American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

When I got my copy of Campaign Gettysburg I couldn't believe the most debated what if of the civil war wasn't covered. Longstreet's attack on the union left on the second day. What if Longstreet took Hoods advice and flanked the round tops to the south. He could have sent A message to Lee of the opportunity and the change in plans just as Stonewall did at Chancellorsville when he flanked the union Right. How about if Longstreet did not backtrack on his march to the left, their by losing A couple hours. Stonewall kept moving even though he had to expose his line of march. Longstreet's sorter detour was already layed out and roughly cut by A detachment of southern troops that morning. Look at your map A little detour around one high point keeps you out of line of sight of the union. If an officer of Longstreet rank could not adapt his plan to A changing situation who could? The designers did not consider this?

Lt.Ernie Fantini
2/3/V111
AOS

There are some nefarious Rebels who have used this approach in the 3 Day game. Not sure if a scenario is needed for this as it gives it away.

MG Drex Ringbloom,
Cdr, 2nd Div "Corcoran's Legion", VIII Corps
Army of the Shenandoah

The "What if Longstreet didn't have his ass on his shoulders?" scenario. It would be a good scenario and wouldn't be hard to create. Just take the existing 2nd Day scenario and change the positions, release times, etc.

Coming up with a creditable set of "What ifs" will take some serious thought. Hood merely wanted to correction to the axis of attack. Then there is Longstreets refusal to adjust to the tactical situation which had rendered Lee's plan out of date. And then there is the poorly planned march. One can be even more aggressive and go back to Lee's orignial plan where Longstreet was suppose to be in position for the attack at 4 AM. The there is Longstreet's decision on the first day to allow Hill's wagon train to pass before his Corps delaying it an extra six hours. One could probably come up with 3-6 alternate scenarios.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

Ernie says of Longstreet: "He could have sent A message to Lee of the opportunity and the change in plans just as Stonewall did at Chancellorsville when he flanked the union Right"

That's not correct. Jackson and Lee, with Stuart present, planned the flank march the evening before, around a campfire which is now a landmarked "last meeting" location.

Your Obedient Servant,
Lt Gen Dwight McBride
V Corps/AOP/USA

I actually have a scenario or two for this. I think, one where Longstreet makes more of a strategice turning movement on day 3, one that is the tactical move around the Round Tops, and one where Sickles stays in postion on Cemetery Ridge.

Send me a courier, and I'll send one, or all to you.

"General Sickles, this is in some respects higher ground than that to the rear, but there is still higher in front of you, and if you keep on advancing you will find constantly higher ground all the way to the mountains."
-Major General George Meade, Commanding the Army of the Potomac, July 2, 1863

Lt. General Rusty Hodgkiss
VIII AoS
[img][IMG]http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v660/mongohuey/generalhodge.jpg[/img]

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For a great historical perspective on the move, I strongly recommend the book "Twilight at Litte Roundtop" by Glenn W. Lafantasie.

It gives not only an excellent look at the Generals, but also the men who fought in the trenches.

Captain Elkin
1/3/VIII/AoS

It's just like shooting squirrels, only these squirrels have guns

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by DwightMcBride</i>
<br />Ernie says of Longstreet: "He could have sent A message to Lee of the opportunity and the change in plans just as Stonewall did at Chancellorsville when he flanked the union Right"

That's not correct. Jackson and Lee, with Stuart present, planned the flank march the evening before, around a campfire which is now a landmarked "last meeting" location.

Your Obedient Servant,
Lt Gen Dwight McBride
V Corps/AOP/USA
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I believe he is referring to Jackson finding that the Federal flank wasn't on the Orange Plank Road which was the planned route of attack. Jackson found Union troops well across the Road at 2 PM so ordered Gen. Rodes to continue on the Brock Road across the Orange Plank Road to the Old Orange Turnpike adding 3-4 miles to the march. At 3 PM Jackson sent a message to Lee indicating the delay but didn't mention the change in where the attack would be delivered. Instead of a 3-4 PM attack it would be a 5 PM attack.

This is where Lee's method of command shined. He believed his part was to get the men where they needed to be but it was up to his subordinates to exploit the local situation as needed. He didn't believe in micromanaging the battlefield. This system worked great with a General like Jackson who wouldn't hesitate to use his own initiative. It failed miserably at Gettysburg with Ewell showing a complete loss of nerve and Longstreet suffering from PMS.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

Quoting
"Longstreet suffering from PMS.

LG. Kennon Whitehead"

General<salute>

Though the esteemed and honarable officer's observations are most valued, I must disagree.

As General Longstreet says in his book

"Colonel Taylor says that General Lee urged that the march of my troops should be hastened, and was chafed at their non-appearance. <b>Not one word did he utter to me of their march until he gave his orders at eleven o'clock for the move to his right</b>. Orders for the troops to hasten their march of the 1st were sent without even a suggestion from him, but upon his announcement that he intended to fight the next day, if the enemy was there.[ ² ] That he was excited and off his balance was evident on the afternoon of the 1st, and he labored under that oppression until enough blood was shed to appease him."

Longstreet received this letter from CHARLES S. VENABLE

"" GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET:
" DEAR GENERAL,— . . . I did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st.) General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy's position, General Lee came himself to General Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the commanding general is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.
" Yours, very truly,
" CHARLES S. VENABLE." "

The myth that Longstreet dallied is just not correct.

It is true he did not want to fight the battle tactically on the offensive, but did the best he could.

General Lee wasn't himself at Gettysburg, and he surely miss Jackson. If Jackson instead of Ewell is there, it certainly could have ended different.

Captain Elkin
1/3/VIII/AoS

It's just like shooting squirrels, only these squirrels have guns

Longstreet had decided that his plan was right and Lee's was wrong. Apparently forgetting who was in command. While he didn't disobey any direct order he did everything he could to make Lee's plans fail. His actions during Gettysburg were very similar to what he did to Joe Johnson at Seven Pines. I am amazed he managed not to be courtmarshaled for his actions there. Somewhat he shifted the blame to other commanders in spite of his direct actions being the major cause of Johnson's plans failure.

Example of the kind of decisions he made that appear to be intended to hinder Lee rather than support him include:

The really big one of deciding to allow Ewell's Corps wagon train to pass ahead of McLaw. This was a fourteen mile train and resulted in McLaw being delayed moving toward Gettysburg from Greenwood until 4 PM. Why any general knowing a battle was in progress would let a 14 mile baggage train move before troops is beyond comprehension. Unless he wanted his troops to not be avaiable for offensive operations.

The second is allowing his troops to sit in camp near Gettysburg for most of the morning in spite of Lee indicating he intended for them to make a morning attack. Lee had sent Captain Johnston along with Maj. Clarke, Longstreet's engineer, and several others to reconner at 4 AM. If he couldn't figure out that Lee wanted an attack, Lee ordering McLaws to move across the Emmitsburg Road south of the Peach Orchard should have been a good indicator. Colonel Long returning to Lee at about 10 AM reported that Lee stated "What can detain Longstreet? He ought to be in position new!" This plainly indicates that in Lee's estimate Longstreet should have had his two divisions in position and ready to begin the attack at 10 AM not 4 PM. This isn't a small error.

And a thousand small ways from ignoring changing circumstances, refusing to modify plans once force on him even though they were based on conditions that changed, letting low ranking officers make decisions for him rather than exerting control (and in the process taking responsibility) of his troops.

Longstreet did everything he could to defeat Lee's intentions short of refusing to obey orders. While in them selves they might not have caused the defeat they did contribute to the failures. The ANV would have been better served if he had left the field. At 10 AM there was on V and VI Corps to stop the attack, at 4 PM the whole Union army was available.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

Is there a what-if scenario showing what might have happened if the McLaw's division marched before Ewell's train? Approximately what time would the division have arrived?

MG Al "Ambushed" Amos, Commanding Officer
4th "Amos' Ambushers" Bde, 1st Div, XX Corps, AoC, USA

If McLaws had followed Johnson's division in the same manner he would have allowed an hour after Johnson cleared the crossroad before starting out. This would place him on the field an hour behind Johnson's divison.

Since Johnson's division did not get into position until nearly dark and did no fighting on the first day it's unlikely delaying McLaws division had any affect on that day's fighting. It would have placed him closer to the field earlier on the first day allowing his men to get more rest but would still have required that orders be issued for the attack to start earlier than it did on the second day.

As to Longstreet being slow to move on the second day, there is nothing in the official record that indicates he was ordered to start his approach march prior to 11 AM except for the recollections of some southern officers which conveniently weren't published until after Gen Lee was dead and not available to confirm or deny them. It's interesting to note that this information was not brought to light until Longstreet had accepted a position with the republican administration of his prewar friend Grant. The only delay on the second day that can definitely be attributed to Longstreet was his request to wait until Law reached the field to begin his march which was granted by Gen Lee. Longstreet can be criticized for his actions regarding the execution of Pickett's Charge but this business of him delaying his attack on the second day is just more of the Lost Cause myth and the deification of Lee perpetrated by the southern writers after Lee's death. The south would have won the war if only this or that had happened. Well the same point could be made for the union in many of the battles they lost or as my friend Charles is fond of saying to these types of comment on the wargame table "yes and if'n you had a blue arse you could join the circus."



Gen. Ken Miller
3/VIII
AoS

Unfortunately there aren't any written orders to reference but there is a wealth of information indicating that Lee planned for a morning attack. The reference I had was from Gen. McLaws about mid morning. There were other indicators as well including the fact that the plan was based on Union depositions in early morning. Considering Lee had four fresh divisions on hand it would be highly unlikely he would deliberaltely delay until 5 PM when dusk would render the attack indecisive regardless of how successful it was.

The wagon train delay wouldn't have gotten the I Corps into the battle on day one but it would have allowed them to move up behind Seminary Ridge to camp by dark rather than at Marsh Creek around midnight. This would have made them well rested for an early morning attack and only an hours march from likely jumping off points for an attack. By such delays battles are lost.

The battle itself was probably lost when Stuart disappeared. After that the ANV had little chance of offsetting its smaller numbers by outmanuevering the AoP. Lee is to blame for not keeping a tighter rain on Stuart and for not recognizing the state of mind of his priciple Corps commanders.

I just bugs me when Longstreet is praised for being some kind of great thinker recognizing "modern" war priciples to cover for dragged his feet at Gettysburg. Longstreet's western battles showed about how good he was without Lee. His ideas at Gettysburg might work in Virginia where the army was on defense but not in Pennsylvania where it had to attack or retreat.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)

I think there were times Longstreet's performance was lackluster, such as any time he operated independently. But I don't think Gettysburg was one of them.

Lee's plan for the 2nd day was for McLaws to form his division perpendicular to Emmitsburg Pike and attack down the road. This plan resulted from faulty intelligence provided by Johnston that Little Round Top was unoccupied. Had McLaws followed these instructions before Sickles moved forward, his right flank would have been presented to III Corps, and it wouldn't have mattered where V and VI Corps were, because McLaws' Division would probably have been destroyed by III Corps alone.

The real culprit was Stuart, and by extension Lee himself. It is very hard to plan an offensive battle with inferior intelligence, as every Union commander prior to Meade had already discovered. After the battle, Lee reorganized the ANV cavalry into a corps of two divisions, under Hampton and Fitz Lee. I believe that if he had done that prior to the Gettysburg Campaign, it might have made a big difference. Even if Stuart had made his ride, the brigades he left behind would have been directed by an energetic and experienced commander who might have provided the screening and scouting the ANV so sorely lacked during the campaign. Maybe.

Once Longstreet launched his attack, it proved very effective. The eleven brigades that participated cancelled out 22 Union brigades of the III, V and II Corps. Longstreet pronounced it the best three hours' fighting in the war, and estimated casualties of 10,000 Union casualties as opposed to 6800 Confederate would lend some credence to that claim, considering the disadvantages of terrain and numbers facing the attacking Confederates. Try playing the Wheatfield to Roundtop scenario against a competent Union player to appreciate just how difficult a situation the Confederates faced. Longstreet's attack also opened up opportunities on the Confederate left as Union troops were shifted in response. Also, a possible opportunity was blown on Anderson's front as his division pierced the II Corps lines but could not be sustained because Mahone's Brigade did not support the breakthrough.

Lee accepted full responsibility for the failure at Gettysburg, and he was right. It was his command style that allowed his subordinates to react to the situation as they saw it on the ground. But it was his subordinates who let him down. Stuart's failure to provide for scouting and screening; Ewell's reluctance to seize key terrain and resistance to abandoning the inferior position occupied by his corps as a result; Heth's precipitating a battle Lee wasn't ready for, with Hill's concurrence. From my readings, I have come to the conclusion that Longstreet was Lee's most reliable subordinate at Gettysburg, and kept it from being a worse disaster for the Confederates than it was.

MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA

I don't understand alot of this discussion...forgive me, but Lee sends out a socuting party at dawn, several miles, across country, dodging union cavalry patrols, but also expects a morning attack, that he apparently hadn't yet decided on?

Then, let's assume that that notion is correct, McLaw's arrives, and places his divison across the Emmitsburg road and attacks as ordered. Sickles would have been in a position to sweep Longstreet's command from the field...Sickles not having moved out to the Emmitsburg road until afternoon.

Now, giving the benefit of the doubt again to the "what if" theorists, let's say McLaws, or some other Confederate offier, sniffs out Sickles presence on the south end of Cemetery Ridge, and the faulty deployment isn't made. Now, the attack is a frontal attack against Cemetery Ridge. Was that plausible? Could Longstreet have carried that position? He didn't think so on July 3rd, and not one of his subordinates seemed to have been disposed to argue with him. In fact, Lee didn't either, and shifted his focus toward the Union center. In fact, the V corps was available by the time that this attack could have been made, while VI corps would not have been, it didn't play much of a role in repelling the attack at any rate.

Lastly, any turning movement further to the south, is going to extend, and already over-extended line, that has been criticized for the lack of communications that it forced upon the rebs, if it didn't in fact create a large gap between Longstreet and Hill. Granted, this worked out okay for Lee at Chancellorville, but the AoP was under new management, and the battle wasn't in the dense thickets of the Wildernes, where such a gap could be, and was masked by the thick foliage.





"General Sickles, this is in some respects higher ground than that to the rear, but there is still higher in front of you, and if you keep on advancing you will find constantly higher ground all the way to the mountains."
-Major General George Meade, Commanding the Army of the Potomac, July 2, 1863

Lt. General Rusty Hodgkiss
VIII AoS
[img][IMG]http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v660/mongohuey/generalhodge.jpg[/img]

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Freman gives a lengthy discussion of who said what and where in his appendix to R. E. Lee but here is the critical passage.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">One of the best witnesses is Alexander. He stated that his artillery reached a point •one mile west of Seminary Ridge about 7 A.M., and in his official report he recorded the fact that he arrived — presumably on the ridge — at 9 A.M.17 Ordinarily, in Pennsylvania, the artillery marched between the divisions, but in this instance, as the position of the enemy was known, the artillery probably followed the rear division. When the artillery was at hand, the whole of the corps was up, except for Pickett's division and Law's brigade.18

Summarizing the whole case, then, it may be said that Longstreet probably had one division, less one brigade, in rear of Seminary Ridge by 7 or 7:30 A.M., a second division there by 8 to 8:30, and his artillery on the ridge by 9 A.M. It took him, therefore, approximately four and a half hours to bring his corps an average of •five miles, and at the end of that time he had not begun his deployment. His troops were simply crowded together, on the ridge and to the rear, without an extension opposite the left flank of the enemy.

This delay in bringing up the First Corps was fatal to the success of Lee's plan. At sunrise on the 2d the Federals had in position on the field only the I, XI, and XII Corps, and almost all these troops were defending Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. The II Corps began to arrive at 7 A.M.,19 the III Corps came up at the same hour and started to take position on Cemetery Ridge,20 and the V Corps arrived about 8 A.M.21 Before 7 A.M., the Federals had scarcely 20,000 unwounded men on the ground, but by 9 A.M. the number had been increased to 58,000.
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Lee during the night had McLaws, Hood and Anderson's division available to attack sometime in the morning. About 20,000 men. Each hour of delay turned this potential battle winning attack into a hopeless slaughter of good troops. In spite of the worse possible outcome, attacking after III, II, and V Corps plus even VI Corps if things got really bad, the attack drove the Union line back and briefly reached Cemetery Ridge's south end.

But even late in morning when there was little reason other than Longstreet's foot dragging, the Union line was still vulnerable to an attack as Lee had planned it. The III Corps line would not have extended past Hood's right. The V Corps wasn't available to reinforce the Union line since it was still east of Wolf Hill and marching. VI Corps was still south of Taneytown.

LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)