Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

As the 'So Sad' posts have sparked my interest. Here is my question:

Which Coalition Country, alone, was the strongest force when fighting LGA one vs. One??? Which had the most success? Which did Napoleon fear or dislike fighting against??

Austria in 1809 ?

Russia in 1812 ?

Prussia in 1813-1815 ? (when they were without other coalition forces)

The Anglo-Allied Army in Spain?, 100 days? (I'm not sure if this applies as the Anglo Allied Army consisted of multiple countries and besides the Peninsular Campaign, did the Anglo-Allied Army ever fight the LGA 1 v 1??)

Of note: I'm still learning Napoleonic history and would enjoy mutiple perspectives and input.

Thanks!!


Let's Spark some debates!!! And no, I do not want to hear your answer if its France!! Yes I know your awesome etc.. etcc... Lol

Well, it depends on who you read- each country has its partisans...
I would think that the Austrians at Wagram fought well, and were outnumbered. If the numbers were even the Austrians may have won. Certainly the Russians in 1812 fought magnificantly and were well led, organized, and supplied. There are many cases in 1813 and 1814 of the Russians fighting very well. The Prussians did not fare well directly against Napoleon.

However,I think two things are important to consider when asnwering this:

(1) yes, Napoleon was one of the best tacticians and battlefield commanders of his day, but he excelled at getting there firstest with the mostest. In the more even fights-Eylau, Borodino, Leipzig, etc, he was not overpowering. I am not saying he always lost unless he had an advantage, only that his mere presence and skill was not enough to determine the outcome..

(2) his independent commanders were very inconsistent. Massena was good early in his career, Davout was perhaps the foremost battlefield tactician and general of the age, Eugene developed into a reliable commander, and Soult had his ups and downs. Beyond that? his marshalls were often beaten by the good Prussian and Russian commanders..

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Jim,

From my small, but ever growing knowledge of this time frame, I must agree with you about Russia. Historically, and this timeframe is no different, Russians in war have always been tough SOB's. I also think Russian artillery was quite impressive in 1812-1813.

The Austrians, I think, also did very well against Napoleon in the 1809 Campaign. Quite often fighting without help from other countries, they fought hard and learned their lessons from 1805. I think they lacked good Commanders and tactics, but were a tough bunch as well.

An excellent conversation that is sure to bring out the partisans indeed.

I can only imagine that moving from campaign to campaign, the Russians likely earned the most respect from Napoleon.
They stood their ground until the dead of night at Eylau.
They did the same again at Borodino.
And they chased him out of Russia in the terrible winter.

The Austrians definitely earned his respect as evidenced by reports of him rounding on courtiers that laughed about their soldiers, declaring to them, "You obviously were not at Wagram."

As for the Prussians and British, I would have to say, that Napoleon appears to have not hardly respected them at all. To his gravest danger.
But, it may be understood in that he had crushed the Prussians in 1806, and when facing them himself during 1813, they consistently ran away. A strategy that absolutely worked in the Allies favor, both short-term and in the long, when you consider how this could have affected his view of them going forward.

As with the British, he faced them only in a long chase across Spain in 1808.

I strongly believe that this disdain for Prussian and British arms ill-served him, and with all the signs of his Marechal's being beaten by these two armies, over and over, surely Napoleon should have known better.

Now, for Napoleon getting there first with the most, very true, and the heart of his strategy. To win battles, Napoleon recognized the priority of superior strength whenever possible (I mean who strives to arrive at a battle with less strength), and initiative (even when on the defensive). I actually think you will find that the French did not always have overwhelming strength in many of his battles, but his grand tactical skills usually ensured that his side won the day.

Regards,

Todd,

Some excellent points. I must agree, the Prussians didn't fight well on their own it seems, sadly. How did the British do in the Peninsular Campaign?

Did the Austrians have any decent commanders, tactically speaking?

Also, I just purchased Chandler's book. Cannot wait to get into itt!!!

My assessment would be:

Austria. Napoleon's consistent foe. Often maligned but a most determined opponent with some good leaders such as Archduke Charles. Aspern Essling was Napoleon's first set back and the loss of Lannes thereafter a major one. The Austrians consistently put large armies in the field vs N and Swarzenberg later on led the coalition to victory in 1813/14 in an Eisenhower type role

Prussia. The army of 1806 was arguably a museum piece. However by 1813 the Prussian army was superbly led and increasingly efficient at combined arms operations. A most formidable foe that proved it's worth in Napoleons final defeat in 1815.

Russia. Probably the most consistently difficult opponent for the French in the field. The campaigns in 1807, 1812 and beyond were proof of the tenacious and determined quality of the Russians. They were the true rival for N in Europe and at Tilsit it was appropriate the two great emperors divided Europe between themselves. It was also inevitable that they would come into conflict again. Especially with the chief agitators in the background see next one:

Britain. As the financier and other main foe of Napoleon their geo strategic influence was vast. There field armies were small but highly efficient. All in all they probably remained the greatest opponent to N's ambitions and their machinations ultimately lead to his defeat.

_________________
Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

And finally Sweden - Bernadotte was an idiot

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

psssst ... Colin ... say something nice about the Hanovarians. It will make Mark happy.

Quite right, and once a French Marechal as it was...

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Field Marshal Sir Edward Blackburn, 1st Duke of Aberdeen K.G.
85th (Buck's Light Volunteers) Regiment of Foot
16th British Brigade
7th Division
III (Peninsular) Corps
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards

I DON'T PLAY WITH ROUT LIMITING OR NME OFF

Gentlemen,

You forgot to mention the Spaniards. The peasants and the brigands of Spain caused the French casualties comparable with all other regular armies combined.

For example, the whole British army caused about 45,000 combat casualties during the 6 years of Peninsular war. 7 month of Russian campaign caused the French about 130,000 combat casualties (excluding prisoners). From memory the whole Spain affair cost Napoleon up to 300,000 soldiers (not all of them combat casualties though).

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General-Leytenant Alexey Tartyshev
Leib-Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment (Grenadier Drum)
1st Brigade
Guard Infantry Division
5th Guard Corps


(I don't play with with ZOC kills and Rout limiting ON)

Alexey, salute!

I prefer to simply forget the Spanish Ulcer,and like my friend General Knox, dwell in the glorious memory of my favorite campaign, 1806.

ps of course, you are correct, though....

Regards,

Eschewing nationalistic comparisons, it appears no two other nations allied at the same time could beat Nappy, when not fighting in Russia or Spain.

Napoleon actually made the unusual mistake of having too large an army to start his 1812 campaign against Russia. He lost half his army due to non battle attrition before Borodino. If he started with an army half the size, he might have gotten the early win he needed, as there was a strong sentiment to attack him amongst the Russian Higer command.

Getting involved in Spain was a mistake, for reasons we don't deal with in these games.

I agree with Warren. Nap tried to use too many troops. Had he accumulated the same amount of logistical support he did with about half the combat troops he would have done better, imo.

Having a limited objective of establishing a larger permanent Poland and Lithuania.

Limited objective...

Napoleon Bonaparte...

Are you kidding me?.....

The man's ego would never allow for a 'limited objective', particularly at the height of his empire. He did not believe that he had any boundaries, until the 'chickens came home to roost' so to speak. I think a 'limited objective' flies in the face of the very personality of the man myself.

Operationally Warren's view is very interesting I think I agree. In a wargame I would probably follow such a plan.

However geo-strategically 1812 was an 'all in, the stakes are western Europe' war. It was about the great confrontation between the two super powers of the time and Napoleon decided to settle it with everything - all cards on the table.

It was to be the great conflict between the two great empires. One which would force Russia to recognise Napoleon, his family and France as the rightful owner and emperor of Western Europe.

The resultant scorched earth and horrific battle of Borodino took Napoleonic warfare to a scale of total war as yet perhaps unseen even in Spain.

Napoleon had learnt a lot from the 1807 campaign in Poland where the weather and poor roads were not dissimilar and his vast numbers were in many ways just a ruthless calculation of what it would take to win based on operational attrition.

I cannot see him planning to field a smaller army. I suspect if he had more available he would have gone even bigger.

A great host seemed to be his idea, one that would both be capable of great attrition and also defeat the morale of the Russians by its shear scale.

Napoleon believed all wars in Europe were ultimately about gaining ascendancy of the mind by breaking the enemies will to fight. Then negotiating a favourable peace for France. His Corsican nature never really left him. Win big and do a hard deal.

So perhaps he thought I will invade with everything, probably fight a big battle and then force a settlement that ensures the stability of my western empire. Until Moscow burned he may have even thought he was in a good position to do just that.

He would then have withdrawn from Russia with terms that stabilised his 'house of Bonaparte'

His greatest mistake was he did not realise to the Tsar this was a battle to the death. And his invasion of Russia and capture of Moscow was an untenable unnegotiable crime to the Tsar and all leading Russian aristocratic families.

He under estimated the Russian character and identified it as like the European monarchs in its style. Trade this or that province for peace. Napoleon never grasped that Alexander would and indeed could not negotiate a peace while he was on the holy soil of mother Russia.

The character of the war of 1812 was unique in the period as a result.

His recovery in 1813 was astounding really given the loss of such vast resources in 1812. He really did cash all his chips at the Casino of empire.

Russia’s losses were also grievous in 1812 and their own recovery similarly amazing.

_________________
Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"