Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

I recently came across an analysis by an Israeli submarine commander on cognitive biases in military decision-making. Unsurprisingly, the very same psychological traps show up in our PBEM battles.
Below is a breakdown of the seven cognitive biases he identified and how I think they appear in our PBEMs.

System 1 vs. System 2 in Command
A real-world commander usually makes decisions under:
• time pressure,
• incomplete information,
• high stress,
• life-threatening risk,
• rapidly changing conditions.

This is a perfect breeding ground for cognitive biases. Decisions are often made intuitively rather than through systematic analysis, which makes them vulnerable.

The commander’s thinking can be roughly split into two systems:
• System 1 (Intuitive): automatic, fast, emotional, error-prone; it creates a “quick snapshot” of the situation.
• System 2 (Analytical): slow, effortful, logical, energy-hungry; it gives us rationality, but the brain is “lazy” and activates it less often than it should.
The core problem in combat is that stress and lack of time forcibly activate System 1, even when analytical System 2 is exactly what is needed.
In WDS, we do not face real time pressure in a turn-based environment and no mortal danger of course. However, in my experience the emotional side still tends to overpower the rational one, and we fall into the same cognitive traps.

The Seven Biases on the WDS Battlefield

1. People feel losses about twice as strongly as they feel equivalent gains.
In WDS this shows up when:
• We fixate on a bloody setback in one sector and emotionally “forget” the progress or victories achieved elsewhere.
• One lost position feels as if the whole battle is slipping away, even if the overall situation is still very solid.
That moment when your losses spike in one area and you suddenly feel like the game is lost? That is pure loss aversion at work.


2. The Last Disaster Feels Inevitable
Players overestimate threats they recently experienced.
Example in WDS:
• Your last attack failed and ended with a French cavalry division counter-charging and smashing your lead division.
• On the next turn you behave as if this must happen again.
• In reality, that French cavalry might now be disordered, scattered, or badly placed.
But emotionally your brain says: “Cavalry counterattack → total disaster. Do not try again.”
Many players give up games or abandon good plans simply because the last bad experience is too vivid.


3. Seeing Patterns That Are Not There
Commanders see patterns even when no real pattern exists.
Typical example:
• You once tried to hold the line against enemy heavy cavalry without forming squares. The line collapsed and you lost the position.
• Next time you face any heavy cavalry, you conclude: “I cannot hold the line against them, ever.”
But the WDS engine does not care about your trauma; it just follows the rules.
Form squares properly and virtually any cavalry will be stopped, regardless of size or type.
We often generalise from one bad experience and treat it as a universal law.


4. Confirmation Bias – Falling in Love with the Plan
Confirmation bias is one of the most dangerous traps.
Once a player “falls in love” with an initial plan, everything becomes “proof” that the plan is perfect. No questions asked.
Then reality hits, the plan turns out to be outdated — and emotions swing the other way: “It’s all lost.” Switching plans is difficult because responding to new developments requires System 2 (rational thinking) while System 1 (emotional) screams that this is all lost.


5. Sunk Cost – “We Have Come Too Far to Turn Back”
Sunk cost fallacy is the stubborn continuation of a bad course of action simply because so much has already been invested.
WDS examples:
• “I have spent 12 turns marching to this ridge; I must take it.”
• “We have already committed three divisions; we cannot pull back now.”
In fact, the past investments are gone, only the future matters. But our brains struggle to accept that.


6. Groupthink – the Silent Dissent (relevant for team games)
In team games (like 2 x 2) , groupthink appears when:
• No one wants to contradict others.
• Players hesitate to point out flaws in the plan.
• The team marches together into a poor strategy simply because “we agreed.”

The more we value harmony and politeness, the harder it becomes to say:
“This plan is bad, and here is why.”


7. Framing Effect – How Things Look vs. What They Are
The framing effect means that how information appears shapes our decisions more than the actual data.
In WDS this shows up when:
• We misread enemy lines based on formation “appearance” rather than terrain and victory points. Like We interpret enemy spotted units through the lens of what we expect to see, not what is actually there. A few spotted battalions are likely just an isolated division, but we hesitate to act, imagining a tightly packed defensive corp.


How to Reduce Cognitive Traps
The submarine commander offered several practical measures to reduce cognitive bias. They translate surprisingly well into PBEM play.

✔ Pre-Mortem Analysis
Before launching a major move, ask:
“Imagine this plan has already failed. Why did it fail? What did I overlook?”
This forces System 2 to wake up and search for hidden risks, weak flanks, or reserves you have not accounted for.

✔ Devil’s Advocate Role
In team games, assign one player whose explicit job is to challenge the dominant plan.
• Their mission is to break the idea, not support it.
• They must be allowed (and encouraged) to say:
“Here is how this could go very wrong.”
This helps neutralise groupthink and confirmation bias.


✔ Red Team Thinking
Open the map and attempt to think consistently as the enemy:
• “If I were my opponent, what would I do next?”
• “Where would I strike, based on what he sees from his side of the map? Based on my spotted units?”
This mindset reveals vulnerabilities that are invisible when you only look from your own perspective.
Opening a scenario – ideally start thinking/planning from the opposite side – you will become aware of their fears and framing effects and can play those to your advantage.

✔ Structured Operational Orders
A short written plan already pushes us from System 1 to System 2.
For example, write down:
1. Objective – what exactly must be achieved?
2. Main axis of advance – where is the decisive blow?
3. Force allocation by division
4. Reserve – who is the reserve and what is their trigger to move?
5. Fallback plan – where do we retreat if things go wrong?
6. Triggers for change – what specific events make us switch to Plan B?
The act of writing forces clarity and reduces emotional, impulsive moves.
If we consciously use that time to put things on paper, we trigger questions about our own assumptions and slowly train System 2 to step in more often.


The Israeli commander summed it up bluntly:
“Cognitive biases cost resources — and lives.”
In our case, the price is only our own ego expressed in victory points.
But the lesson is the same: more planning → more System 2 → better outcomes.

_________________
General-Leytenant Alexey Tartyshev
The Adjutant-General of His Imperial Majesty

Leib-Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment (Grenadier Drum)
1st Brigade
Guard Infantry Division
5th Guard Corps


(I don't play with with ZOC kills and Rout limiting ON)

Excellent analysis of the psychology of gaming

Your reflection on cognitive biases within the framework of Napoleonic WDS games is truly insightful. It shows how, even in an environment without real pressure, our decision-making process remains vulnerable to mental shortcuts, emotions, and false inferences. It’s remarkable how professional tools — pre-mortems, red-team thinking, structured operational orders — translate so effectively into PBEM play, helping to reintroduce analytical discipline in a context that often encourages impulses and “falling in love” with one’s plan.

I would add just one point we often underestimate: the moment in which we play. Many of our tactical choices occur late in the evening, after long and tiring days, when attention, clarity, and the ability to activate “System 2” are naturally diminished. Fatigue and lack of focus amplify biases and make us more prone to rushed moves, emotional reactions, or over-interpreting the situation.

The conclusion is simple: in WDS, as in real warfare, it is not only the manoeuvre on the map that matters, but also the mental quality of the moment in which we make our decisions. Recognising our own cognitive limits — and perhaps choosing to play a turn when we’re more lucid — already represents a form of “superior command.”

_________________
Podporuchik Sandro Lasco
Military Order Cuirassier Regiment
2nd Cavalry Brigade
2nd Cuirassier Division
Cavalry of the 2nd Western Army
2nd Western Army Reserves

interesting. Thank you.

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