Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

I'd like to throw a thought out at you, and see what you think of it.

To my mind, the last truly good chance for Napoleon to come out on top of the Napoleonic Wars was the Battle of Bautzen.

My reasoning is this. If Ney's flanking march had been carried off, the French could have inflicted such a serious defeat on the Prussians and Russians that Austria would have been far less likely to intervene. Under those circumstances, Napoleon would have stood a fair chance of either coming to a peace, or even defeating the Russians and Prussians and at least stabilizing things along the Oder (or even the Vistula).

That would have still left the problem of Spain, but even if he'd lost everything to the line of the Pyranees (which would likely be pessimistic), he still would have come out in decent shape.

By the time the summer truce ended, the numbers game was so heavily against him that this "window of opportunity" was gone.

So, what do you think? Was there not even a chance at Bautzen? Or, do you perhaps think there was a later chance? Was all lost the day the Russians didn't surrender at the loss of Moscow?

Feldmarschall Freiherr Gary McClellan
Generalissimus Imperial Austrian Army
Portner Grenadier Bn
Allied Coalition C-in-C

I totally agree with you Gary. Crush either Prussia OR Russia, their alliance falls apart, Austria was straddling the fence (not a big fan of Russia after 1805) and basically Napoleon could turn to the Peninsular fighting.

Bill Peters
Armee du Rhin - V Corps, Cavalerie du V Corps, 20ème légère Brigade de Cavalerie, 13ème Hussar Regiment
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt and ... more to come)

[url="http://www.fireandmelee.net"]Fire and Melee Wargame site[/url]

Gary,

I would disagree because, IMO, the fall of Napoleon's Empire is directly traceable to his ill-advised attempt in 1808 to usurp the Spanish throne and place his brother on it. [:D]

Up until the Spanish adventure, Napoleon had displayed a flawless, diplomatic touch, playing on the numerous issues which divided the other European powers to first isolate and then serially destroy them. Equally important, he had applied the Revolutionary precept of "make war pay for war" by engaging in relatively short campaigns which brought in far more booty than they cost.

All this went by the boards once the Spanish Ulcer began. [B)] On the diplomatic/strategic side, he was forced to fight all subsequent campaigns with a third of his available forces pinned down in the Peninsular meatgrinder. This created an open invitation to all comers to fight France while she had one arm caught in a bear trap. [8] Moreover, the war in Spain was the antithesis of "make war pay for war." Within a year all the booty to be had was consumed and thereafter the cost of maintaining the forces in Spain steadily drained the French treasury to the breaking point.

The only way that Napoleon could have saved his empire was to have cut his losses in Spain and pulled back across the Pyrenees. Alas, his ego would not allow that, so the end of his empire became a foregone conclusion.

Regards,

Paco

<i>Maréchal</i> M. Francisco Palomo
<i>Prince d'Essling, Grande Duc d'Abrantes et
Comte de Marseille
Commandant - Ecole Militaire
Commandant - Division de Cavalerie de la Vieille Garde </i>

I have to agree with Paco. Napoleon was with out doubt the master of the battlefield but the Spanish ulcer was a key part of the division of France's strategic energies. Also due to the nature of this war it sapped the Emperor's empire without giving the rewards much as Paco says. Occupations are always costly especially against a guerilla war or as its now known an insurgency, ask the USA.

Napoleon was forced to gamble more and more on his battle capabilities whilst the strategic situation had clearly turned. I would argue this turn occurred around 1809. By 1815 it was all on one battle.

Had he won Bautzen without that idiot Ney well being Ney, perhaps he would have lasted longer but ultimately time was against the master of war.

Regards

Colonel Colin Knox,
Baron de l'Empire
2e Regiment Gardes d'Honneur
La Jeune Garde
IIIe Corps ADN
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Paco, Colin

Certainly a valid point, and I've long thought that Napoleon lost because he just didn't know "When to leave well enough alone," and the decision to invade Spain is certainly the prime exhibit in that. (I've always wondered if an attempt to put Ferdinand on the throne and make him a puppet would have worked any better, but that's a digression).

Still though, nipping the "War of Liberation" in the bud at Bautzen would have allowed Napoleon a chance to go back to Paris and reassess things, with the situation on Spain being his major focus. The harder question is, aside from pulling back to his side of the mountains, what he could have done about it. Still though, while that option may have been very un-Napoleonic, it was open to him, if push came to shove.

My key point, is that a victory at Bautzen would have at least let him start to explore those options, and is the last point at which a viable road to getting out of the mess would have been visible.

Feldmarschall Freiherr Gary McClellan
Generalissimus Imperial Austrian Army
Portner Grenadier Bn
Allied Coalition C-in-C

OK I disagree with both positions LOL.[B)]IMHO Napoleon's chances of a lasting reign were lost beyond revovery somettime after his troops crossed into Russia in 1812. Not sure when the exact point would be because up until a certain time he could have successfully withdrawn with minimal damage to his army and resources. Following the winter debacle his armies never really recovered and his allies began to doubt him and waver. Yes, the Spanish ulcer was painful but it was not fatal until after the 1812 campaign. It would have continued to fester and bleed but I submit if Napoleon had himself returned to Spain instead of invading Russia the outcome in Spain could have possibly been very different. Perhaps he could have defeated Wellinton, certainly he could have driven him back into Portugal. No, I think if you have to pick a moment, battle, or event which was MOST critical to Naps downfall I believe it has to center on the invasion of Russia in some manner.

Excellent points all around though and of course they were all critical.

Major General Ed Blackburn
Commanding Second Div, II Corps, AAA
3rd Bn / 1st Regiment of Foot Guards

Ed, I'd agree, that the debacle in 1812 was catastrophic, but, my point is that it wasn't absolutely irreversible, that there was still a glimmer of hope, and a road out, until the moment that the Austrians made their decision to intervene in 1813.

I'm not convinced that Nappie returning to Spain would have helped. Aside from the Political cost of doing such a thing (extreme), the deeper problem is that the French faced a situation where "chasing down Wellington" wasn't the primary thing that needed to be done. They needed to pacify a nation in arms, which is a far different thing.

Feldmarschall Freiherr Gary McClellan
Generalissimus Imperial Austrian Army
Portner Grenadier Bn
Allied Coalition C-in-C

I'd just want to add a new aspect into discusion. It's about the material means of France to keep war going. It's very well known after desaster in Russia french cavalry was much less valuable than before. Not the last part of it was a lack of horses. No matter will French beat Russian and Prussian forces at Bautzen they will lack cavalry for the time. on. That's why btw I personally do not believe in possibility of a decisive victory for the French forces. Allies would be warned about incomming French wing. And hence Allies could suffer a defeat, maybe very costy, but it won't be a desaster like one in Russia. Anyway... the second thing French had a lack of is artillery. The fact is that they lost 1000+ Guns in Russia, lots of guns in Polis fortresses and all of the arty in Peninsula. 150+. Not much of course but still after such loses any piece vould be valuable. Of course they could use old gun from the fortresses. From Italy or Netherlands as they did. But it means not only that they would have decreased firepower, but they would also have a lot of different types of arty that inreases difficulties in supply. And hence more horses needed. And I must mention these pieces were much heavier and hence were less mobile and required even more horses to draugh them. As you remember there was a real difficulty with horses in France. TAnd if all of the horses are taken from the economy, specially from the serfs there would be difficulties with food. Zugzwang for Napoleon isn't?

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Mayor Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Gary, I would have to agree with Paco on this one. Spain in 1808 was the thing that started Napoleons downfall. On the political front it was a disaster. It notified both allies and enemies with the replacement of Ferdinand that Napoleons political ambitions extended far beyond France. After all Ferdinand was technically an ally when he was replaced. They were sure to think who would be next and which one of his lackeys would replace what monarch. As is the nature of insurgencies when sufficient troops were used in a region to suppress it, it would just move to a region where there were not sufficient troops. Guerrilla warfare is costly in men, material and morale and if he had concentrated on Spain and pushed Wellington back there were still the lines at Torres Verdes. Massena took a look at them and did not even try to break them. Of course his supply line was almost non-existent by then. The invasion of Russia hastened his downfall for sure but its beginning was in Spain.

Fahnrich Jim Woods Jr
IR 15 Zach

Yes the 1812 campaign was a disaster for Napoleon, so was his foray into Spain, but neither had to be a total disaster in a sense. By the time Murat left the remains of Napoleon's army on the Elbe, the Russians were not pressing the French as hard and in fact they were not in the best state either. Napoleon's mistakes were more in who he put in charge at this point and later in the 1813 campaign. By putting the likes of Ney, McDonald, and Oudinot in charge of separate armies, he gave easy victories to the Allies that encouraged the allies and helped lead the Austrians off the fence. He makes the same mistake in Spain, Massena was not up to the task, Marmont was a boob as was Jordan and his Brother Joseph. Look at what Suchet was able to do, and even Soult was able to do wonders after all seemed lost. I do not think that had Napoleon held off the Allies in Germany in 1813, that Wellington would have been able to really invade France from Spain. For what ever reason Napoleon always seemed to leave his best commanders on the side lines when they were really needed. Davout would have stomped Bernadotte in the north, and StCyr was also a very able commander.

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; "The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

Greetings gents,

I'd say that the last chance for Napoleon to come out on top had less to do with military prowess and more to do with poor diplomacy. French power and prestige was squandered after Friedland. Too many concessions forced upon the vanquished, rather than a magnanimous peace.

Cheers!





Jeff Bardon
Marechal de l'Empire
(temporarily retired)

I have to comment again - I agree with Jeff. N's disposition was just too ego driven and of course Corsican! A shame for histories greatest soldier.

Regards

Colonel Colin Knox,
Baron de l'Empire
2e Regiment Gardes d'Honneur
La Jeune Garde
IIIe Corps ADN
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm