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Wow! I don't even know where to begin with that. I would have been less surprised had either Dan Sickles or Butterfield been the fellow standing at the podium.
First, he uses Lee's quote that Meade will make no blunders on my front, and make haste to take advantage if I make one on his, to say that Lee meant that Meade will do nothing.
Next, he professes to know what John Reynolds felt the night of June 30th about the Pipe Creek circular, which Reynolds likely never recieved, and even had he seen it, it did not in any way make a move to Pipe Creek mandatory. In fact, if one takes the time to read it, it seems like more of a contingency plan, in case one of the corps ran into a rebel force that they couldn't handle. Reynolds' orders remained to support Buford's command. Period.
He then goes on and on about this withdrawl order. Good grief, I thought that academia had moved past this! Had such an order not been prepared, or thought of, then what if Lee breaks through? The same men, Butterfield, Pleasonton and that crew would have been up in arms because of Meade's lack of forethought. Is it coincidence that those were the fellows that caused most of Meade's postwar troubles, in conjunction with Sickles? I think not.
On to Sickles, and Meade's apparent neglect of his left flank. He ordered Sickles to relieve Geary's division very early on the 2nd. Why would he have thought that Sickles remained asleep in his tent, instead of following the order to move into line, connecting with Hancock on his right, and stretching to LRT? Also, the Baltimore Pike was Meade's lifeline. He could not lose on his right flank, period. Naturally that would have been given most of his attention. It is also curious, that this fellow didn't mention that Meade the Meek was looking at his right as a possible place to ATTACK Lee from. Convieniently left that out of his "discussion".
As a side note, he referred to Sickles position as "swampy". Sure the area just north of LRT would have been wet, and Sickles contended that rebel batteries placed on the Peach Orchard Ridge would have blown him off of his position on Cemetery Ridge. My question has always been...then how in the hell did the Union line manage to stay there on the 3rd, without so much as an attempt by Lee to blast them off of the ridge? I'll tell you why. because he couldn't with the Union holding LRT. (Not to mention, Sickles was a fool.)
Next he went on to say that Meade called his corps commanders to the Liester house to tell them that he was retreating. I have always thought that too much has been made of this impromptu conference. It always sounded to me that Meade was more interested in the condition of his army, and wanted to get it from the horse's mouth so to speak, and called everyone together to get it. I'm almost certain that I read somewhere that Butterfield was who initiated the poll, and the questions. Meade had already telegraphed Halleck that he intended to maintain his position BEFORE the meeting at Army HQ. I can't recall the time of that wire to Halleck, but will be more than happy to look it up if anyone wants me to prove it.
Lastly, the non-attack at Williamsport. It was said that Meade had no regard for the well being of his common soldiers, and that those soldiers WANTED to strike Lee's army in it's intrenchments. Everything that I have ever read, said that those soldiers were very happy NOT to have attacked those works once they got a look at them. Meade did intend to attack them, but was dissuaded by the same Corps commanders who apparently won the battle of Gettysburg without him. He was admonished by General Halleck that "War councils never fight." However, afterwards, it was apparent that those works were very strong, and I'm pretty certain that Lee's troops wanted nothing more than a chance to play their old game of shooting yankees from behind breastworks.
The only argument that I can make is that General Hunt said that Meade, "was right in his orders as to Pipe Creek; right in his determination under certain circumstances to fall back to it; right in pushing up to Gettysburg after the battle commenced; right in remaining there; right in making the battle a purely defensive one; right, therefore, in taking the line he did; right in not attempting a counter-attack at ANY stage of the battle; right as to his pursuit of Lee. Rarely has more skill, vigor, or wisdom been shown under such circumstances as he was placed in..."
Then, as his conclusion he says that the Duke of Wellington advised in 1803 to select your ground before an engagement, (Which he bashed Meade for doing at Pipe Creek.), invite your enemy to it, and you will win an easy victory. And they don't erect statues to might have been's. Was Gettysburg a might have been, or was Lee's army defeated? Everything that I've seen leads me to believe that the Union did actually win at Gettysburg, just as the Allies won at Waterloo.
I told you Drex! Don't get me started! LOL! I am proud of myself for not using any colorful language...because that guy got me all riled up.
_________________ I tell you, I'm ready to go out tomorrow and go to smashing things. - General Phil Sheridan General Rusty Hodgkiss 3rd Brigade Second Division VIII Corps AotS 
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