Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Has anyone read Maude's works on Ulm, Jena or Leipzig? Worth buying or not?

Podporuchik HarryInkski,
Lithuanian Uhlans
14th Brigade, IV Cav Corps,
2nd Army of the West

Definitely worth reading, they are available online for free if my memory serves correctly. I'll have to look up the email I received to retrieve the url.

Colonel Amos, 1ère Brigade Commandant, 2ème Division de Dragons

They contain no OBs for the most part and no maps that I can remember. You would need to use maps from other books to follow the action.

Good reads but dated. Better accounts abound IMHO. If you can find them at a library borrow them.

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

Books are great! No where else did I see such an objective and constructive approach. It is not an outline of events. Neither it is an ode of someones geniality. Definitely the book is not a first read. It's implied that the reader is well acquainted with the subject. But if you want to understand why the whole campaign turned out this way and not the other the books are simply a must. I do not share all the authors' ideas. But the books make you think.

I do not accept explanations like "Napoleon was a genius and all the others were plain idiots." It does not take into account 150 year old traditions of Austrian army, it's internal structure with all the politics and extreme overcentralization. It takes nothing into account. It's like "an object left to itself tends to fall on the ground because it's the Law of Nature". Not until such an explanation is thrown away any theory of gravity is possible.

The whole structure of the Austrian military evolved in such a way that an ordinary commander would act exactly as any one of Austrian generals acted in reality. We must give Napoleon credit in recognizing these faults in structure and making a killing on them. That's exactly what he did and exactly what Maude describes. Others don't. For example word Hofkriegsrath is mentioned in Clausewitz' "War of 1799" or Arnolds' work on Marengo only a few times, while this institution was one of the most important actors in the campaign. The choice of examples is important. It demonstrates that such a concept was popular in mid XIX century as well as in early XXI.

Ulm, Leipzig and some essays are available for free here:
http://openlibrary.org/a/OL18462A/F._N._Maude

One more point. It's a real pleasure to read a text written in such a beautiful and complex language!

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<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Yes, for that reason, Anton, I take Bowden's works with a huge grain of salt. In my mind Napoleon did little to revolutionize the various arms of an army (artillery being a slight exception). It was similar to how Robert E. Lee reacted to his commanders. Both knew their enemies and based their campaigning on them but I think that Lee actually did a better job. The only exception would be that Lee only had two subordinates early on (Jackson and Longstreet) while Napoleon had a complex organization based on a larger staff system. Lee had a good grasp of his subordinates while Napoleon often played off his Marechals on each other which would result in incidents in the field when "L'Emperor" was not watching.

Robert Goetz' viewpoint on Austerlitz for instance was much more accurate in my mind than Bowden's. He brought out the combat and the troops very well.

Maude's account of the Lutzen battle was both technical and also emotional. He not only used times (which bothers me when other authors just keep saying "and then") and also interjected language that brought out feeling about the troops. Both a personal and technical narrative at once.

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

Lee was really fortunate to have subordinates like Longstreet and Jackson. But without his will these men wouldn't be what they were. It makes me think about misery of Napoleons' marechals. As no one else had he a chance to put the best men into a proper place. But he didn't. Why? The point is not very well described, is it?

The work on Leipzig is not without fault. It's written as if it was a Prussia vs. France war. But it was not! During the whole campaign Russian contingent exceeded the one of Prussia. During the Leipzig part it was true for Austrians too. But there is not a sign of such a systemic approach neither towards Russian nor towards Austrian troops. For the later it was fixed with "The Ulm campaign", but not for the Russians.

History of Russian regular army was not as long as the Austrian. It couldn't be traced back to Thirty years war. But it could be well traced to the Great Northern war. In Seven years war the army was in principle the same as it was created by Peter the Great. Rumyantsev and Suvorov demonstrated what could be achieved with such an instrument. But without these Great Chieftains it was still very capable. Reading accounts about battles of Frederikan and Napoleonic wars I can't help noticing that the army had a tradition of it's own. Massive batteries, stubborn infantry resistance, active and agile cavalry, completely intransparent screen of cossacks. I can recall only one example when Napoleon managed to defeat this army - Friedland (at Austerlitz Napoleon has once again defeated Austrian staff system. Russian commanders had no real power, troops were ordered to act as if they were Austrians). In all the other cases results were either inconclusive or it was a clear french defeat. The system was great! It was very much different from what other armies were used to. But it worked as no one other did. Why does no one write about that?

Napoleon made a correct conclusion from previous military experience - for a war against countries like Austria, Russia and to some extent Prussia having excellent light troops to be really successful it should be rapid. Otherwise partisans will neglect all the effects. Strangely only Russia ever dared to adhere to an obvious principle - what is bad for the enemy is good for us. No one ever tried to prevent Napoleon from having general battle except the Russians. No one tried to start a war of attrition except Russians and Spanish. But in the later case it sparked by itself. Why no one writes about that? Why should we always read about "bearded warriors", "faulty staff system", "mysterious russian soul" and all the other ridiculous stuff?

Nevertheless Maudes' works are very good! I do regret he didn't write such a piece on Russian campaign.


<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Ta for your advice and the links. *S*

Podporuchik HarryInkski,
Lithuanian Uhlans
14th Brigade, IV Cav Corps,
2nd Army of the West

Anton you raise a valid point. In 1812 the Russians particularly before Smolensk escaped Napoleons plans for a decisive battle.

This had a dramatic effect by the time Borodino was reached in that the French army was weaker due to strategic consumption and the Russian soldiers having retreated and seen their country burn had become fanatical in their determination to confront Napoleon.

The result was the rather horrific clash of the great empires at Borodino. A battle which Napoleon desperate for quick results and always the gambler went for the tried and trusted sledge hammer.

We all know the results. The Russian truly did ultimately defeat Napoleon by utilising the vastness of Russia and the will of the Russian soldier to endure.

These things said I think it is wrong to be dismissive of Napoleon whilst he was not an innovator tactically his grasp of the Military art created the 'operational level' which is still used today.

He also introduced a number of key disciplines into military planning that were systemised by the German general staff into a doctrine. Famously employed back against France in the 1870's. A latterly to terrible effect in 1939-1942.

The cornerstones of his strategic system namely Flexibility, security, speed and timing have indeed become the basis for many successful business ventures even today. And his vision the basis for the unification of Europe.

Napoleon for all his flaws was the master of war. But like all ego centric individuals his singularity became his weakness.

That should in my opinion not diminish our interest in learning from the master.

To put other generals from the age at his level is in my view like putting mice with the elephant.[:D]

Vive l'Empereur[:D]



General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Colin Knox</i>
<br />
The cornerstones of his strategic system namely Flexibility, <s>security</s>, speed and timing have indeed become the basis for many successful business ventures even today.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

These are basic principles for strategies of all the successful commanders. Struck through is a question he never really bothered about and at which he finally broke his neck in Russia.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Colin Knox</i>
<br />
In 1812 the Russians particularly before Smolensk escaped Napoleons plans for a decisive battle.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">
The whole campaign is a huge strategic maneuvering. A sequence of them. Napoleon hoped to have a general battle around Vilno. Next he hoped to have a general battle at Vitebsk. Pahlens rear guard action allowed the 1st army avoid seemingly inevitable disaster. Davout was to cut off Bagration, but in general he didn't succeed. But due to his energetic pursuit russian armies could join only at Smolensk. Smolensk was the third time russians were avoiding the battle during this campaign. But they did the same in 1805 (Kutuzovs retreat), 1806-07 (Bennigsens retreat before Eylau) and again in 1807 (Heilsberg, Friedland).

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Colin Knox</i>
<br />
That should in my opinion not diminish our interest in learning from the master.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

True only as long as learning does not turn out to be slavish imitation and worship.

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Anton placed the link I have. In fact it was he who sent it to me. [:)]

Colonel Amos, 1ère Brigade Commandant, 2ème Division de Dragons

You would be incorrect to consider the Austrian army as that which served in the 30 Years War. There was no national distinctive at the time. Even saying that the Hapsburg army dated back to that time is a bit incorrect.

I would trace the Hapsburg army back to the days of the Wars of Spanish Succession and that period. Truly the army of the 30 Years War was more of a "private" army. Yes, there were inhabers for the regiments during the Napoleonic Wars but the Austrian army really didn't come into existence as such until later. The inhaber of the Napoleonic Wars was not as powerful a figure as that of the 30 Years War.

The tradition of the Russian army can still be traced back to the Muscovites of the 16th Century. There are certain things about that army that carried forth to the Napoleonic Wars.

I would say that both armies saw their true professional origin in the late 1600s (post 30 Years War) and early 1700s.

The armies that fought for Austria during the 1700s was much different than that of the 30 Years War. Each unit had its own quarter master system, etc. Provisions, enlistment were all handled not by region as per the Napoleonic Austrian army but by who could round up the most men to fight under his banner.

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

'True only as long as learning does not turn out to be slavish imitation and worship.'

Haha, Anton your abrasive posts are entertaining.
[:D]

General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Colin,

I'm glad to please you. Really. And the better you learn the more interesting will it be to cross swords with you again [8D]

Bill,

Of course they were different! The idea is that evolution of warfare tradition could be traced to this and that era. From the late years of Thirty years war one can trace characteristic features of Austrian warfare. For Russian army such a border is clearly somewhere around early XVIII century. The old regular army was literally destroyed during events like this one http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... reltsi.jpg


<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Anton last time we crossed swords you dissappeared mid battle.[:)]


General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Colin, I had a very hard and long time at work[:I] I didn't imply that your performance was poor. Quite the opposite. It was great and very instructive.

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>