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Anton,
Thanks for the article - its in my favourites now. The last paragraph is especially solid.
However apart from "experts" who did not have a right to review a history book there is a group, including Zamosky himself. Who actually DO know what they are talking about.
Look at this reviewer from Amazon:
Kevin F. Kiley's profile
<i>I am a retired Marine Corps artillery officer and a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point. I presently teach Middle School US History and am the author of Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815, and have contributed chapters to Cold War Hot and Dixie Victorious. I have a book on uniforms of the American Revolution coming out this fall and am working on a book on the Battle of Guilford Courthouse and one on the uniforms of the 19th century.
“The Russian campaign is definitely the most difficult to write about. In this volume, the author presents a highly readable account of that great campaign that is an valuable addition to the literature of the campaign, but it isn't a stand-alone account of the Russian campaign, and it isn't without its flaws.
Overall, the author has demonstrated a more-than-adequate grasp of the poltical problems facing the belligerents in 1812. The causes of the war are evenly handled, and the sole blame is not laid at the door of the French, or at Napoleon's. That being said, the author has not painted an accurate picture of either Napoleon or Alexander. Napoleon's character is relegated to the 'traditional' view of him being driven 'by a lust for power and domination over others' as well, among other things 'having no sense of justice' (which is a gratuitous and ludicrous statement, Napoleon formulating and giving France and the Empire the Code Napoleon among other civil reforms). It is only recently that an accurate picture of Napoleon's character has been developed by historians and it is a shame that work wasn't taken advantage of here.
On the other hand it appears that Alexander is given the benefit of the doubt at almost every turn, even though he was a particide, an Asian autocrat, who wielded his unquestioned power in Russia, was a treacherous ally, and one who refused to support the alliance he made with Napoleon in 1807. He was slippery, double-dealing, and a coward who deftly used intrigue, deception, and treason to his benefit. He tried to be a soldier, and was not, interfering rather than helping his generals in the field. His chosen advisors, his 'aides-de-camp' were carpet knights and not soldiers, who helped with this interference. He fought the Turks and the Swedes, as well as the French, and it is probably that his lauded stance of not negotiating with Napoleon in 1812 until there were no French on Russian soil was because he feared being assassinated by those same nobles that murdered his father.
There are other errors in the book. The author labels Tilsit a triumph for the Tsar, whcih is a fantastically inaccurate statement; states that the battle of Aspern-Essling in 1809 were 'twin battles' when they were not (it was one action, which the Austrians won-the first battlefield victory over Napoleon since 1796-it is known as Aspern to the Austrians and Essling to the French, hence the hyphenated use of both names by many historians); and War and Peace is mentioned as a quasi-reference for the period, which is a gross error.
The author inaccurately states that the Russian artillery arm was probably the best in the world in 1812, which cannot be supported by any substantive reference. The French artillery arm had been recognized as Europe's best since 1789 and it had not been eclipsed by any other European artillery system since. The Austrian and British artillery arms were also superior to the Russian artillery. The Russian artillery officers were poorly trained and educated, and the 'new' equipment of the 1805 System were copies of Prussian and Austrian material from the 1740s and 1750s. Further, the manner in which Russian artillery was commanded and employed was inferior to French artillery doctrine and this was remarked upon by various Russian artillerymen, notably Yermelov, Sievers, and Kutusaiv.
The author also stated that the French transport corps was 'le train.' Actually, there were at least two different types of 'train' in the French service. The train des equipages (supply train) is the organization to which he is referring. There was also a train d'artillerie which was responsible for hauling the artillery equipment. there was also a smaller engineer train to boot.
While some of the military sections of the book are substandard and carelessly done, the overall impact of the volume is a credit to the author. While many other authors and historians have misinterpreted or left out key factors of the campaign, this author does not. He correctly labels the Russian generals and high command for what it is-in short a mess. Further, the Battle of the Berezina is analysed correctly in that it was a decisive victory for the French. Further, the crucial Battle of Maloyaroslavets is labeled a French victory. The issue with the most impact, however, is that the author correctly states the heavy losses the Russians incurred during the campaign which many overlook, focusing on the disaster that befell the Grande Armee. Russian losses, for the same causes, the cold and exposure, are clearly brought to the forefront of the narrative.
If used with caution in the areas outlined above this is an excellent narrative of the Russian campaign. It is highly recommended and should be on everyone's bookshelf who is interested in the Napoleonic period in general and the Russian campaign in particular. I am looking very much forward to the author's next effort.â€
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