Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Mike Ellwood</i>
<br />As for the geo-political considerations of Kutuzov and the Russians it is correct that without a strong France that England would be dominant in the world. Napoleon recognised that, if Kutuzov did too then all credit to him. I believe the Russian Emperor was convinced for a short while of this too.

Why then did they not stay allied with France and Napoleon? This to me is a most intriguing question, as that alliance would have been dominant world wide had they been able to operate as such and destroy or marginalise the English navy.

My interpretation is that Alexander was swayed by the Russian isolation from Europeand, the percieved 'divine hereditary' of the european monarch's 'club' and the ever present short term economic advantages Britian waived under the corrupt and self interest noses of the European powers.

To that end it can be argued the greatest winner from the Napoleonic period were in fact the British. Thus the British strategy ultimately won out over all others. They became the dominant world power.

Fascinating isn't it [:)]

Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry
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Yes Mike, It is a very interesting question how the history roller-coaster could go if Alexander would not be a selfish prick and would actually have listened to the Francophile party (Kurakin, Rostophin, Rumyantsev’s family, Kutuzov and many more– who were all very powerful figures), which advocated that Peace with Napoleonic France, would have far better choice for Russia than war.

Napoleon up until 1812 could not make sense from Alexander’s absurd foreign policy of going into war with France while exactly the opposite would make his country superpower without risks of war. Not surprisingly, French also saw the benefits of this arrangement and there were numerous attempts of the French Government / Napoleon to make a solid Peace with Russia starting as earlier as 1800. However, for Alexander it was just personal dislike of Napoleon above everything else.

Had Alexander acted the smart way along the lines of Peace policy with Napoleon starting from 1801 - I think we could have this conversation in French rather than English - as Revolutionary Wars proved - France cannot be defeated without Russia.

At the end as you pointed out, the real winner of Nwars was GB:

“Russian army gave teeth to British Goldâ€

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by morvael</i>
<br />And what about "General Summer", who killed tens of thousands of horses, even before Borodino?

There are so many factors, but they all lead me to a conclusion that it was logistics and supply issues that bled Grande Armee of 1812 to death. Some were caused by bad decisions of the French HQ, some were caused by good decisions of the Russian HQ, some were caused by weather, some were caused by guerilla, some were caused by untrained recruits, some were caused by poor infrastructure in Russia, some were caused by enormous distances involved. Some could have been solved there & then, but some were unavoidable considering technology & knowledge at that time.

Colonel Dominik Derwinski (LoH, OCR, OE, CV, EM, MM)
Duc de Sacile et Comte de Garonne
Commandant Cavalerie de la Jeune Garde
La Grande Armée - IIIe Corps d'Armée - 2ème Division (Friant)
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Yes, what is the use trying to prove it one way or the other?

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Bill Peters</i>
Yes, what is the use trying to prove it one way or the other?


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I guess the answer is in between these two visions of

“In many ways therefore, the battle of Borodino was a microcosm of the 1812 Campaign as a whole. During which the Russian high command had forced Napoleon to fight the kind of war that suited them but not himâ€

On the topic of the French-Russian alliance, I agree with Alexei.
Alexander had mixed feelings regarding Napoleon: he envied him and disliked him the same.
However, let's not forget that Alexander had come to power thanks to the Pro-British party: the nobility that lived off the trade with Britain.
That party pushed the Czar to wage war vs France as the blocus was damaging its trade. They were the main reason IMHO.

Whereas there were clear benefits for both countries to continue the Alliance. I think they even talked about going to India together for a cup of tea!!

And yes the Russian army was the fiercest to defeat.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Jean-Denis</i>
<br />However, let's not forget that Alexander had come to power thanks to the Pro-British party: the nobility that lived off the trade with Britain.
That party pushed the Czar to wage war vs France as the blocus was damaging its trade. They were the main reason IMHO.

Whereas there were clear benefits for both countries to continue the Alliance. I think they even talked about going to India together for a cup of tea!!
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That’s True.
The assassination of Tsar Paul happened not without a "good advice" from London.

However, there were three Russian parties at that time - the pro-British, pro-French and Russian-nationalistic which advocated that Russia is powerful enough to take its on political course without being pro-someone and Alexander certainly had a choice of the golden middle without falling into silly extremes of war with either GB or France. Of course war with Britain would not be of any economical benefit too but the one with France proved to be A LOT MORE dear.

Russian historian Sokolov in his book mentioned that Alexander could easily play his own independent game and benefit from the Anglo-French rivalry without being involved in war and fighting blindly for British interests. Eventually what Alexander did is he made a Britain a dominant power in Europe and sometime later it backfired on Russia in Crimea.

I assume you speak French so I would recommend you two books by Sokolov:
- The Army of Napoleon
- Austerlitz: Napoleon's Europe and Russia
http://www.amazon.fr/s?_encoding=UTF8&s ... %20Sokolov

I find his books are fun to read, his analysis is very comprehensive, in-depth and very convincing and he is a big authority on Nwars in Russia and I also find his books very objective. Not suprisingly French also recognised it and in 2004, awarded him with Legion de Honour for his book on Grande armee.
http://napoleon1er.perso.neuf.fr/Oleg-Sokolov.html

The book on 1805 Campaign is the best I have read - even the minor 1805 battles are researched and critically analysed in a great detail. Unfortunately, as of now it is available on Russian and French only.



Major Alexey Tartyshev
Moscow Grenadiers Regiment
2nd Grenadier Division
8th Infantry Corps
2nd Army of the West (NWC)

August, (I realize Alexei is probably your historical pseudo)

I read Austerlitz (v. good) and had an autograph signed by Oleg Sokolov during a battle reenactement of Montereau (1814, SE of Paris), where Oleg Sokolov was riding a horse and playing Napoleon himself!![8D]

And yes, continental powers were just pawns to enable England to build its maritime power worldwide, grow its trade and colonies. This has been the basis of England foreign policy well before Napoleon. It also resulted in :
- the creation of Belgium in 1815/30(Anvers harbour was seen as a threat to England and left bank of Rhine was deemed as a good offensive platform or at least it was denying France of a defensive positon behind the Rhine).
- also in Crimea war
- and still today, with its attempts to block EC development which it viewed as a new continetal blocus before integrating it despite De Gaulle initial refusal..

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Jean-Denis</i>
<br />August, (I realize Alexei is probably your historical pseudo)

I read Austerlitz (v. good) and had an autograph signed by Oleg Sokolov during a battle reenactement of Montereau (1814, SE of PAris), where Oleg Sokolov was riding a horse and playing Napoleon himself!!

And yes,
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Are you serious? Wow! I think he is known by the name “Sireâ€

Dobrii den, then,
Yes most serious. I'll see if I can get hold of my photos and post one or two.
Borodino should be interesting. Montereau was a much smaller occasion but Sokolov brought some friends as it was announced that there was a strong contingent of Russian reenactors coming all the way from Mother Russia with smaller replica of guns! [:)]
What was also nice was to see Chasseurs à Cheval riding by cars in the middle of towncentre after the battle. Quite unreal! [:D]

During my daily perusal of new titles at Amazon I came across this one:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/067002 ... d_i=507846

<u>Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace (Hardcover)</u>~ Dominic Lieven (Author)

Looks like it came out last month, how timely indeed.[:D]

<i>Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Lieven, professor of history at the London School of Economics, uses Russian archives as the basis for this seminal reinterpretation of Napoleon's defeat in 1812-1814. Russia's leaders cleverly engaged Napoleon in a kind of drawn-out campaign the French system was least able to wage. Russia's armies outfought Napoleon's, thanks in good part to the courage, endurance, and loyalty of soldiers led by officers whose central virtues were honor and courage. Russian staffs and administrators kept the troops supplied despite the long and increasing distances between bases and theaters of operations. And coordinating the effort was Tsar Alexander II, whose courage, skill, and intelligenceheld together the final alliance against Napoleon all the way from Moscow to Paris. Lieven weaves these threads together with flair and offers insight into the specifics of everything from infantry tactics to diplomatic negotiations. He concludes that Russian and European security were mutually dependent, and that Russia's war was seen by Europeans a one of liberation from Napoleon's exactions and ambitions. While debatable, neither point can be dismissed. Illus., maps. (Apr. 19)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. </i>

I have not purchased it yet but it juste went into my queue. Prof. Lieven seems to be in accord with Alexy's view that the French Army was already destroyed before Gen. Winter arrived on the scene. He gives much more credit to Russian ability to supply, clothe and feed their forces and give Alexander great credit in holding the Alliance together after 1812.

The book covers 1807 through 1814.

I have to say I disagree with much of the above but perhaps my mind will be changed upon reading this book.

Field Marshall
Ed Blackburn
Commanding Second Div, II Corps, AAA
3rd Bn / 1st Regiment of Foot Guards

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by zinkyusa</i>
<br />During my daily perusal of new titles at Amazon I came across this one:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/067002 ... d_i=507846

<u>Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace (Hardcover)</u>~ Dominic Lieven (Author)

Looks like it came out last month, how timely indeed.[:D]

<i>Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Lieven, professor of history at the London School of Economics, uses Russian archives as the basis for this seminal reinterpretation of Napoleon's defeat in 1812-1814. Russia's leaders cleverly engaged Napoleon in a kind of drawn-out campaign the French system was least able to wage. Russia's armies outfought Napoleon's, thanks in good part to the courage, endurance, and loyalty of soldiers led by officers whose central virtues were honor and courage. Russian staffs and administrators kept the troops supplied despite the long and increasing distances between bases and theaters of operations. And coordinating the effort was Tsar Alexander II, whose courage, skill, and intelligenceheld together the final alliance against Napoleon all the way from Moscow to Paris. Lieven weaves these threads together with flair and offers insight into the specifics of everything from infantry tactics to diplomatic negotiations. He concludes that Russian and European security were mutually dependent, and that Russia's war was seen by Europeans a one of liberation from Napoleon's exactions and ambitions. While debatable, neither point can be dismissed. Illus., maps. (Apr. 19)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. </i>

I have not purchased it yet but it juste went into my queue. Prof. Lieven seems to be in accord with Alexy's view that the French Army was already destroyed before Gen. Winter arrived on the scene. He gives much more credit to Russian ability to supply, clothe and feed their forces and give Alexander great credit in holding the Alliance together after 1812.

The book covers 1807 through 1814.

I have to say I disagree with much of the above but perhaps my mind will be changed upon reading this book.

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perfect timing indeed [;)]
I have been a proud owner of this book for the last 10 days and surprisingly this British Professor is very sympathetic to my views [:D]

But what really made me appreciating this book is in-depth analysis of known and semi-known facts. The book is not descriptive but it’s rather an objective discussion of events - which is too often absent in history books. The book assumes some knowledge and background as most of it is really a critical analysis -rather then a list of facts mixed with first-hand accounts for example found in Mikabidze book (The Battle of Borodino Napoleon against Kutuzov).

So far what have seen, Lieven would usually summarise a situation in a few sentences (assuming the reader has some knowledge on the subject) and then he would go into a few paragraphs / pages of analysis of the situation.

For example when in the chapter discussing Borodino – Leiven compares the tactical situations, deployment etc to Waterloo to give a Western reader a perspective on why the battle developed the way it developed. He often provides his opinion on the situation and he justify why, for example he would often analyse the first-hand accounts of both sides – sometimes dismissing them completely or sometimes taking them with a pinch of salt and he would provide an explanation to his judgement.

What if scenarios are also present – for example he discuses the factor of Napoleon’s Guard involvement at Borodino agreeing with Bessieres and concluding that Napoleon did the right thing not to send them through as “Kutuzov’s army would still have got away down the New Smolensk Road and the ultimate strategic outcome of the battle would not have been alteredâ€