For yesterday and the next few days: Leipzig Anniversary!
The largest land battle in European history until World War I which is rarely covered in books. (meanwhile, Waterloo, a battle I really could care less about is covered with millions of articles, books, etc - [xx(])
14th Leibertwolkwitz - one of the largest cavalry actions of the war - Murat and the Allies both misuse their cavalry which results in no effect for either side other than to lose more horses and riders.
15th More troops come up to the field.
16th Wachau - The Army of Bohemia launches an attack on Napoleon's southern front which results in the French counterattacking and driving them back. Fortunately for the Allies, the French forces that could have turned this into a victory for Napoleon must be used elsewhere.
Lindenau - The Austrian 3rd Korps with assistance from mobile cavalry formations and the 1st Light Division assault the western side of Leipzig but are repulsed when Bertrand's Corps arrives to save the day.
Mockern - Probably the key action of the battle. Blucher and the Army of Silesia arrive to assault Marmont's positions to the northwest of the city. III Corps could have saved the day but only a division (9th) takes part and the rest of the corps is sent to the south to supposedly help out Murat's front. Bertrand, of course, is aiding the defense of Lindenau. Marmont's forces put up a brave fight only to be smashed at the last by the Prussian cavalry reserve. He pulls most of his army back behind the Parthe.
17th - Blucher follows up his victory and smashes some French formations which remained behind but learns that Schwarzenberg has ordered that no attacks will occur this day while the Allies lick their wounds and await the arrival of the Army of the North and more Allies from the south and southeast.
18th - Bernadotte finally up with the Army of the North. Sporting an attitude after being reproached for not coming sooner his army takes a roundabout path to the battlefield. Instead of striking where Napoleon is weakest they instead opt for a concentric attack on his positions. Napoleon has wisely pulled back his forces to a line which can be more easily defended. His troops being retreating through the city. He is careful to do it in a manner that will not bring about panic but nonetheless there is only one bridge out of the city that the troops can use. Defense of the city is left to v.Hochberg who is given very little with which to work with. The fruit of this will be seen on the 19th. The attacks are met with determined resistance and the Allies cannot crack the French shell.
19th - The main part of the French army has retreated but there are still some 40,000-60,000 men on the right bank of the Elster. The suburbs are assaulted and the French corps are intermingled in the city to no purpose. Responsibility for destroying the bridge is eventually left to a NCO who blows the bridge prematurely. Napoleon loses most of these troops as a result. Poniatowski drowns while trying to swim the river.
And thus ends one of history's greatest battles. But so little is written about it that it still surprises most people that study the the Napoleonic Wars.
Both sides committed huge blunders. Here are a few of them:
14th - Murat uses his cavalry in a large block to no effect. Rather than combine his infantry and artillery (horse) with the cavalry His Rashness continues to believe that a large massed cavalry force will accomplish much on the battlefield. The result is a spent force that loses valuable troopers which could have been useful for Napoleon for the main battle.
The Allies use their cavalry in small groups, again with no infantry assistance. Little is accomplished as well. (this was a reoccurring theme with the Allies throughout the War of German Liberation).
15th - Here is where Napoleon could have used his forces to the north (Marmont) to attack the Allies in the south before they could assemble a larger force. The Austrian corps (except for Klenau) were mainly outside of supporting distance. While MacDonald and the II Cavalry Corps were absent he had enough manpower to overwhelm the Army of Bohemia.
16th - My take on the north: pull back Marmont from Mockern and blow the bridges. Assemble a grand battery (2) at key positions near Leipzig and deny the Army of Silesia the ability to link up with the main army to the south. Put Bertrand in Lindenau to protect the supply lines (and Blucher's possible move in that direction) to the Rhine/depots. Send the rest of the army to the south and hide them behind the hills in and around Wachau so that the Allies are unaware of the move. (this may be a good example of what we miss in our games - we rarely look at the battle from the other side of the hill - i.e. we open up the battle as the other side and do a check of LOS to get an idea of what the other side sees)
I believe that the result would have been that the Army of Bohemia would have had to withdraw and the Army of Silesia would have had to keep a respectful distance from Napoleon until Bernadotte arrived.
The Allies - a useless assault in the south which saw one complete Austrian corps moving on Connewitz to no avail. Better to just put a cavalry unit over there to keep the link with the forces facing Lindenau and use that force to assault Wachau.
Marmont has been blamed for the loss at Mockern but truly Napoleon and Ney deserve the blame. The former did not believe that the Army of Silesia was that close despite Marmont's messages to the contrary. Ney did a poor battlefield recon as well. The forces at Mockern were a hodge-podge collection. Marmont only could influence the placement of his corps and some cavalry assets. One wonders what Ney's role was supposed to have been. Traffic director for troops moving through Leipzig?
The French V Corps had some of the best line troops of the army. The Marine artillery units fought very well for the most part. So good that when one of them was defeated the Prussians claimed to have defeated the Marines of the Guard! Mockern was one of the most hotly contested villages of the entire wars.
17th - Schwarzenberg's desire to wait for more troops is probably wise and Blucher's clearing action on the northwest bank of the Parthe probably was all the Allies could hope for. The rain made musket fire mainly ineffective. The French were off balance in this sector but the Army of Bohemia had just fought a major battle and were in no condition to tie down Napoleon in the south. The French probably could have moved forces to check Blucher anyway (Yorck's corps is hors de combat after Mockern and its mainly the Russians and some Prussian cavalry that do the work)
18th - The Allies (Schwarzenberg) pressing for a broad front assault probably meant that Napoleon could escape. Better to transfer most of the Army of Bohemia over the river to fight towards Lindenau and make the French defend that side of the city. Blucher, likewise, could have slipped over to the south and kept a bulk of the French army busy while Schwarzenberg's forces make the main assault. Bernadotte and the advancing Russians from Dresden could have masked the city and held the French there to their front.
19th - The bridge. Pretty much the main error of this day. The lack of Napoleon to build more bridges to assist the army in retreating. Even had he not retreated more bridges would have resulted in a better line of communications.
Its a shame that more works are not written on this campaign. Digby-Smith's is one of the more recent works. I recently purchased it and he makes much use of quotes from officers and civilians at the battle. Some errors are noted (on Amazon's site) in the text which frankly surprised me but there is a dearth of material on this battle.
Other works to read:
Chandler - Campaigns of Napoleon - a good synopsis of the battle but dated. Outlines the key features of the battle.
Nafziger - Napoleon at Leipzig: The Battle of Nations 1813. Almost all of this third volume of his work on the 1813 campaign is about the battle. Other than Smith this is the most amount of pages devoted to the battle in any work I have read. Very detailed. Good if anyone wanted to put a game together on the campaign (computer or board).
Maude - dated work on the campaign. A good synopsis of the campaign that was a standard work read by officers in military staff colleges for years.
Hofschroer - Leipzig 1813 (Osprey Campaign series) - has nice diagrams of the battle but lacks detail where you need it most. Has maps of other battles such as Dresden and Wartenberg. Some take issue with his narrative. As usual the Osprey series has an OB which will help the gamer recreate the battle.
Bowden - Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813 - mainly the OBs are the key point of this work. All French OBs - nothing on the Allies of course. It would be nice if he did up a book on the Allies OBs but Scott is mainly interested in telling the story of the campaigns from the French side.
Petre - Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany 1813 - the usual work that I have read on the campaign. Very detailed and the maps are very helpful if sometimes indistinct. He gives the reader a good feel for the terrain prior to the battle.
Esposito/Elting - West Point Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars - good maps on Leipzig.
There are a few websites that have nice narrative and maps as well. Some include OBs. Here is one that is of good use:
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Leipz ... of_leipzig
I have also purchased a game by Kevin Zucker/OSG:
Napoleon at the Crossroads
Along with his Strategic Studies they add in some interesting information on numbers for the troops.
One of his comments on Davout (that he was no longer the Iron Marshall) I found rather contradictory as from all accounts I have read, Davout was placed in Hamburg because he could be trusted to get the job done.
One wonders if Davout had been in charge of that vital southern front instead of Murat how the Battle of Wachau would have gone ...
The Russians from all I have read, still seemed to have been as brave as ever. While I wouldn't give them the morale of NRC I feel that they probably deserve a good rating anyway.
The Austrian army was nowhere near as good as that of 1809. Rothenberg comments in his great work "Napoleon's Great Advesary" that they couldn't execute the drill manual and were mainly used in columns for maneuver. But frankly how many units of this campaign could?
Colonel Bill Peters
Armee du Rhin - V Corps, Cavalerie du V Corps, 20ème légère Brigade de Cavalerie, 13ème Hussar Regiment
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt and ... more to come)
NWC
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