Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Don't worry Anton no offense was taken I was just teasing you a little. I know you are a good player.

We will cross swords sometime again soon no doubt in the meantime my dance card is full.

General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Helga! Some fire water here! We have to drink for the memory of Col. Maude, successes of All Blacks and prosperity of those nice birds with unique metabolism (I mean kiwis).[:)]

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<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

I have read his book on Leipzig and found it to be a bit light compared to Nafziger. It's a good primer but then get Nafzigers three books on the whole campaign for some serious reading. Of course I enjoy reading that a regiment was here and 15 minutes later they were here and then 15 minutes after that they were over here. [:)][:D]

Lieutenant General
Ed Blackburn
Commanding Second Div, II Corps, AAA
3rd Bn / 1st Regiment of Foot Guards

Nafziger's books have typos all over. You have to sift through them. Plus he will show you an OB in the back but for the battle will note that the OB was much different. A good example is his OB for the Prussians at Lutzen. Then read the text and he completely changes the ways the brigades were formed. He is a frustrating read at times.

His chronology on the Battle of Dresden just about drove me to jump off of a bridge! [8D] George also does alot of detail on the Allies but very little on the French in the narrative. He will tell you exactly which battalion of the Allies attacked but very little is ever said about the French units. Usually its just a command that is listed. Sometimes just "the French" ...

I wish that Robert Goetz would put a book together on 1813. He really knows how to put things in the proper perspective.

Petre's work on 1813 was my first read of the campaign as a whole. Chandler's of course being the first time I read of it at all.

For Maude's 1806 book - his maps were of help on the game we did. He also had charts in the book that were helpful. I dont think that these appear in the paperback version. You have to get the Greenhill Books version that was put out in hardcover to get the charts. I hope I am wrong on that regard.

His 1805 Ulm work was decent. I found things in there about Ulm that I didn't find in other works.

So all in all we have established that the Russian army is still superior to anything that has ever walked the planet (even the B-1 Bomber) and nothing can stop a cossack charge if caviar is the target ... [;)]

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

Thanks Anton kind words, especially about the All Blacks a subject very dear to my heart. By the way I see the Russians are coming to NZ for 2011 well done.

Now returning to the Tondu I am a Napoleonite for sure [B)] and when I play I do try to emulate his method. Worship no, admiration for excellence yes.[:D][:D]

Napoleon was as flawed as we all are - such is the human condition.
But I still maintain he was the master of war. But as you are Russian it is natural for you to dispute that. The Czar did and won!!

Salute! Helga vodka here for my Russian rival.


General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

'So all in all we have established that the Russian army is still superior to anything that has ever walked the planet (even the B-1 Bomber) and nothing can stop a cossack charge if caviar is the target ... '

Bill that is quite funny the Russian hordes[:D][:D] I am sure will respond - Tongue in cheak gents

General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Experience of Russian army is worth studying just as well as one of Austrian or Prussian. I never heard about studies like that. The only exception being Arnolds "Crisis in the snows". It's a great narrative of events but lacks Maudes' deepness. Hence it treats the actions on the Russian side as a pure improvisation, not the only course of events possible with the known history. As a result I liked very much the part that described the battles themselves but didn't like at all the parts with conclusions. If you have any other candidates, please let me know.

And, Bill, you were quite offensive.[:(!]

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<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Argh the offence!

No war is won without it. So therefore to win we must be offensive. It is the nature of our creed! [:D]

However one key element of armies success, I think is lost on most historians and gamers, is the quality and quantity of junior leaders.

The French system L'Emperor inherited had a huge cadre of experienced and independantly minded officers and NCOs. This enabled the talented to rise and to contribute in no small way to the "fate and fortune" of battle and operations. Particularly towards operationally combined ops utilising widely spread formations from regt to Coprs. "Luck is the residue of design" I have read and believe it to be so.

The other continental (not so much Anglo) armies did not have the same QUALITY in the same QUANTITY and therefore lacked a level of imagination and independence at all levels until late in the wars (1814!)

You can see the same system in operation and in explanation to the German successes in 1939-44.

In the end the armies with the bigger economies won out - both in 1814-15 and 1939-45.

It is also the reason the USA is the only Super Power in the world. They have both the economy and the quantity and quality to prevail in the end.

Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry

Mike .
Very well said .. [;)]

<font color="red">Maréchal</font id="red">
<font color="red">BEECHAM</font id="red">
<font color="blue">La</font id="blue"> Commandeur, <font color="red">I Corps</font id="red">


Prince d` Istria et Comte d` Arles La Jeune Garde

"Toujours féroce,jamais étourdi"

Mike,

section 2.0 of the Club rules says "Friendly banter is encouraged, <b>rude and antagonistic behavior or cheating <u>will not be tolerated.</u></b>"

Are you sure all of your statements are correct? Are you sure that they follow from one another? Are you sure that the idea you mentioned is missed? To my mind it's the second most widely used concept. Second only to "Napoleons genius".

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<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Yes. Im sure.

Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry

Better average quality of low level commanders would mean that the quality of the troops by themselves were better. It would have two consequences: 1. French troops would generally prevail no matter was the Emperor with them or not. 2. French troops would prevail in small warfare.

Was this the case? I think not. Or how can you explain that at Caldiero(1805), Maida(1806), Golymin (1806), Pultusk(1806), Heilsberg(1807), Sacile(1809), Klyastitsy(1812), both battles of Polotsk(1812), Grossbeeren(1813), Dennewitz(1813), Kulm(1813), Katzbach(1813) French tactical superiority didn't allow them to prevail? The list is too long to be ignored. The list contains battles fought against all the major powers. I didn't include those battles from Peninsular campaign. They would make the list even longer.When the French really met forces of inferior quality namely Neapolitan, Spanish, Portugese, Austrian militia the outcome was predictable without Napoleons presence. When the French were engaging regular armies of major powers the outcome depended upon Napoleons presence. For me it's a clear indicator that not in the individual quality lies the cause.

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

<i>1. French troops would generally prevail no matter was the Emperor with them or not. 2. French troops would prevail in small warfare.</i>

Anton I think these premises may be invalid. In the first case good quality troops with qood NCOs and company level officers can be beaten if put in an untenable position by blundering Corps commanders. Many of the battles in your list fall into this category.
In the second case it depends on what the definition of small is. To me to test the premise requires analysis of performance at the battalion level and below. A company or platoon can fight excellently in a losing battle. So the list of actions you cite shed no light on this.

IMO by the very nature of the roots of the French Revolutionary armies (inherited by Napoleon), which were citizen armies where many of the promotion were based on performance and merit guarantees an excellent class of NCOs and junior officers. The pool is larger and the best rise to the top as compared to a monarchial army where this is not generally the case. I think Mike's argument is valid and is not disproved by the outcomes of any list of large battles.



Lieutenant General
Ed Blackburn
Commanding Second Div, II Corps, AAA
3rd Bn / 1st Regiment of Foot Guards

Quality and quantity of junior leaders on its own does not win battles. If you were to argue about the most important trait of Napoleonic wars it is clearly the morale

• The will to endure the hardship and to make it to the battle on the first place.
• the will to stand under enemy fire for hours without routing
• to withstand enemy fire when charging
• Hold the position when the enemy approaches it.

Highly trained Peninsular war veterans of the British army were humiliated and routed at the Battle of New Orleans by American militia without much training and discipline.

At the Battle of Krasnii in 1812 newly formed Neverovski’s division “were attacked by overwhelming numbers of French,Polish & Germancavalry under Marshal Murat . Neverovski formed his inexperienced infantry into one (two ?) large square and slowly retreated along the highway. According to the Russians “40 attacksâ€

Now that's robust debate, sirs!

I like what my commander says. With the luxury of space, the Russians were formidable.

Victor Davis Hanson conclusion in 'The Western Way of War' is that the West is blinkered by a view of war that sees the 'decisive battle', a whole war compressed onto a single cataclysmic field, Armageddon, as being THE way of war. Nothing else quite rates as 'war' proper or properly makes sense as war without a clear and absolute end in mind. Of this way of war, Napoleon was a true Emperor, the man who made it modern.

I also think the quality of leadership in the French armies, especially at the lower levels was exceptional. Moreover, that talent could rise. How many of the french generals started as NCOs or junior officers in the 1790s (including you-know-who)? How many men in the other armies had the same tales - or did they rot in the ranks under their aristocratic masters? Morale is more than spirit, it is organisation and will.

However, if one isn't beholding to a view of battle as a singular decisive event, if marching away can count as purposeful and useful maneuvering rather than being held in a 'decisive battle' frame as a (shameful) 'retreat', if wars can be long in time and distance and be contests of many little threats/fights/maneuvers/, then Kosyanenko's arguments deserve some air. The 1806/7 and 1812 campaigns make far more sense from that perspective. There were not just two armies but two different attitudes to making war in opposition. As such, I think I agree with his comments on Arnold's otherwise brilliant 'Crisis in the Snows'.

Podporuchik HarryInkski,
Lithuanian Uhlans
14th Brigade, IV Cav Corps,
2nd Army of the West