Dierk - Flexibility in part but face it, the Allies of 1813 for instance were limited in their ability to maneuver on the battlefield when in line which means that in order to get the troops from point A (line formation) to point B they must change into column to do so.
An advance of 100 yards by an Austrian line would almost always lead to disorder for example. I call that inflexible.
And the column was a more maneuverable formation but for firepower the line was still superior.
But yes, there were tactical refinements over the drill book that were improvements. Peter H. in his Osprey book on the Prussian Cavalry of the later period discusses how some of the complex maneuvers were really not well suited for the battlefield.
But Rothenberg points out rightly that the Austrians of the later period lacked the ability to maneuver on the battlefield. Which was party why they really didn't do so well in the War of Liberation.
The Russians had suffered huge losses in Russia and Poland in 1812-13. They were replacing their ranks with men from the militia battalions. Not exactly fine military men.
Colonel Bill Peters, 17th Dragoons, III Corps, French Army
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