Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Has anyone read "Blundering to Glory" by Owen Connelly?

http://www.amazon.com/Blundering-Glory- ... 365&sr=8-2

Its in its 3rd Ed. Is it worth reading?

The title is misleading as the author praises Napoleon and considers him the greatest general of all time. I read one of the reviews and the comments lead me to believe that due to his acting on the spot he should be considered a genius.

Wellington did that too of course.

Anyway, any feedback, negative or positive is desired.

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

Yes your correct Bill. Wellington at Waterloo definitely stumbled into Glory...Blucher should have taken the credit for that one! [:D]


Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry

It is a good, quick overview of the campaigns of the periods, focusing much on what the great leaders did not do. For instance, I think-it has been a year at least since I read it- he talks about Napoleon making numerous mistakes in Italy, especially before Marengo, and how these get forgotten about. I think he also looks at the Ulm manouver as a happy accident for Napy and other similar things. I am not sure how much will be new to you but it is a fresh approach to the period. Worth a read but not as much of an attempt at revisionism as say Moser's "Myth of the Blitzkrieg."

I have a paperback copy (bought it used for a few bucks at a local bookstore) and can mail it to you if you would like.



Feldmarschall Jim 'Prinz' Pfluecke
Commander, Austrian Cavalry Reserve
3 Graf O'Reilly Chevauxleger Rgt
Hahn Grenadier Bn

Jim - no, that wont be necessary. Mike is going to buy me a copy for being a wise cracker! [8D]

I dont know if I would say that Napoleon cannot take credit for Ulm. Frankly he had advanced knowledge of the Austrian deployments to some degree via spies. His maneuver was similar to him trying to turn the rivers in N.Italy. Hold the enemy in place at one point and then turn his flank at a couple of river crossings and cut his line of communications.

But anyway, it looks like a good read nonetheless and something I might get in the future.

Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt, Austerlitz and ... more to come)
Swiss-Swedish Army CinC, Musket and Cannon Game Club - Come over and see what we are all about!

[:D] Gentlemen,

Bill, in fact I would post you my copy (2003)if you would like. It is a good read along with the book below.

Jim, I also have The Blitzkrieg Legend (the 1940 Campaign in the West) by Karl-Hienz Frieser first published in Germany 1995 and re-realeased in English 2005. Mossier has drawn heavily from Frieser's research and analysis I feel. However both have great insights to the workings of the Political and Military interaction and thinking. I do see these insights as being more plusible for the German success and structured in a human way of understanding and realisation of both immediate tactical decisions and wider operational freedoms and constraints playing off the political string pullers. Niether the 'blitzkrieg or Napoleon had mastered their methods and ways of operating in the early campaigns.

Of course Napoleon made mistakes, just as the Blitzgrieg was not without its weaknesses and set backs. Its the ability to be flexible and have the commanders and resources available to allow that flexibility that has in both cases allowed for victory when defeat was a real possibility. The exploitation taken in the field by the commanders on the spot were huge factors in making the German and French forces the successful victors in these campaigns.

Rommel and Patton were advocates of, and operated in this way. Where the likes of the Allied high command in 1940 and Montgomery in '44 relied more on methodical planning. When things didn't go to plan..failure...(Cean, Market Garden) not enough flexibility, imagination and elan!

Both book's ultimate conclusion I agree with.....the factories(numbers/economy)will defeat the flesh in the end. Unless the aim and its achievement can strike a desisive blow to the will of the nation before the numbers can take effect (Vietnam, Tet Offensive).

Here endith a quick snapshot lesson from Histories archives. [:D]


Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry

I would even argue that all German concept and methods of operations (and the successes they achieved after 1807) were in fact lessons learnt from and at the hand of Napoleon. Lessons that they had learnt and were able to quickly incorporate within the high command early on. This then filtered down to the lower command levels as time and conflicts continued.
German operations during WWII being the climax of a technological (and three dimensional) All Arms, Corps and Army concept and method of operating. [^] [:D]

Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry

Mike I agree.

I think non soldiers and politicians think of military expertise as a perfectly laid plan executed and carried out 100% as intended.

This is just not the case, pretty much ever. A true military genius is the leader who can improvise and remain flexible. This was Napoleons principle strength. I like to think of it like a serpent that oscillates this way and that in harmony, or perhaps like a boxer bobbing and weaving his way around a ring.

N's conduct at Wagram is a great example.

If you choose to judge generals by their errors you will find plenty of resources on all of the great ones written by scholars who study books. However and rather ironically to quote Rocky 'it's not how hard you can hit, it's how hard you can be hit and get up and keep going'

Churchill signed off all his memos with KBH - keep buggering on.

It seems to me this principle is true in pretty much all things.
Failure often is the essential ingredient in excellence. Most highly successful business people will attest to this.

It comes down to how you look at a failure. Is it as something you should regret or something you can treat as an opportunity and learn from. Histories greatest people generally fall into the latter category. Most people don't dare to risk failure normally and that locks them in mediocrity.

'He who dares wins' should probably be changed to 'He who wins dares to risk losing'



General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

By the way Bill looks like a good book!

General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Colin Knox</i>
<br />
It comes down to how you look at a failure. Is it as something you should regret or something you can treat as an opportunity and learn from. Histories greatest people generally fall into the latter category.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

History greatest people could afford phrases like "By God's grace I never lost a battle".


<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Adjutant Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Bill
you said"I dont know if I would say that Napoleon cannot take credit for Ulm. Frankly he had advanced knowledge of the Austrian deployments to some degree via spies. His maneuver was similar to him trying to turn the rivers in N.Italy. Hold the enemy in place at one point and then turn his flank at a couple of river crossings and cut his line of communications."

and I cannot disagree. This illustrates why this book is not as "controversial" as the title would seem. He just tends to point out that even success does not always work as designed and how that can make someone's opinion of themselves (a certain Mr. Bounaparte in particular) make mistakes later...

Feldmarschall Jim 'Prinz' Pfluecke
Commander, Austrian Cavalry Reserve
3 Graf O'Reilly Chevauxleger Rgt
Hahn Grenadier Bn

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i></i>
<br />Napoleon cannot take credit for Ulm. <hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I think both Napoleon and Mack worked hard on the outcome [:D] So the credit should go to both really.

"<i>The opportunity to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is <u>provided by the enemy himself</u>." </i>(Sun Tzu)

Major Alexey Tartyshev
Moscow Grenadiers Regiment
2nd Grenadier Division
8th Infantry Corps
2nd Army of the West (NWC)

'Never interupt your enemy when he is making a mistake' N 1er

General de Brigade Knox
Grand Duc d'Austerlitz et Comte de Argentan



Escadron Mamelouks
Chasseurs a'Cheval
Division de Cavalerie la Vieille Garde.





CO. 1er Brigade, II Heavy Cavalry Division, Reserve Cavalry.
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Seriously though we all expect the best from people all the time. People have off days and make bad decisions. Its being able to recognise when they are made by the opponant or ourselves and taking advantage or remedying those mistakes that makes a difference. No plan survives contact with the enemy. It is the force best prepared and best able to adapt that generally takes the day. Moral factors obviously are the ever present factor as well.

Take the 100 Days. Napoleon did have a great plan. The execution of it was bungled. Wellington was cuaght napping (no pun intended [:D]) Blucher was flexible and able enough after Ligny to act effectively. Wellington only just managed to get enough troops to hold the Waterloo position long enough for Napoleon and his Marshals to make enough mistakes that the pendulum of fate swung into their favour. Advantages siezed and squandered by all throughout! These were men at the hieght of their Military ability and vastly experienced.

Thats why its such a fasinating and decisive subject. Plans and Actions v Fate and Fortune....fasinating [:)]

Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Mike Ellwood</i>
Take the 100 Days. Napoleon did have a great plan. The execution of it was bungled. Wellington only just managed to get enough troops to hold the Waterloo position long enough for Napoleon and his Marshals to make enough mistakes that the pendulum of fate swung into their favour. These were men at the hieght of their Military ability and vastly experienced.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Napoleon was sick and past his prime anyway, Ney had too much responsibility and had probably never recovered mentally from the Russian Campaign, and in hindsight Grouchy was obviously overpromoted. Napoleon could also have used Berthier and a few of his other marshals and generals, like Suchet who was left holding down a minor front superbly.

I have <u>Blundering to Glory</u> but never had time to read it. I just finished David Maland's <u>Europe at War 1600-1650</u>. That is very well written, although probably dated. It's hard to summarize the 30YW in 200 pp but he did a very good job. I have ordered two of his other books, <u>Europe in the Sixteenth Century</u> and its followup (the XVII).

Chef d'Escadron Andrew Shore
12ème Cuirassiers
2ème Brigade, 1ère Division de Cuirassiers
Ier Corps de Réserve de Cavalerie, Armée du Nord
zaraath@speakeasy.net

"Napoleon was sick and past his prime anyway, Ney had too much responsibility and had probably never recovered mentally from the Russian Campaign, and in hindsight Grouchy was obviously overpromoted. Napoleon could also have used Berthier and a few of his other marshals and generals, like Suchet who was left holding down a minor front superbly."

Yes Napoleon was not at his best for several days yet it was still "a near run thing"! Past his prime is a little to presumptuous I think. Ney's natural go forward tendencies I think he himself may actually have kept in check as he was wary of Wellington and the British reputation from the penninsular. Again not at his best but still he so nearly took and held Quatra Bras. He roughly handled the Anglo - Dutch to boot. Had D'Erlon turned up before the Brit Guards it could have been a very differnt story.

Yes I think everyone agrees that Grouchy made the wrong decision when he heard the guns. Berthier was assiassinated so unavailable and this was a major blow to the french operationaly. Yes Suchet was a definite asset had he employed him. Nappy's mistake that one. The placing of Davout in Paris was a most fasinating and intriguing placement!

Wellington was still in his prime at 46 and did underestimate Napoleon's operational and strategic strengths. The British regimental system always had it over the French tactically and morale wise. You can't say someone is past their prime just becuase they are sick or old look at Blucher 16-17-18 June! The man should have been dead or bed ridden, at 72!

So many variable factors and so many cliche realities. I do belive it is the period where the most unpredicatable outcomes were always possible. Carpe diem indeed!! [:D]

Col Mike Ellwood
Commander Officer
3rd Dragoon Division
Reserve Cavalry