Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Ah, a Prussian officer who appreciates fine music! The sight lightens my heart.

And actually, the 'Lieutenant' is a Captain. I sent him his epaulettes some time ago along with a new ribbon strip. I suppose he may have been a bit too hungover as of late to have dressed his uniform.

Please Lieutenant Peccolo not another song. Well I am off to Pierre's Tavern, no Hanoverian Singing and the pretty redhead!

Battle On... Somewhere else!

Well I don't sing too well, and I don't know any Russian ditties, but I do know Russians love rhetoric and logic so here goes:

"Fire trucks are red because newspapers are read. Newspapers originally cost 25 cents. Half of 25 is about 12. 12 inches are in a foot. A foot is a ruler. Queen Elizabeth was a ruler. Queen Elizabeth was also a ship. Ships are in the ocean. Fishes are also in the ocean. Fish have fins. Fins fought the Russians. Russians are red and that's why fire trucks are red. They are always rushing."

I wonder if Scott has an um pa band and steins he could bring in to support Du Wurger. It is after all October!
Al I enjoyed that

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

Oh Colin asked for an Um Pa Band!

Here you go!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yeb08cbUswk

Great Movie by the way....

_________________
Generalfeldmarschall Scott Kronprinz "Vorwärts" Ludwig von Preußen
Kommandeur des Königlich-Preußischen Armee-Korps
Chief of Staff (CoS) of the Allied Coalition
Allied Coalition Webmaster & Club Website Support

Oh even better....I found Mark's moonlighting job....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ao8vIrzYto

_________________
Generalfeldmarschall Scott Kronprinz "Vorwärts" Ludwig von Preußen
Kommandeur des Königlich-Preußischen Armee-Korps
Chief of Staff (CoS) of the Allied Coalition
Allied Coalition Webmaster & Club Website Support

According to David Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon, Wellington, when visiting with Blucher at the mill of Bussy, upon seeing the Prussian units deployed on the forward slopes suggested that if he were in Blucher's place he would get more of the troops under shelter of the rising ground. This was said in the presence of Hardinge, the British commisioner attached to Blucher's headquarters. Furthermore, Wellington added as he left, "Well I will come; provided I am not attacked myself." There was a significant battle at Quatre Bras, where the successful Anglo-Allied defensive effort most certainly saved the Prussians at Ligny from a truly devestating defeat, as it denied Napoleon's effort to maneuver against their right rear flank.
- The source for Chandler's writing on these matters is Sir H Maxwell, The LIfe of Wellington, published in 1899.

As for the quality of Prussian troops during the 100 Days Campaign, according to Alessandro Barbero in his excellent work The Battle, almost all the officers from the rank of Captain up had begun their service before 1806, and the average age of Corps and Division commanders was 45, the same as for Napoleon and Wellington. This said, these career officers did lead in terms of quality of manpower, equipment, and organization, the worst armed force that Prussian fielded in all of the wars.
Yet, it would seem obvious that it was precisely the quality of officership that so well served this command, as one might say the same of the French during the 1813-1814 Campaigns.

Great conversation to have with one and all about this epoch we each so enjoy.

Regards,

Todd ,

You reference a truly fine study of the period, Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon is in my view a must read if you love the period , regardless of the side you follow, in fact I find myself re- reading sections or chapters of the fine work all the time

I must say that my studies do lead me to agree with Todd on this one. Wellington was hesitant to move away from the coast. It was this initial hesitation, and the delay incurred by the congested roads once he finally did begin to maneuver on Quatre Bras, that nearly cost the Coalition the campaign. Were it not for the foresight of the Dutch-Belgians and their blatant disobedience of orders to deploy as they did, Quatre Bras would certainly have been captured by Ney despite that Marechal's own dalliance in the face of rapidly unfolding events. Due to the timing and manner in which his forces finally did arrive, the very best Wellington could do was to prevent what would certainly have been a decisive envelopment of the Prussian right flank. Had Wellington's actions been any different on that day, D'Erlon would not have received the confusing orders which he did and would himself surely have engaged the Prussian right on a somewhat shallower envelopment.

The 100 Days Campaign was not won by the Prussian Army. Neither was it won by the Anglo-Allied Army. It was won by both working together. The Prussians would never have survived the Battle of Ligny had the Anglo-Allied Army not been aggressive in its occupation, and defense, of the crossroads at Quatre Bras. By the same token, the Anglo-Allied Army would certainly have been routed at Waterloo, but for the timely arrival of the Prussian Army. Neither of the Coalition Armies was a match for La Grande Armee, but together they became greater than their individual parts.

Of course, it the Hanoverians had not been present, the French would have won anyway. OK, so that is just a personal perspective!

And by the way, Scott did tag my other career very well. Hey, you have to do something to feed all the freakin' animals we own.

Scotts cameras seem to be everywhere and certainly he also has an endless supply of resource (and amusing to say the least ) material -

Ok what is it that you are agreeing with Todd over ? My disagreement with Todd is over Wellington alleged tactical recommendations regarding the Prussian troop deployments to Blucher at Ligny. Thats been a matter of dispute for ages. Todd brings up a statement by Hardinge which brings the number of officers present that support or mention Wellington making that statement to One. Of the eight officers present,including The Hanoverian Dornberg and The Bavarian Thurn und Taxis none make any mention of it in there recollections of the meeting. There in lies the problem.

Wellington had his own problems that prevented him from supporting the Prussians I agree and one could say that not the least of those problems was trusting his French contacts rather then the intel that was provided bye his allies and the delay it causes. However the fact still remains that Bluchers decision to fight at Ligny despite being short Bulows corp was predicated on the promise of support from Wellington. That decision was made after the meeting at Brye not before,the other option being discussed was a fighting withdraw towards Gembloux where IV corp was due to be the following morning. Things didn't work out as planned to say the least.

Regards
Walt

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Generallieutenant Walt GroßHerzog Moehle von Neuhardenberg
Kommandeur der Korps Artillerie-Brigade
Kommandeur der Gardegrenadier
Königlich Preußische Korps

We can continue the discussion over cups of coffee, pots of tea, and fine breakfast here in the tavern (sorry, no bloody English breakfast though, my delicate constitution can't handle it).

On May 3rd 1815, at a council of war between Blucher and Wellington at Tirlemont, Blucher pressed for an immediate offensive by the 210,000 men already available in the Netherlands, but he was persuaded to await the arrival of the other Allies.

Although the first reactions on the 14th were slow, next day the Prussian staff ordered the implementation of the contingency plan ageed to with Wellington on May 3rd - namely the concentration of the Prussian IInd, IIIrd, and IV Corps at Sombreffe behind the screen provided by Ziethen's retiring formations.

Although the Prussian concentration was going ahead as previously planned, it was nevertheless placing Blucher's army in increasing peril - for in warfare few movements are more dangerous than a forward concentration of troops in close proximity to a powerful and advancing enemy.

(Taken from Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon).

I feel that the point is that the Allies had come to the basic (and standard) agreement, that their armies would support each other at the hinge of their respective fronts.

Whichever army was not attacked by Napoleon would support his fellow.

Unfortunately for the Allies, it was also a standard strategy for Napoleon, when faced by superior strength, divided between two opposing armies, to adopt the central position, by striking at the hinge between the two forces, driving them apart. This is what keeps the Allies from providing close support for one another, and usually allowed for L'Empereur to defeat his foes in detail. He used this strategy many times throughout the Wars.

This time, Blucher marched not away from the front, but more or less parallel with his ally.
And Waterloo was the result.

As Mark said, a victory obtained by the combination of the Allied armies working together.

Ah, thanks Helga, fine tea this morning.
French pastry anyone?

Regards.

Walt, I was responding to your statement as follows:

"Todd
What source are you quoting that Wellington advised Blucher of ANYTHING other then he would support him if attacked ? which as we know he didn't follow through with. It took the Guard to push the Prussians out of Ligny, a largely inexperienced Prussian army at that. An inexperienced Prussian army that gets beaten at Ligny,rallies and marches most of the night and the next day making it to Waterloo in time to support Wellington if not to save the day,personally I think its the latter."

In my opinion, your question concerning Wellington's advice to Blucher to deploy on the reverse slope was rather the smallest part of your comment. The larger part to me was your suppostion that the Anglo-Allied Army did not march to the aid of the Prussians and the implication that the Prussian Army won this campaign single handedly. That is no way the truth, and smacks of Prussian propaganda to as much a degree as any of Siborne's writings favor the Britsh Army. The truth, as is most often the case, lies somewhere in the middle.

Regarding deployment on the reverse slopes, for all of his other shortcomings, I think everyone would readily agree that Wellington was in fact a masterful, defensive tactician. Blucher was a man disposed entirely towards offensive action. Now, I personally would agree that offensive action is the more effective of the two, provided that it is not recklessly conducted. Blucher would sometimes be reckless in this regard. I would conjecture that the Prussian Army under Blucher's command, and this is a singularly significant point, was probably the only army in the world that would have rallied so quickly after thier defeat at Ligny to march so many miles to the salvation of thier allies at Waterloo. I would further conjecture that the Anglo-Allied Army under Wellington's command was perhaps the only army in the world that could have ever survived at Waterloo long enough for the Prussians to arrive. These two leaders, with thier vastly differing skills, indelibly shaped the outcome of the conflict. It was not one or the other, it was decidedly the combination of both that won the day.

And let's not forget von Gneisenau who was critical in rallying and moving the army in the right direction after Ligny.

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Général David Guegan

3ème Régiment de Grenadiers - Bataillon d'élite du 3ème Légère
2ème Brigade
Grenadiers de la Réserve
Réserve
La Grande Armée
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"From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step."
Napoléon Bonaparte

Military justice is to justice what military music is to music.
Groucho Marx

...in Blucher's absence due to his incapacitation resulting from bearing the weight of his fallen horse.

As I recall though, the Prussian staff also argued for a withdrawal toward their line of communications and away from the Anglo-Allied Army. A movement that was actually what Napoleon had anticipated. It was this preconception on the manner in which the Prussians would withdraw that contributed to Grouchy's very poor pursuit.