Let's see here...to answer a whole bunch of questions....
Yes. Meade was physically able to go to the front. He chose not to, because, A) He was still considering Pipe Creek as a line, and B) He couldn't be sure that more Confederates wouldn't pop up at say, Emmitsburg. So he, in my estimation, wanted to stay in a central location, (Taneytown), prepared for any eventuality. He christened Hancock, an officer that he trusted, and whom he had just gone over his plans with, and sent him north in his stead. (Apparently a wise choice on his part, as we all seem to agree.) Just as a what-if, how much criticism would he have taken, and still be taking, had he rushed off to the front, and the rebs have shown up at Emmitsburg in force? He'd have been the General that lost the war in a mere 3 days.
To say that he stayed at his HQ for most of the battle, is also, I think harsh. He spent the entire morning on the 2nd, looking over the right of his line. Probably concerned because of the nearness of the Baltimore Pike to his right, and, also looking to strike a blow there when 6th Corps arrived. He then went to see Sickles about, his, (Sickles), inability to find a line. When Longstreet's guns opened on Sickles front, he rode off, and began to send every available horse, man, and gun, and in some instances, some men who were in fact not available, to pull Sickles bacon out of the fire. (At one point, even leading a counter-charge.) July 3rd, I do agree that he spent mostly at HQ, then moving HQ when the cannonade became, um, bothersome, to HQ activities. He did arrive on Cemetery Ridge just as the attack was ending and receding back toward Seminary Ridge. Lastly, I'd like to point to John Pope, a man who had "his headquarters where his hindquarters ought to be".
His alleged failure to pursure Lee effectively, I think, is also a revisionist kind of history. (I can agree that he got off to a terrible start, giving Lee an etire day's headstart. He was overly cautious, and sent out John Sedgwick, a fella also prone to be over cautious, to see what the rebs were up to.) He chose, not follow Lee, but rather, to try and swing around him, and get ahead of him before Lee reached the Potomac. (Much the same way that Grant did at Appomattox.) He was unsuccessful in that attempt, and would have been forced to attack Lee, in a prepared position. I think that the 1864 Campaign offers plenty of evidence as to how difficult a poposition that was. So to say it was a missed opportunity? Sure it was. But after Lee got the headstart, there really wasn't much chance to head him off.
I do agree that he is a character of the Civil War, and even the battle of Gettysburg, more than a leading role kinda guy. I also think this has alot to do with the way he was. He didn't seek credit, or advancement. Didn't look to become famous, and went so far as to throw newspaper reporters out of his camp, because he thought that they were giving secrets away to the rebs. For that he was completely stricken from any reports made by them, and the army was ever after, "Grant's Army". I think that it's a shame that he doesn't get more notoriety, as I think that he was one of the best army commanders produced by the Civil War on the union side.
For a more thorough look into Meade, check out some light reading. (LOL)
Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade
Meade of Gettysburg
Coddington's Gettysburg Campiagn, a Study in Command is another good look.
WOW! Sorry so windblown...but Meade is my guy! LOL!
"We must decide. If it's the wrong thing, we'll find out soon enough, and can then do the other, but we must decide." US Grant
Major General Rusty Hodgkiss
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