American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

Gentlemen...

Just thoughts, and questions...


I don't know the campaign very well, I don't have the game yet.

Why did McCellan run? Granted if he'd attacked on the south side of the river while the Rebs were all north it would have changed things, and this has been beaten to death. But, why did he run without fighting.

Then, if he'd just stood his ground and gotten organized on the south side of the river, gotten Porter's (+) troops across... could he have held? I realize a supply base was needed, but I don't think that situation was ever as urgent as Mac made out...

How does the HPS Campaign Peninsula handle all of this? Does it freeze the Union command and "fix" corps?

Thanks,




Maj Thompson
4/3/VIII
AoS

Hi,Major,

I have just started a campaign and don't know how the campaign tree will play out, but I have played a couple of the seven-day scenarios. In the Seven Days scenario, I don't think anyone was fixed, but I think they have a version where that is an option. My opponent whipped me before Jackson could make his presence felt. After the fort at Corinth, which is -60 modifier, the -50 Peninsula embankments didn't seem to protect my men much from concentrated Union artillery fire, particularly if he brings up the heavy artillery. In the second, Beaver Dam Creek-Malvern Hill, Jackson arrived in time and my previous experience helped me defeat my
opponent, but his powerful artillery kept him in the game long after his infantry was decimated. In looking at campaign scenarios, I don't know how the South can win, because I don't think many units are fixed, but since I haven't really played any of the campaigns, someone else will have to comment there.

MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA

McCellan lost the campaign in spite of winning almost every battle in it because he was McCellan. Like Antietam he was always preparing for defeat and wondering where the other 100,000 Rebels were.

Peninsula handles it by presenting the various battles that made up the Seven Days in the order they occur using them as branch points. Most of the one or both sides have substantial fixed forces. Weak points to the game are that some of the smaller battles like the first engagement where the Union tests the south side defenses and Savage Station have affects out of proportion to their importance.

The biggest problem in the Campaign game is that the Union can throw the Battle of Gaines Mill which will save Porter and allow him to win the battles that follow and usually the campaign. Some campaign trees favor this others don't.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
III Corps, AoM (CSA)

If you really want to have total freedom forget the campaign and start with the 407 turn scenario where you start with all forces unfixed and total freedom to maneuver as you see fit. Den McBride and myself are playing it and it has been a blast so far with some unforseen twists and turns.

General Mark Nelms
6/3/IX/AoO
"Blackhawk Brigade"

Your question Major Thompson has crossed my mind many times and after reading a lot of different explanations I came to the following conclusion.

McClellan had political ambitions and could not afford to lose a battle or worse the AoP. A loss would be the death knell of his political ambitions. I believe it was at the core of his decision making. Most of what he said, wrote and did pointed to this observation.

There was absolutely no boldness (a key attribute required to win) in any of his military decisions. In spite of winning every battle and advancing from Yorktown to the gates of Richmond he conveniently exaggerated the Rebel Army size (in case he lost). Lee's boldness unnerved him so he had to leave. Same issues at Antietam were he significantly outnumbered Lee.

He did not get along at all with Lincoln, blaming him for all his woes and why he could not win in the Peninsula. He was not even polite or respectful to Lincoln showing political partisanship at its worst. It is the same today with the Democrats and the Republicans. Time has not changed a thing. I am amazed to see today’s political rants to be similar to the Union Democrats vs. Republican rants during the ACW. General are not above these things.

IMHO

Best Regards,

General Pierre D.
1st Bde, 3rd Div,I Corps
Army of Georgia, CSA

ACWGC President
1997- Oct. 2006

I'd have to concur with LTG Whitehead. McClellan's intelligence from Pinkerton's and the Union Intelligence Service was systematically flawed, and overestimated Confederate strength by 50-75,000, compounded by McClellan and his staff's overinflation of that inflated number.

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Army of Mississippi
Western Theater
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I agree with the bad intel and no real desire to prosecute the war thoughts others have expressed. Little Mac didn't have the confidence to risk much if anything in battles...


General Jeff Laub
Union Chief of the Army
ACWGC Cabinet Member
http://www.geocities.com/laubster22/UnionHQ/