that extent...Let us hear no more of artillery efficiency as measured by the number of its victims."
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 1989, p.171



Lt. Gen. Ed Blackburn
II/VI/AoS
"Forward Bucktails"

I think the artillery is finally right in Peninsula now that they have gone back to mostly 6 or 4 gun batteries and you use full defensive fire before melee. It makes it a lot tougher to march up and melee guns using that combination as the larger batteries have a lot more wallop and you've got to think twice fearing full fire trying to melee them.

General Mark Nelms
6/3/IX/AoO
"Blackhawk Brigade"