I just finished reading (finally!) the detailed "historian's view" of this battle. (I call it a "historian's view" rather than an After Action Report. AAR's are written by the participants, and only tell one side of the story - and usually just one small part of that. Strickler's write-up not only included information garnered from communications of both sides, but also came from a detailed understanding of the organization of both sides.)
From Strickler's account, I learned the Confederates had infantry on the eastern side of the river early on. It sounds like the Union was very fortunate. Heavily outnumbered and approaching Hope Ridge could have been disastrous. I seem to remember thinking General Brogden was being overly cautious when he decided to put out skirmishers (when I thought it was important to push to the river as soon as possible). It's a good thing he followed his instincts!
A key thing pointed out in Strickler's narrative was the lack of a road across Crum's Ford. Since the Rebels had entrenched right behind the ford (as they had behind every crossing!), Reynolds' I Corps couldn't simply rush across as we had hoped. Every unit moving across the ford had to pay entrenchment movement cost (whether in column or in battle line formation), and they automatically disrupted. General Brogden had to get his men to recover from disruption and move out - while under constant attack. His grit and determination saved the day.
If the Rebs had had Strickler's knowledge that they greatly outnumbered the Yanks for the first several hours of the fight, it MIGHT have been a good idea for them to have crossed at the Hope Bridge. Given the EXTREME Fog of War from a double-blind scenario, however, I would have done the exact same thing had the brogan been on the other foot. The only difference I would have done (as has been implied by both Strickler and General Swanson) would have been to leave only one or two regiments to block the Toll Gate bridge and use the rest to build a line of breastworks along the eastern edge of Reich's ridge, followed by entrenchments. (The breastworks would protect the men in column building entrenchments.) General Swanson (as mentioned in the write-up) has essentially said the same thing, that he left too many men exposed for too long trying to fortify the lower Toll Gate position.
As for the scenario design, the only change I would make would be to add two more geographic objectives - one far behind the lines of each side. In the War, protecting one's supply line was essential in nearly every battle. Losing that would demoralize an army. So, five objectives instead of three, all beginning the battle in Confederate control. Begin the scenario as it did, with a Confederate victory. The Yanks would have to take two objectives (instead of one) for a Draw, and three or more for a Victory. This would keep the Union side 'honest', forcing them to keep some units in reserve as a rear guard. As it was, we could march all of our forces east of the river with no concern about our rear (well, once all our supply wagons had safely caught up with our lines, that is.
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My hat is off to my partner, General Brogden, and to our opponents, Generals Swanson and Hively, and - most importantly - to General Strickler for putting this scenario together.
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