Dave Stotsenburg wrote:
The Overland campaign was a battle of attrition, that's how Grant fought it. It is what it is...
Grant did NOT fight the Overland campaign as a battle of attrition. He may well have been aware of the balance of forces more than any previous Union commander had been and attrition may well have proved to be a decisive factor, but Grant never undertook to wear the Rebs down simply through relative losses. He manuevered constantly and repeatedly tried to outflank Lee so he could fight a battle on terms of his choosing with the Rebs at a disadvantage. His movements are more complex, more closely controlled and more ambitious by design than McClellans, Popes, Burnsides, Hookers or Meades had been. He differed from any previous commanders in that he was willing to carry on fighting after failures...ultimately making use of the Unions ability to sustain losses.
Cold Harbor gives him a reputation as a Butcher. Grant himself immediately said he regretted the Cold Harbor losses. The losses would have undone any previous Union commander, Grant appeared indifferent to them in a professional sense.
A commander seeking to fight a simple campaign of attrition wouldn't bother to employ complex manuvering and a search for advantage like Grant did.
Dave Stotsenburg wrote:
...Well the French guard can be beat and the opposing armies have A rated units to go up against them. Perhaps your superior tactics aren't that superior after all?
General Wilkes with all due respect it seems that when you win it's through your superior tactics, when you lose it's some fault in the game.
I never found a way to beat the elite French units (though I didn't try to too many times). I found my Prussian army at Jena-Auerstadt was both quantatively and qualitively inferior. I felt I'd been "suckered" into an impossible situation. I held the main French body with delaying action and caught and surprised a section of the French with a flank & rear attack. I found the French A+(+(+)) units pretty much immune to the effects of shock. There was little else I could do to gain tactical superiority further. That was my impression. It didn't seem right to me.
I can't remember the last time I won a battle through superior tactics. Likewise, I can't ever remember claiming that superior tactics were mine only. Any recent wins have been through a dogged application of superior numbers. Any clever movements by myself or my opponent have been rendered secondary to my bulldozing my way through the opposition calmly and always keeping in mind that I probably have thousands more men than the fella facing me.
I've moaned about Gettysburg (and been educated about details there) and I have moaned repeatedly about things on Overland (some OOB's only). I've never complained about the games I've lost at Atlanta, Antietam, Bull Run, Shiloh, Corinth, Franklin or Peninsula.
I have complained about various aspects of the game system but I don't think I've hid behind excuses when defeated.