Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

An article from Empires, Eagles and Lions (EEL) written by Jean Lochet, copied from MagWeb:

Combat Tactics:
Brigade and Division Charges
Basic Principles
by Jean A. Lochet

The tactics were very simple. They ignored all the subtle maneuvering and obeyed a general principle that overrode everything else:

"Attack. all out attack. quickly and completely."

Cavalry

For speed in attack and surprise i.e. to constantly dominate the enemy. the French cavalry grandmasters based their actions on two principles:

1. Concentration under one direct command all the forces so the cavalry commander could strike quickly the assigned objective with the maximum strength possible.

2. Use of simple evolutions and attack procedures to avoid errors and and be executed without hesitation.

Time is important! If an order is to be repeated, time is wasted and the opportunity may have disappeared as well as the supreme advantage of attacking first.

PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AT THE BRIGADE AND DIVISION LEVEL

The basic phases of a cavalry combat were:

1. IN AWAITING POSITION: The cavalry adopted a formation per regiment en masse i.e. in close column by deployed squadrons one behind the other.

2. COMBAT FORMATIONS: The basic combat formation was the line.

For combat a brigade or a Division was deployed in 2 lines.

The first line was to deliver the attack and the second was the reserve. The two lines were deployed either one behind the other or in overlappping echelons.

With a Division including 3 brigades, 2 brigades were placed on the first line and the 3rd on the second line.

With a brigade with 3 regiments. 2 were placed on the first line and the 3rd on the second line.

3. THE CHARGE

The first line was to charge -- straight ahead.

The charge was always carried out deployed in line (or in echelons) but not necessarily with the full line. The enemy could be probed with a regiment or a brigade. Then, the commander would evaluate before launching a new echelon, the result obtained by the first one in order to engage only the necessary units. So the order given to attacking force was very clear:

"Here is the objective to strike. Charge home without worrying about your flanks and run over everything."

Only one objective was assigned: strike the enemy like lightning and break them!

If the first fraction was repulsed, a second one was launched. And if that one was also repulsed, then the commander himself would strike like at the combat of Hoff confirmed by Murat's report:

"The cuirassier regiment launched first was repulsed as well as Colbert's brigade, but I was there; I vigourously charged forward with the Division and everything was run over."

4. THE SECOND LINE

The second line was the reserve and was to assist the first line.

On occasions, it prevented flank attacks. It had to be ready to pursue the defeated enemy.

That reserve followed the first line to a certain distance to assist it without risking to be thrown back if the first line was repulsed. The distance between the first and second line was 200 to 250 pas (paces).

5. RALLYING AND REFORMING

After the charge, the cavalry fell back to the rear as quickly as possible to reform on 2 lines so to be in a position to quickly renew an attack.

So was the way an isolated cavalry brigade or Division was fighting and had most of the time infantry as a support. to allow it to rally if necessary. But in a large battle, it was relatively rare to engage on a decisive point such relatively small forces. Preferably larger forces were used in such cases.

COMBAT TACTICS: CAVALRY FORCES LARGER THAN THE BRIGADE OR DIVISION

When in a larger battle a decisive blow was planned against the enemy, several Divisions were concentrated as -oer the above principles. that is also on two lines under a single command (usually Murat),. each echelon flanking the other.

1. THE DEPLOYMENT

The deployment was as it follows:

As a first echelon, one Divisions on 2 lines. Then behind it on one of the flanks. A second division also on two lines. A third Division, behind the first line, also on two lines. Finally, the fourth Division, if it was available, was deployed behind that large formation also on 2 lines. So in such an instance, the cavalry could often be deployed in 4, 6 or 8 successive lines depending on the number of units concentrated.

2. THE CHARGE

Except in exceptional cases like a Eylau, Ratisbonne, Waterloo. etc. were the charges were made in columns for lack of space, the usual combat took place as it follows.

The first echelon carried on the attack, and if successful, started to pursue the enemy supported by the other echelons at proper distances.

If the first echelon was repulsed, the second echelon moved forward to reestablish contact with the enemy and allow the first echelon to fall back to the rear to reform on two lines.

If the second echelon was not sufficient, the third one intervened, and finally the fourth one, so each each defeated echelon would fall back to the rear to rally and reform on two lines to renew the attack if necessary.

So the combat took place in a series of efforts given by echelons flanking each others -- each of them forming an independent unit -- but each line was still under the control of a single commander.

In fact, such actions, because they were separated on the right or on the left had a tendency to give back some independence to the individual Division commanders and prevented the single commander the control of the combat.

When the mass of cavalry reached 3 or 4 Divisions, the Emperor gave the command of that de facto corps, a commander of his own choosing, but the combat still took place as outlined above.

EVOLUTIONS

We have outlined how charges were carried out. Now, let us see how some simple formations allowed breaks through. deployments, flank attacks, the means to counter that of the enemy and finally the rallyment.

For the breakthroughs and deployments, the squadrons, having most of the time to go through some gaps to move forward, had to reduce frontage by forming columns of platoons, then redeploying ahead in line and charged. When it was necessary to move on the right or left of the line, the squadrons also formed in columns of platoons and refaced forward by either successively moving left or right par platoon, or the change of direction by the column heads and by a forward to redeploy into line.

During the Empire, the change of front were seldom used as too slow and too complicated.

FLANK ATTACKS

To counter a flank attack, the maneuver was very simple and consisted in moving the second line (or part of it) in good order, forward straight ahead. Consequently, that was now the turn of the enemy to be taken in flank, which was often disorganized and at a disadvantage because in order to make its flank attack, it had had to make some successive quarter-wheels.

Flank attacks were made to either relieve a defeated friendly line or to initiate combats on several points at the same time.

In the first case, i.e. to relieve a defeated friendly line, a flank attack was almost always successful since it was carried on a disorganized unit with tired horses because of the prior combat and were taken in flank or the back by fresh cavalry.

In the second case, it was a different story as it was practically impossible to take the enemy in flank by breaking through its center line. Such a maneuver could not be carried out 99% of the time. That type of flank attack had for main objective to confuse and deconcerter the enemy by attacking it on several points.

RALLYING

The rallying was carried on as per the following principles:

1. If defeated the cavalry was failing back quickly to the rear behind the support echelon (infantry or cavalry) to quickly reform on two lines, and then moving forward to resume the attack if necessary.

2. If the enemy had been defeated, rallying was carried on the most forward echelon and the pursuit actively carried on by the second line (reserve) supported in turn by the reformed victorious echelon.

Quick rallying was a very important maneuver since victorious or defeated, the line was broken after the impact, and -- ONLY -- regained its initial power by reforming and by going back under the control of its commander.

The battle reports of the period have a tendency to prove that the squadrons were well versed in quick rallying.

CONCLUSION

The combats evolutions and tactics were so easy and simple to apply that they could be carried out with horses of relatively average training and of lesser blood and with horsemen of mediocre abilities.

The irrefutable proof is given by the great cavalry battles carried on by the poorly trained French cavalry in 1813, 1814 and 1815. At that time the French cavalry was facing the well mounted European cavalry mostly numbering many veteran horsemen in its ranks. On the contrary, the French cavalry after the huge losses of the retreat of Russia, was in the process of reforming and practically, with the exception of that of the Guard, had only conscripts in its ranks, but in spite of that consistently defeated the enemy squadrons.

The secret of these successes is easily explained. The speed and the audacity on the attack were the two main factors. To obtain the speed the illustrious cavalry commanders had understood that only the simplest movements had to be used to be understood without errors and lost of time.


Unusual Cavalry Tactics and Tricks: Cavalry vs. Infantry and Artillery

Some unusual cavalry tactics are, on occasions, found in many battle reports and first hand accounts and can be useful to wargamers eager to apply real Napoleonic tactics in their tabletop battles.

1. ARTILLERY BATTERIES

As a general rule, cavalry avoided to attack an artillery battery or position frontally.

If ordered or forced to do so, the cavalry would do so in skirmish or open order. It was not important to maintain good order when attacking artillery, but was important to avoid the effect of canister, which became murderous at short range (about 300 yards). So the assaulting cavalry would normally gallop the last 350 yards or so.

When sent to attack artillery in position, cavalry would normally make an approach from the rear or flanks often in open order or to the opposite side to the position of any infantry or cavalry in support. When the enemy support was cavalry, the approach would be made most of the time in echelon.

At Austerlitz, the 5th Chasseurs a cheval took an 8-gun battery by an attack on the rear.

During the 1814 Campaign of France, in March 1814, a cavalry force of chasseurs a cheval and lancers came upon a battery of 18 Russian guns near St. Dizier. 1 squadron of chasseurs charged in skirmish order at the gallop the front of the battery and at a distance of about 350 feet (100 meters) from it the wheeled to left and right, then charged on both flanks. At the same moment a squadron of lancers in open order charged the front. The battery was taken and eliminated.

2. CAVALRY VERSUS INFANTRY

According to von Bismark:

the most difficult part of the cavalry combats is the art of attacking infantry successfully.....

With the progress of the modern tactic, it becomes every day more difficult to attack it with success. That new infantry tactic consists in the quick formation of masses (squares) and in the destructive effect of a well-kept fire.... When the infantry has its morale intact, a charge... will rarely succeed... here we can recommend:

(1) to use artillery fire (canister)prior to a cavalry, charge...
(2) to avoid attacking infantry when fresh, well posted and of apparent good morale...

It is much better if the cavalry await the opportunity, to catch the infantry at a disadvantage, during a maneuver or while marching...

When the infantry has received a shock strong enough to to damage its morale, for instance in the steady rain at Dresden and Grossbeeren in August 1813, etc, in these cases, the cavalry has only to present itself to obtain the results.

In the other cases against fresh infantry, one must weight the price of success against the losses that may, occur and balance the success.

Well, the above confirms what we all already know. The success of cavalry against fresh and well trained infantry is almost nil. Occasional square breaking, like at Gamia Hernandez, was pure luck and not the norm. Cavalry charges against poorly trained infantry were much more successful.

We wish to thank George Nafziger for providing us with most of the original French material that was used to prepare our lecture.

Sources
Aubier, Lt.Colonel A. La cavalerie napoleonienne peut-elle encore servir de modele?, Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1902.
Bonie, General T. La cavalerlie au combat, Baudoin & Cie, Paris 1887.
Bismark, comte von Bismark Tactique de la cavalerie, Levrault, Paris 1821.
Chandler, David The Campaigns of Napoleon MacMillan, N.Y. 1966.
Parquin, Charles Napoleon's Army, London 1969.
de Lee Nigel French Lancers, Amark Publishing Co. London 1967.
Misc. notes and documents from French archives (Archives Guerre).





Colonel Al Amos
1erè Brigade Commandant
2ème Division de Dragons

Monsieur bar keep two bottles of Rum to the Monsieur Bravo but Monsieur this is not table top and the HP game game is a lot different but I do agree with this attack attack attack !

Col de Art 6/3 II Corps AN Marbot CS

Thanks Al most interesting.
regards


Colonel Colin Knox,
Baron de l'Empire
2e Regiment Gardes d'Honneur
La Jeune Garde
IIIe Corps ADN
http://www.aspire.co.nz/colinknoxnwc.htm

Thanks for posting that Al.

<center>[url="http://homepage.ntlworld.com/a.r.barlow/Napoleonic/nap.htm"]Lieutenant Colonel Antony Barlow[/url]
~ [url="http://www.geocities.com/anglo_allied_army_stats/Anglo_Allied_Army_Cavalry_Corps.htm"]2nd British (Union) Brigade, Anglo-Allied Cavalry Corps[/url] ~
~ [url="http://www.geocities.com/militaireacademie/dragoons.html"]4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards[/url] ~
</center>

Thanks, Al! Very funny. Specially the part about concentrating command in one persons hands and always keeping the reserves.[8D]

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Mayor Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

L'Armee had its Cheval in a large Cheval Res that is what is ment in one man hands not one players hand Mon General. Give him a small bottle of wine tack away his Vo merci bar keep.

Col de Art 6/3 II Corps AN Marbot CS

Oh, come on! Do you really think that man who only leads charges is an effective commander for large cavalry formations? And how you suppose it looked like? He draws his sword, charges across the swamped field, if a a trop or even pace of the horse that is stuck in deep mud may be called a charge, then he is involved in sabrefight and during the course of it he calls his aide-du-camp, who by the way is also involved in fight and orders him to rde "over there" where untouched and hidden from them by smoke, dust mist or whatever, cavalry reserve stands. And this very cavalry reserve has to attack "right that" enemy formation, that is not seen either. It's not even funny! Once someone is engaged in fight personally he loses control. So yes, formally french cavalry was usually concentrated "in one hands", de facto it constantly had commander involved in fighting and hence had no command at all! And reserves, ah these damn reserves, sometimes they were not kept at all. To name just a couple of instances - 1st day at Leipzig and 2nd day at Dresden. No CAVALRY reserve at all. There were infantry and arty behind but they were just an anchor in case cavalry would be defeated. And if it happened like at Leipzig it would be out of fight for the rest of the day.

And so we have a great example of people writing (talking) not about real history based on real examples but about the myth, wide spread unfortunately, that has nothing to do with reality.[V] But it sells well[}:)]

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Mayor Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

A refreshing realist for once! Thank you, Anton Kosyanenko. Perhaps you are in a field which rests itself on observation and quantitative analysis, such as something in science or engineering? I applaud your frankness.

A great book on the actual 'realism' of battle is John Keegan's "Face of Battle", which supports much of what Anton implies. One of the chapters in that book is devoted to Waterloo.

Having just finished Keegan's book, which is replete with logical deductive analyses from simple facts, I was quite changed in my view of Napoleonic battle. For example, Keegan says there is no record save ONE on all of the cavalry attacks on Anglo-Allied infantry at Quatre Bras and Waterloo of a FORMED infantry battalion ever breaking and routing or being broken by ANY cavalry charge whether it be heavy or whatever. The one instance was a DEAD horse already shot which SLID with his pinned rider into a square, physically moving dozens of soldiers which through that opening was exploited by the rest of the charging cavalry. That was stated to be an extremely rare happening by the men who witnessed it (the only one EVER by veteran officers of the peninsula). All eyewitnesses that Keegan read (and he read many many many) said that cavalry when charging a square would NEVER close within less than 10 to 15 yards or so of the square and NEVER came on at full tilt -- the horses refused. The cavalrymen would lap around the square edges "making primate displays of aggression" but their HORSES would not approach the unbroken bayonet lines. Here is just an example of how what is in these games is untrue. I recently had nearly 2000 men (in two battalions) both in square with skirmishers on top be broken by a charge of 700 or so heavy horse! When I read Keegan's book I wondered how that was possible.

Further, French surgeons after several battles made a count of the number of bayonet wounds found on wounded or dead. Out of categorizing tens of thousands, only a few (less than 10) were recorded as being by bayonet. So, how realistic is the column melee against a FORMED line or column and pushing it back, still formed but in the column case facing away or in line still facing the enemy. Often the defeated infantry unit by melee won't afterwards break and rout, and then where are we? Two large bodies of men who obviously would have closed bayonet, but the evidence shows that one side or the other would either in attacker case FAIL TO CLOSE WITH THE ENEMY or in defender case always haul ass backwards in a disordered rout, so that the bayonet never got used. (du Picq's studies as well discovered this.) How many games against novice players (who haven't learned melee destroys your own units by fatigue -- which another matter altogether) have I seen where melee after melee after melee against formed infantry lines happens, when reality was that few actual melees occurred. It was, as Clauswitz said of battle between two opposing armies, more often like two 500 lb gorillas trying to scare each other off: one side or the other would run away. Even the vaunted French Imperial Guard "disappeared back into the mist (from black powder smoke)" when the British Foot Guards unleashed volley after volley into thier ranks at Waterloo. If they didn't, if the Guard had "charged or died" then the Foot Guards would have been swept from the slope before Mont St Jean and the battle would have ended differently. But eye witnesses said the French Guard in the final assault on Waterloo came up within a few dozen yards of the allied lines and then waivered and then turned around and retreated back into the smoke. If the Imperial Guard can't close with a formed enemy unit, then what other unit can?

And finally, a Napoleonic battle after a few minutes old was like fighting at night because of all the musket and cannon smoke. Commanders could not see the units next to them. Is that incredibly hugely impacting thing on the "Fog of War" simulated in our games? No. Eye witness after eye witness in those battles said they couldn't often see their own battalion the smoke was so thick. Visibility is a huge deal affecting communication and intelligience during a battle that is usually no wider than a mile or two.

Then the sound. One man command a large horse reserve!? HAH-HA-HA-HA. Ever stand near a jet engine on the tarmack? That's how loud a musket/cannon battle is calculated to be when all the sounds are added together. Can you hear a guy next to you let alone the bugle of a battalion or regiment? Eye witnesses in those battles said they couldn't see or hear much beyond a few yards of their immediate position.




Col. Dirk Smith
1e Bg, 16 Dv, V Corps
Armee du Rhin

Dirk,

That's a fascinating and refreshingly challenging post. It reminds me of something I was reading about British infantry in Nosworthy's 'Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies', where he cites first hand accounts which contradict the myths of generations of historians. He says (based mainly on accounts from the Peninsula) that the British infantry <u>rarely</u> poured multiple volleys on their enemy but instead fired a volley (or two) at close range and then often settled the issue with a fierce and determined bayonet charge, the silent and determined order only giving way to utter ferocity in the last moments. He also cites accounts of British infantry in line formation on the attack, not firing at all, and purely relying on the bayonet to sweep enemy infantry away. As you say, actual contact with the bayonet was extremely rare but the psychological impact of the enemy behaviour was the determining factor. In these Peninsula accounts the French infantry obviously <i>believed</i> that the British infantry relished the opportunity to get in amongst them with cold steel and this triggered and immediate rout, often with minimal damage to the British infantry. This may not necessarily be a reflection of a lack of quality of the routing unit, but rather reflect a realistic appraisal of the ferocity of the enemy, based on experience. I suppose the British infantryman came to expect such a response and this fed into his self belief.

So if all this is true infantry in line formation, without superiority in numbers, <i>could</i> and <i>did</i> on numerous occasions break enemy infantry through the use of the bayonet, both on the offensive, and as a defensive counter-attack with absolutely minimal casualties to the victorious infantry. I suppose this all depended on a perfect balance of discipline, steady morale, efficient use of musketry (and holding back until close range), and a total belief in their invincibility with the bayonet, and a corresponding recognition of this by the enemy infantry. A combination of factors which were not present in all infantry encounters, or by all armies, throughout the Napoleonic wars, and so cannot easily be simulated within our games, and indeed would contradict the way melee works in the games, where huge numerical superiority is needed to guarantee success without suffering huge caualties in the victor. Of course there must be many examples of infantry breaking before the French infantry bayonet too, but I'll leave that to others to provide.

As for the Imperial Guard infantry's recoiling from attacking the Britsh Foot Guards. Surely this isn't so much proof that such an attack could never suceed in general, but rather reflects the perception of the cababilities of the enemy in front of them and the corresponding low expectation of them breaking, coupled with the effective musketry aimed at them. Perhaps too there was already a feeling that the battle couldn't be won? Had rumour of the Prussian arrival filter down by that stage?

<center>[url="http://homepage.ntlworld.com/a.r.barlow/Napoleonic/nap.htm"]Lieutenant Colonel Antony Barlow[/url]
~ [url="http://www.geocities.com/anglo_allied_army_stats/Anglo_Allied_Army_Cavalry_Corps.htm"]2nd British (Union) Brigade, Anglo-Allied Cavalry Corps[/url] ~
~ [url="http://www.geocities.com/militaireacademie/dragoons.html"]4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards[/url] ~
</center>

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by dragoon</i>
<br />Perhaps you are in a field which rests itself on observation and quantitative analysis, such as something in science or engineering?
Col. Dirk Smith
1e Bg, 16 Dv, V Corps
Armee du Rhin
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Quite right. Risk management and financial engeneering. Working with raw intraday market data and market microstructure[8D]

As for the number of men with wounds from bayonets how can we rely on data that is fractions of percents when actual loses are estimated really roughly. For example at Borodino estimates for both sides are 30 000 to 50 000 dead, wounded and missing. With accuracy like that we can't talk not only about fraction but about percents too. BTW this very argument I first read from D.S.Walter on CCC forum, so copyright to him.[:I]

<center></center>
<center><b>Eyo Imperatorskogo Velichestva Leib-Kirassirskogo polku
General-Mayor Anton Valeryevich Kosyanenko
Commander of the Second Army of the West </b></center>

Mssrs.,

In no particular order, I would make the following points:

1) <i>The Face of Battle</i>-

Keegan's <i>The Face of Battle</i> was a truly seminal book which single-handedly launched a revolution in how military history was written. The genius of the book, however, lay in his magnificent critique of traditional accounts of battles and their utter failure to accurately depict what exactly happens when the opposing bodies of men met on the field of battle. Thus, the first chapter is an extended exposition on the limitations of traditional military history and the succeeding chapters applied his proposed methodology to three famous, well documented battles: Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme. His suggested methodology, the need to break down the analysis of a battle into an assesment of what actually happens when the various branches encounter each other (e.g., inf vs. inf, inf vs. cav, etc.) was inspired and his application of that method to the three cited battles was a wonderful tour de force. Keegan's area of expertise, however, lies primarily in 20th Century warfare, so his observations about Napoleonic tactics must be taken with several grains of salt. (And, yes, I have read and own nearly every book Keegan has written)

2) Bayonets & Melees

Yes, the records of nearly every well documented Napoleonic battle reflect a negligible number of bayonet wounds (Statistically the vast majority of casulaties were inflicted by artillery). Likewise, I agree that most first-hand accounts reflect that few assaults actually resulted in a "melee", either one side or the other would break and run before there was an actual "clash of steel." By the same token, nearly every contemporary writer of the period emphasized the importance of a "bayonet assault" as the only sure means to carry a position. The start of a "firefight" was deemed to be the death knell for any assault, leading to an inconclusive stalemate. Were they delusional? Not having been there, I'll never know for certain, but methinks that the way out of this conondrum is to understand the psychological effect of having several hundred men charging in with fixed bayonets. If the assaulting troops withstood the shock of the defenders' fire and kept advancing, the defenders would then break and run. Meanwhile, the key to the frequent success of the British infantry was that they held their fire until the attackers reached point blank range, 20-30 yds, when their fire would decimate the attacker's front rank and then immediately counter-charged while the opposing column was completely shaken.

Do either the BG or HPS game engines accurately reflect this? Of course not.[B)] As has been noted elsewhere, many of us have repeatedly suggested that some type of pre-melee morale check be instituted to no avail. That said, the games are, after all, an abstraction and an assault which simply results in disordering both sides and, at most, pushing back the defender 100 yds, can readily represent the inconclusive firefight where neither side had the <i>elan </i>to close with the enemy.

Regards,

Paco

<i>Maréchal</i> M. Francisco Palomo
<i>Prince d'Essling, Grande Duc d'Abrantes et
Comte de Marseille
Commandant - Ecole Militaire
Commandant - Division de Cavalerie de la Vieille Garde </i>

Gentlemen,

One more comment regarding the purpose of training and doctrine. Once battle is joined it becomes difficult even with modern communications to orchestrate a battle. In the Napoleonic era it was much more difficult (bordering on impossible) as already stated by others for a commander involved in the battle to provide direction to the attacking forces once the battle is joined. Hence the importance of the post that began this thread -- a standard doctrine/method that was understood by the various sub commanders and could therfore be carried out absent direct orders. So rather than dismissing the doctrine as impossible to carry out to perfection, recognize that the training and disposition of forces could lead to successful implementation without the need of the commander ordering each action. I've led men in combat and it is remarkable how the training kicks in so that there is not a great need to direct each action.

General Theron Lambert
Grande Duc de Montereau et Duc d'Angers
3rd Division
VI Corps
Armee du Rhin
Commandant Grenadiers a Pied "les Grognards"