Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

I have always contended that Napoleon lost his last campaign because of the choices of commanders he made. Soult was a poor choice as CoS, there were generals available that had trained and served under Berthier. While Soult might not have had full trust for independent command he was a very good battle commander. I understand the reasoning of leaving Davout behind in Paris, he was his most trusted, but his remaining in power depended on winning a fast quick victory, no matter what happened in Paris his fate rested in the field. Suchet was regulated to boarder defense, again a quick victory was essential in this campaign. I believe that he should have left Mortier in charge in Paris, not as brilliant as Davout bnut he was unfit for field command at the time and was trust worthy. Grouchy at the boarder along with the others he posted there. Some other person in charge as CoS other than Soult. Davout in charge of a wing, Suchet in charge of a wing, Ney and Soult under either Davout or Suchet. If he had made these changes I believe his plans would have worked out. Comments?

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; "The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

Hi Tony
I trust all is well with you. Yes an interesting discussion I recently read somewhere that one reason for the youth N had in his command was his feeling that the Marshals by 1815 were war weary and inclined to sit on the laurels in the field.

That said I think the fact Berthier was gone had a huge impact and certainly a robust tactical field commander who was not just a maniac (Like Ney) would have made a big difference. Soult seems to be the perfect field commander at say Waterloo and perhaps Davout in Grouchy's place. However I think N was concerned that Soult was a little defeatist as a result of his previous experiences against Wellington.

Napoleons maneuvers in the 100 days campaign were quite superb at times but lacked tactical finesse so I agree with your overall argument. Also the problem with the ‘central position’ model he employed is that it often lead to half victories as pursuit was not as thorough.

My 5 cents.

Regards


Colonel Colin Knox,
Baron de l'Empire
2e Regiment Gardes d'Honneur
La Jeune Garde
IIIe Corps ADN
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Good topic Tony. I don't argue your points but do want to point out the reasoning for Nap's choices in regards to Davout and Suchet. Suchet was probably his best combat commander capable of handling an independent command as he demonstrated over and over in Catalonia. Napoloeon felt he needed his best commander to handle the meager forces out on the the Austrian frontier and thus the choice of Suchet. The decision to leave Davout was based on Nap's feeling that Davout was his most loyal and trustworthy subordinate as well as being highly capable. Nap could not afford a fifth column or any instability erupting in Paris while he was figthing in Belgium. In hindsight I think Napoleon would have been better off to bring Davout and Suchet along because as history showed he had to win the first battle.

Major General Ed Blackburn
Commanding Second Div, II Corps, AAA
3rd Bn / 1st Regiment of Foot Guards

Still, let's be entirely honest here. It's entirely immaterial. He shuffles his commands and manages to win at Waterloo... what happens?

He gets destroyed somewhere along the Rhine or the Meuse a month or two later, and history records Schwartzenberg or the like as the great hero, and not Wellington.



Feldmarschall Freiherr Gary McClellan
Generalissimus Imperial Austrian Army
Portner Grenadier Bn
Allied Coalition C-in-C

Gary you might be right, but I do not think it was all that certain that the allies would have been so unified if Napoleon had won a crushing victory over Wellington and Blucher. I agree with you in part Ed, Napoleon based his decisions on Suchet being one of his better Marshals as was proven in Spain, and everyone knew that Davout's loyalty was beyond reproach. I would disagree that Suchet was his best, I believe Davout was second only to Napoleon. I think a fifth column would not have lasted had Napoleon won a crushing victory in the North, such a victory could have slowed the allies down and caused second thoughts. Wellington was their best had he been destroyed the impact would have been great.

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; "The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

Mssrs.,

I tend to agree with Tony that a decisive victory in Belgium could have saved Napoleon's throne. At the Congress of Vienna the knives had already started to come out, notably the secret <i>entendre</i> between GB, Austria & France aimed at isolating Prussia & Russia. Napoleon's return provided a basis for papering over the numerous issues which divided the Coalition, but it remained a very shaky proposition. Napoleon's revelation of the secret deals that Talleyrand had brokered shook the confidence of both Prussia and Russia in advance of Waterloo. A crushing defeat in Belgium might have been all it would have taken for the Hohenzollerns to pack it in and cut a separate peace.

Moreover, it is generally overlooked that 100,000 Austrians under Württemberg suffered a stinging defeat at Le Souffel on June 26, 1815 at the hands of an outnumbered French army led by Rapp. In the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, the Austrian defeat at Le Souffel became irrelevant. But what would the Hapsburg's have done if they faced the prospect of a victorious Napoleon reinforcing Rapp's victorious army on their frontier? And let's not forget that Murat, as King of Naples, had declared war on Austria. After Waterloo, the pathetic Neapolitan army was crushed in short order, but matters would have stood very differently following a decisive victory in Belgium. By 1815 Austria had regained all of its lost territories and could well have decided, in the aftermath of a French victory in Belgium, that the candle was not worth the game and made its own separate peace.

Regards,

Paco

<i>Maréchal</i> M. Francisco Palomo
<i>Prince d'Essling, Grande Duc d'Abrantes et
Comte de Marseille
Commandant - Ecole Militaire
Commandant - Division de Cavalerie de la Vieille Garde </i>

Nap's timing did him in. Had he waited a bit longer to leave Elba then perhaps he would have found a divided Europe as the Polish issue was creating discord at the peace conference.

Bring Davout and Suchet would have been good choices, but no other marshal would have subordinated themselves to them. There was great jealousy amongst the group.

It would have been better to bring new blood into the mix with upcoming generals.

Also, don't worry about the Vendee. Use the troops on the frontline.

... and even if Nap does win Waterloo then procedes to be destroyed by Schwarzenburg? That's great! We wouldn't have to listen about Wellington, Wellington, Wellington. AHHHHH! If I hear one more thing about how good Wellington (or Montgomery for that matter) is I might just burst! [:D]

Colonel Al Amos
1erè Brigade Commandant
2ème Division de Dragons

Excellent points Paco, I nearly had forgotten Rapp's victory. Al your right, hearing nothing but Wellington is a little old[}:)] As for Montgomery, well I hardly hear anyone claiming him as it should be[;)]

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; "The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

Strange thsi topic has just come up..

I stumbled accross this today while browsing for new books to splurge on...

http://www.chapters.indigo.ca/books/Nap ... 'Waterloo'

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<center>Monsieur le Marechal Baron John Corbin
Commanding L'Armee du Rhin
Grande Duc de Piave et Comte de Beauvais
Commanding the Division de Cavalerie de la Moyenne Garde
NWC President</center>

It's interesting to see such vigorous debate over the fate of Napoleonic France but I doubt that he would have been left to rule France. I don't doubt for one minute that as soon as the dust had settled Nappy might well have thought it wise to annex some country or another by way of force.

I too for one am fed up of hearing about Wellington and the Thin Red Line, perhaps one should look at the Thick Red Squares instead.




Lt. Colonel Angelo Abruzzese,
12e Chasseurs à Cheval
2e Brigade, 3e Division Cavalerie
IIIe Corps ADN

Gents,

A very interesting topic and still. I don't actually understand why the discussion goes this very way. Ok, let's suppose Davout and Suchet are present in Belgium, let's suppose Davout is placedinstead of Grouchy and marches towards Waterloo and in the afternoon not one but two colomns - french and prussian arrive on the field. What's next? Allies still have advantage in numbers. Maybe not such a huge. Bonaparte has almost all of the troops already weary of the day fight and times comes to the evening. What will happen? French will decisively defeat the allies? Having odds 3:2 against them, having most of the troops badly fatigued and having several hors of daylight? How is it possible if they couldn't do that when odds were in their favour and they had all the day in front?

I firmly believe this is impossible. The most probable variant would be the armies keep mouling each other and finish the day where they are. There may be another fight next day or may be not but let's consider strategical situation during the night after the first day. Bonaparte has approximately 75 000 remaining, allies have somewhere about 120 000. Most of the troops are highly fatigued. French cavalry of the main army is exausted with unsucessful charges. This fact is of vital. Why? Because if allies decide to fall back will french be able to organise a pursuit? Certainly not! Not with such odds! Not against hordes of prussian cavalry. So allies have an opportunity to march back toward Brussels safely and attach quite a few british and prussian reserves. Did Bonaparte have such strategical reserves as both Wellington and Blucher had? Could he have addition of 50-60 000 fresh troops?

If it came to that they can fall back further toward Antwerpen or even to Breda. Neither Brussels nor Antwerpen are Paris wich is to important to be lost. They are not even comparable to Moscow which, although important, could be lost. And wait a minute Benkendorf in 1814 managed to hold Breda for quite some time with a fistful of men against very much superior odds. It would be very strange if allies having almost double advantage in numbers would not be able to hold it. In two words once British and Prussian armies are united Bonaparte can't decisively beat them any longer. They can always fall back and back. To Netherlands where active operations are merely impossible for french or to Germany closing to the coming reinforcements.

And the main point. Yes, Rapp defeated Austrians. Let's say all the Austrian army of 100 000 is neutralised with Rapp' 26 000 man strong corps. It's exaggeration but still. Napoleon with his army is neutralised with Wellington and Blucher. But aliies do have an ace in the sleeve. When Russian army under Barclay what will Bonaparte do? What army can he send against this force of 100 000+ veterans? Boys and invalides? National guard? They would be smashed and torn in pieces as they were a year ago? Will he march with his main army to face this thread? But then Brits and Prussians would follow him and there would be another Leipzig and yet again Bonaparte would be badly outnumbered and he will suffer defeat just like in 1813. Everyone understood that and no one would drop of the coalition. On the contrary powers would compete for the chance to increase their role in defeating France in order to have a better share in the New Europe.

The fact is that when first prussian colomn arrived to the fields of Waterloo Bonaparte's throne was doomed. He had only one chance - to defeat Brits and Prussians in parts. He wasted it. No matter will Grouchy arrive or not. No mater was it he or it was Davout or whoever - Bonaparte would be sent to St. Helena. So if we really consider what if's let's go several steps back. What if he decided to march through Mons for example....

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<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Mayor Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

I would like to see Waterloo Campaign broadened to include more mapped terrain to include areas where we could fight instead of just in Belgium. Since France is generally rolling terrain its quite possible to do up a ton of 150 x 100 maps (or larger) in a short amount of time. I can put a 150 x 100 map together in 2 hours.

Add in the 1814 game at some point and then use the maps from it for Waterloo to work for a larger scope campaign ...

Add in that extra Prussian corps, more French (conscripts?) and the Austrians for good measure.

Jolly good.

Bill Peters
Armee du Rhin - V Corps, Cavalerie du V Corps, 20ème légère Brigade de Cavalerie, 13ème Hussar Regiment
HPS Napoleonic Scenario Designer (Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena-Auerstaedt and ... more to come)

[url="http://www.fireandmelee.net"]Fire and Melee Wargame site[/url]

It might be to large an undertaking, but to have an 1814 campaign with the 1815 campaign added in where you could as allies and Napoleon decide the campaigns in a wide area would be great. Besides the 1813 campaign the 1814 campaign had always been my favorite, so much area to manuver with so many possibilities.

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; "The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

Anton

"What if's" are truly fascinating. Had Davout replaced Grouchy in command of the right wing of the Armee du Nord, would he have seen fit not to press Napoleon for orders as Grouchy did on the morning of the 17th? Would he have lost contact with the Prussians after Ligny? Personally, I think not. Davout was a proven commander of all arms and exceptional in independant roles. Most would agree, I think that he was second only to Napoleon. Perhaps most importantly he was comfortable with independent command roles and had a belief in his own ability. Something that Grouchy was not.

Had Davout commanded the right wing, the Prussians would have had no time to collect their forces at Wavre and consequently there would have been no Prussian intervention on the 18th.

You may say that without the possibility of Prussian intervention, Wellington would simply have withdrawn. Not an easy task at the best of times and certainly not in the face of a superior force, with a decided advantage in cavalry and with the worlds foremost commander of the last 20 years in personal command.

A truly fascinating subject.

<font color="gold">Général de Division Greg Morgan, Grande Duc de Montebello et Comte de Gironde
Commandant IIIème Corps
Armée du Nord

Escadron des Gendarmes d'Elite "l'Immortels" de la Vielle Garde
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While events on the field ( A french victory ) would be great... I supsect the effect would be far reaching in terms of political shock value.. Just look at teh effects his escape caused even before he hit the field at Waterloo.

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<center>Monsieur le Marechal Baron John Corbin
Commanding L'Armee du Rhin
Grande Duc de Piave et Comte de Beauvais
Commanding the Division de Cavalerie de la Moyenne Garde
NWC President</center>