Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Following the topic raised by Colin Knox I just wanted to expand on this further.

Austerlitz indeed was the greatest victory but it was not a result of some sort of magic prevision by Napoleon. His orders from the 1st of December and the general battle plan signed off on the evening of the 1st of Dec suggest that the flow of the battle was not a result of cunning calculation but the improvisation based on the flaws of the Allied battle plan.

Napoleon’s battle plan says nothing about attacking allied center; it says nothing about encircling the enemy between Pratzen and the ponds. The disposition says nothing about operations in this area at all!

In fact the disposition prescribed the opposite: the main attack towards east was to be performed by Lann’s and Bernadote’s Corps supported by the entire Reserve cavalry. That is why the bulk of Napoleon’s forces including the entire reserve cavalry were concentrated around Santon hill. Davout was dispatched towards Kobelnitz:



In short, no operations around Tellnitz and Sokolnitz were planned. In reality, the so called “main attack” towards Pratzen was carried by a limited force of Soult’s Corps who found himself outnumbered while attacking the heights, who had less than 1,000 cavalry under his operational command and who after capturing the heights had no further orders and had no idea what he is supposed to do next.

The traditional view on the French battle plan (which to this day found on Wikipedia):

“….the French troops would attack and recapture the Pratzen Heights, then from the Heights they would launch a decisive assault to the center of the Allied army, cripple them and then encircle them from the rear”

- has little to do with reality. The classical view of the battle was born as a result of post-factum knowledge about the battle.

The day before battle Napoleon did not plan to attack Prazten heights and had no idea which way the allied columns occupying the Pratzen heights were going to move. If Allied columns were going to stay on Pratzen as was advocated by Kutuzov, the task of capturing the heights would be suicidal. Prior to battle, seeing Allied columns occupying the heights Napoleon exclaimed: “if they think I am going to attack them there, they will have to wait for a long time”.

Most likely the plan was to crush Bagration cutting off Allied communication lines to Olmutz and then turning his front from West to East facing south. Seeing Allied columns abandoning the heights Napoleon realized the opportunity to achieve what was achieved historically and it appears that to large extend the greatest victory was achieved due to the flaw of the allied battle plan, the weaknesses in the allied command chain (that is only nominal command by Kutuzov) and Napoleon’s ability to recognize the opportunity. However, this was not as a result of precisely calculated plan but rather an improvisation.



Even with the full knowledge of each other’s forces and disposition – the historical scenario is still a challenge to both players, especially the Allied who having equal forces is burdened with a task of attacking and faces a dilemma of defending the heights or attacking Sokolnitz/Telnitz. I also suppose we are yet to see an Allied player who can beat Colin Knox playing the French. If there are any senior French officers willing to try H&R 1.03 Austerlitz historical scenario drop me a message.

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General-Leytenant Alexey Tartyshev
Leib-Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment (Grenadier Drum)
1st Brigade
Guard Infantry Division
5th Guard Corps


(I don't play with with ZOC kills and Rout limiting ON)

Salute!

It may well be true, that the great victory of the Sun at Austerlitz was more a matter of opportunity than grand design (to lie like a bulletin), but then, that is the remarkable feature of Napoleon's art of war.

L'Empereur would often make his initial deployment (usually the day/night before) a standard affair, left and right wings, a center, and a reserve (with adjustments made depending upon the terrain, and the knowledge of enemy dispositions).

On the day of battle he would make further observations of the foe's deployments, and actions, and then adjust his own plan accordingly.

Yes, the Allied plan was faulty, and Napoleon took lethal advantage of this, but that is what the master did, over and over to his opponents.

Regards,

"Most likely the plan was to crush Bagration cutting off Allied communication lines to Olmutz and then turning his front from West to East facing south. " - Alexey

By doing this the Allied army is still being cutoff from its base, and crushed against the water obstacle presented by the lakes and swamps, as it was historically. The allies merely presented an alternate point to strike them at.

Although I agree historians have gone too far in giving Napoleon credit for planning how the battle would go down to the detail it unfolded, I still think we can credit Napoleon for devising a scheme over the days before that enticed the Allies to possibly expose thier LOC. He did intend to strike them at such a moment to achieve a campaign ending victory. This he planned, this he did.

I think it is fair to say Napoleon deliberately weakened his right and strenghtened his left and center in hopes the Allies would concentrate on his right and weaken their lines somewhere else. There is also NO DOUBT he deliberately gave up the Pratzen Heights prior to the battle. So this vitory was certainly more than just bad planning and incompetence by the Allies. Napoleon probably had a range of options in his head before the mornnig sun came up. I don't think he had his mind made up prior to the battle on exactly what he would do but rather had a general idea. He made his dispostitions and then waited to see what the Allies would do. He then timed his attacks nearly to perfection based on what he saw developing. I think that was his genius at Austerlitz.

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Field Marshal Sir Edward Blackburn, 1st Duke of Aberdeen K.G.
85th (Buck's Light Volunteers) Regiment of Foot
16th British Brigade
7th Division
III (Peninsular) Corps
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards

I DON'T PLAY WITH ROUT LIMITING OR NME OFF

Yes – undoubtedly Napoleon provoked Alexander to act aggressively and deliberately gave up the heights.

I think he hoped to cut off the Allies from its base in Olmutz by attacking Bagration with the bulk of its force but I doubt that he planned to encircle the big chunk of the Allied army as based on the battle plan and original disposition of both armies there was no reason to hope for encirclement. Cutting off from its base yes – encirclement I don’t see how this could be predicted as of 1st of Dec.

Pushing Bagration towards Olmutz and separating him from the rest of army while separating the army from its base - is a victory but it’s not the greatest victory. This is not to mention that in order to minimise the damage Allies could either do any or combination of the below:
1). reinforce Bagration
2). just stay still on heights turning the battle into the frontal engagement having both quantity in artillery and quality in position (the heights)
3). Just pack up and retreat towards Austerlitz (I bet if Kutuzov had the command, he would do that).

IMHO only around 9am when it became apparent that:
Firstly- Allied left wing abandoned the heights and
Secondly - Allies were either pinned or inactive at Telnitz-Sokolnitz line –
Only at this point the greatest victory started to materialise in Napoleon’s head.

PS. this is a far cry from one of the movies where Napoleon, being in Boulogne camp, pokes the map around Austerlitz and says: "I will destroy them here"

_________________
General-Leytenant Alexey Tartyshev
Leib-Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment (Grenadier Drum)
1st Brigade
Guard Infantry Division
5th Guard Corps


(I don't play with with ZOC kills and Rout limiting ON)

Alexey wrote: PS. this is a far cry from one of the movies where Napoleon, being in Boulogne camp, pokes the map around Austerlitz and says: "I will destroy them here" [/quote]

Gotta loves the movies!

That particular quote is probably borrowed from a famous incident related by Bourienne, his secretary, when Napoleon was planning the 1800 campaign in Italy, and laying down upon the large map, calculating all the odds of possibilities, and placing his finger on the plain of the Scrivia river, and saying, "this where I will fight them," or somesuch. His finger rested upon Marengo.

Regards,

Salute Gentlemen!
My read on it is that each of the posts below are right in different ways. Austerlitz is to me quite paradoxical at times and the fact that each of these posts see's different angles is to me the equivelent of the fascination this battle offers. There are so many ways to look at it and its a battle that would be worthy of a similar output of books as Waterloo.

I have composed quite an extensive post on the strategic side of it including maps but I will hold off posting it as Major Amos is the latest Allied player to pick up the sword against me and try to vanquish the French army of 1805.

Helga a round here for these fine officers.

_________________
Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"