Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Napoleon has received much criticism for his performance at Borodino.
I love to study these great battles in depth and this one is no exception.

At Borodino I believe Napoleon went for what I call a sledgehammer strategy.

Sometimes when I am in doubt about the variables in a particular scenario I fall back on the concept of ‘out and out mass’. If you examine Borodino, how it was fought out and the deployments you will see Napoleon was filled with doubt. Perhaps therefore he calculated a sledgehammer approach was his best strategy

When I play this scenario I have the benefit of god view and clear idea of the disposition of forces. This leads me to a variation on Napoleon’s strategy that is more oblique in shape. I believe had the master been privy to the intelligence I have he would have done similar.

However adulations of Tondu aside let us return to what happened on that fateful day.

In essence the strategic situation led Napoleon to the conclusion that he must use the simplest principle on which he had based his career - mass.

Napoleon above all else was a supreme calculator of the odds. I therefore figure he felt this approach was the best gamble available in light of the overall situation and intelligence available. In many ways his depressed state on the epic day may well have been explainable by the fact he realised the odds had already shifted against him.

Therefore when one examines the situation carefully we see that he was most likely correct to employ his sledgehammer approach.

He directed a huge mass against what was in effect the Russian left. While their centre and right were prone. An altogether correct strategy given his understanding of the situation.

However Napoleon was unable to calculate in two key factors. Firstly the 2nd row of fleches in the south was not visible from his locale. Secondly I believe he was shocked by the performance of the Russian infantry at Borodino. Despite a frightful massacre the Russian’s created history by showing their famous stoic determination. Indeed Napoleon was heard to comment ‘what are these automatons’s they throw against me’.

All in all I judge Borodino to be a correct plan by the Emperor given the available intelligence. A plan that was foiled by the magnificent Russian soldier who saved the day in spite of poor operational leadership. Tactically the likes of Bagration emulated the efforts of the rank and file and also paid the ultimate price.

All in all Napoleon does not deserve the criticism for his plan at Borodino in my view and also we must credit the soldiers of holy mother Russia with what ‘must surely have been their finest hour’.

It really was a terrible day fought by two most desperate opponents one far from home and another inspired to defend the motherland.

What say you of Borodino my fellow officers? Let us, with our operational minds, debate this battle that the historical scholars have failed to grasp.

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

I always enjoy your analysis Colin and liked what you said about the God view. It is hard to critize Napoleon in that regard. That being said I believe there is more to the story. I do not believe Napoleon was up to his past standards during this campaign and especially on this day. There is some documentation available on his health being bad (having a bad cold) and being a bit morose and missing his son. I believe his judgement was clouded and this led to some bad decsisions on his part. I do not disagree with your conclusion about Napoleon believing the massed frontal attack to be the best option available to him although I think in hindsight it obviously was not. During the lead up to the battle and during the battle Napoleon made two crucial incorrect decisions which led to the battle ending in a tactical victory for the French but a strategic defeat, in my opinion. First, there is some evidence to support that Davout favored more of a flanking or turning movement following Poniatowski around the Russian left which was initially badly exposed.

I will simply quote Clauswitz in that regard:

The ground taken up by the left wing presented no particular advantages. Some hillocks with a gentle slope, and perhaps twenty feet high, together with strips of shrubby wood, formed so confused a whole, that it was difficult to pronounce which party would have the advantage of the ground. Thus, the best side of the position, the right wing, could be of no avail to redeem the defects of the left. The whole position too strongly indicated the left flank to the French as the object of the operation, to admit to their forces being attracted to the right.
”
— Carl von Clausewitz, The Battle of Borodono, Mikaberidze, Alexander

I believe the old Napoleon would have been more imaginative in his creation of a plan.

The biggest mistake of course was that following the gaining of the tactical victory and taking of the all the initial Russian defensive positions Napoleon refused to commit the Guard. This probably would have turned the tactical victory into a much more decisive one.
The only chance Napoleon had of winning the 1812 campaign at that point was a complete, decsivie near annihalation of the Russian Army and he should have understood that. The Russians won by still having an army to fight again another day. Once again I believe Napoleon of early years would have committed the Guard and gone for the jugluar.

Great discussion point.

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Field Marshal Sir Edward Blackburn, 1st Duke of Aberdeen K.G.
85th (Buck's Light Volunteers) Regiment of Foot
16th British Brigade
7th Division
III (Peninsular) Corps
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards

Thanks Ed good input. Yes the 'Davout manuever' is famous and N has copped much criticism for ignoring his advice, hence my alternate view.

I like your comments generally and in particular the Guard. The problem was the strategic situation had already turned I believe and Napoleon went for the battle of annihilation but was hamstrung by his uncertainty. I think he knew he was already in the crap (evidenced by his shrinking army) and was in a bit of a connundrum as to what to do, hence the unimaginative sledgehammer battle plan and latter conservation of the guard for survival reasons really.

Yes it's a great battle to study. I have come to know N better through these games and instead of dismissing his errors I like to try and understand his mindset on the assumption he was the master of war throughout his career (my opinion). I agree poor health was a factor in 1812 also but I suspect a bit of depression contributed to that in light of his realisation of his desperate situation.

I don't entirely subscribe to the Chandlerian view about his decline. I actually think he got better as a soldier but worse as a statesman. The latter pushed the geo-strategic situation against him increasingly resulting in massive gambles and calculations to that effect on the battlefield. He came to rely on the military solution for everything, a fatal flaw that super powers often experience when their political influence declines.

Thanks for joining the conversation Ed.

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

I agree Colin, I don't really think he was in permanent decline, rather a temporary emotional funk and some annoying health problems. Heck in many ways I believe the 1814 campaign was his most masterful campaign. Obviously he recovered his faculties for that.

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Field Marshal Sir Edward Blackburn, 1st Duke of Aberdeen K.G.
85th (Buck's Light Volunteers) Regiment of Foot
16th British Brigade
7th Division
III (Peninsular) Corps
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards

Yes Ed I agree 1814 was brilliant actually given a few minor things being different 1815 could well have turned out brilliantly.

Yes I think he over reached himself in 1812 and actually realised it but did not want to let on to his subordinates.
As a result he burnt himself bending every nerve to compensate and by Borodino was flat as a result.

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

Memory is gone, but somewhere I read that Nap recieved word of one of Wellington's victories in the Iberian Pens shortly before Borodino. I'm sure that didn't help his attitude either.

Yes Al I recall something similar actually now you mention it. It was probably Salamanca as this was on 22 July 1812. I think you are right this would have made him feel the desperation even more so.

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

Excellent analysis Colin, Not much I can add. Indeed Napoleon’s performance at Borodino had all the features of his genius:
1. he conducted his typical diversion attack (Borodino village),
2. he did identify and did attack the enemy weakest point (Russian left),
3. he did have the mass artillery concentration (~300-400 guns against Russian left and Rasvski position), skillfully creating enfilade fire zones.
4. he did have the envelopment maneuver (Utiza) and
5. he did have the concentration of the mass and mass cavalry charges.
6. Napoleon even succeeded in capturing the controlling artillery position (Raevski Redoubt) but unlike in most of his battles, all the above factors had very limited to no results, thanks to the stoicism of the Russian infantry and local initiative by various Russian commanders (mainly Barklay but others too like Ermolov, Konovtnitizin etc.).

The only thing I would disagree with you is on “poor operational leadership”.
Kutuzov had to deploy significant forces on this right flank to protect his operational line in the same manner as Wellington did in 1815 dispatching 15,000 of his army to Hal. As opposed to Wellington’s troops, Russian forces deployed on the right flank did engage the enemy playing the crucial role later in the battle. Also:

"The dense Russian deployment was designed to force Napoleon to fight a battle of attrition....with Napoleon present in person and his army considerably outnumbering the Russians as regards trained troops (militia or Cossack), Russian victory was in any case unlikely.... in may ways therefore the battle of Borodino was a microcosm of the 1812 Campaign as a whole, during which the Russian high Command had forced Napoleon to fight the kind of was that suited them but not him (Lieven, Russian against Napoleon. page 195)

PS. I have a few other points to add but have to go and pack up – I am flying to Borodino’s 200 anniversary tomorrow

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General-Leytenant Alexey Tartyshev
Leib-Guard Preobrazhensky Regiment (Grenadier Drum)
1st Brigade
Guard Infantry Division
5th Guard Corps


(I don't play with with ZOC kills and Rout limiting ON)

Thanks Alexey. Great comments on Russian operational leadership. I won't disagree I love to see our Russian members getting involved in the conversation.

Actually the portrayal in English text of Kutusov at Borodino is I understand controversial and not aligned with Russian accounts. So I will withdraw that comment particularly as Kutusov (& Barclay) performance over the whole campaign was excellent.

That said I guess their performance was less than N's in that area on the day and as his was a bit below par as well. So you would say Kutusov was not outstanding but not as bad a portrayed.

To me it was the Russian rank and file and the local commanders that saved the day for Russia. Like you say the Russian army was at a disadvantage numerically.

Enjoy the anniversary I am sure it will be fantastic.

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

I agree with you, Colin. I think the single, biggest factor was the determination of the Russian soldiers in the rank and file. The Captains, Lieutenants, and Sergeants win the battles, the Generals just make sure they are present to take the credit.

Gentlemen,

If you don't mind, a few words on how I see the evolution of the Art of War in XIX century and the role of Borodino in it.

Clausewitz noticed that it was an Austrian desease to think that local action undertaken to achieve local results can't in principle lead to consequences of strategic scale. This was definately not the case with Napoleon. Even if he didn't act to achieve decisive strategic results he always kept them in mind.

One more point raised by Clausewitz "war is a continuation of politics via different means". And the reason for war is a peace that is better than before the war. Hence the strategic goal is to decrease enemy's means of waging war compared to your own. Either to destroy the state or to destroy the army. And the army may be destroyed either in battle or under "special conditions". These special conditions usually are connected with strategic pursuit, which usually leads to loss of military value if not disintegration of the retreating army. Commencement of such a strategic pursuit is usually considered to be a result of victory in general battle. But this connection is not quite necessary. For instance in 1805 Russians and in 1808 British retreated without being formally defeated. Also "special conditions" do not always apply to retreating army only. For example La Grand Armee in 1812 and Army of Silesia in 1813 before Katzbach both suffered badly being on the offensive.

Two steps back, now. By the end of 7 Years War the warfare looked as follows. Armies deployed in two lines. The second forming tactical reserves for the first. Frederick the Great with his genious eye, attacked the weakest point of the enemy position. And due to better drill and discipline of his troops usually managed to break the line. And Breaking the line he broke the whole order of battle causing the enemy to retreat. But only rarely his victories led to commencement of strategic pursuit. Partially because there were always several enemy's armies around. Partially because his light troops were much inferrior both to Russian cossacks and Austian hussars. Always going to the decisive result on the field of battle he rarely went to it on strategic scale. Such a strategy was very costly, because it required exceptionally high quality of troops and persistance of a gap in quality. By the end of XVIII century having such a gap was very difficult, since all of the armies were drilled by the Prussian methods. Even if not to the same level of perfection.

Suvorov, on the contrary, looked for the commencement of such a pursuit. Preferably taking enemy by surprise, rather then defeating him in battle. But if the enemy decided to stand and fight he also didn't hesitate. And also always gone for the decisive result. But the means were quite different - a kind of special preparation of the troops. In fact it was enough for a regiment to be under Suvorov's command for a few weeks to reach the full level of adoptation of this method. But there were constrains. It was mainly applicable to Russian troops and Suvorov's name (even in for of "our commander is his pupil") if not personal presence was needed. Anyways it was much easier than Frederick's method.

Oh! Too late! I'll be back(c)

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A few things that I do not think have been mentioned:

(1) I have read that Napoleon rejected Davout's proposal because he feared the flank march would give the Russians the opportunity to retreat again. So, he abandoned manouver on the large scale and went with it on a smaller one, with the Polish flank attack.

(2) Reserving the Guard. The legend is that it was Napoleon the ruler, not Napoleon the field commander, that made this decision. If this is true, it makes some sense and has its own logic that stands up reasonably well-cost verses benefit.

(3) Size of the field and the armies--this is a question: did this limit his ability to control the battle (as opposed to being ill)? He also had some of the best field commanders of the period leading the battle, in Davout, Eugene, and Ney (forgive my ignorance of the quality and fame of his cavalry leaders, maybe the Col. Marbot from Texas can clue me in).

(4) As Colin notes, the plan was not all bad considering the tactical and strategic circumstances. Although as has been pointed out, if you are fighting for a knockout blow, then committing the Guard seems to be logical in its own way to.

regards!

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I knew Anton would get Suvorov in there.

Excellent points Anton, as I was reading your comments about strategic pusuit what came into my mind was the difference between the 1805 and 1812 campaigns in that regards. (Especially the period between Ulma nd Austerlitz). Would you consider Napoleons chasing of the Russian army hither and yon prior to Borodino to be strategic pursuit? If no,t what if he had destroyed the Russian army at Borodino? Does strategic pursuit imply a sucessful outcome for the pursuer in it's definition or can there be a failed strategic pursuit?

Jim's third point is a great question and I think the answer is yes and no. Yes, if the army was dispersed and Napoleon could not closely supervise his corps commanders. No, if the army was concentrated and he could. The French army without Napoleon in direct command was often a different animal. His corps commanders were very good when given direction by Napoloen but were often inept without it.

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Field Marshal Sir Edward Blackburn, 1st Duke of Aberdeen K.G.
85th (Buck's Light Volunteers) Regiment of Foot
16th British Brigade
7th Division
III (Peninsular) Corps
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards

Hi All
Some good points all round.

I too want to pick up on Jim's 3rd point.

If you study the terrain at Borodino closely you will see the large forests tend to seperate the French forces. And unlike us with our god view and Radio's Napoleon and his commanders needed to be able to witness events and direct communications accordlingly.

I speculate this was actually one of the main reasons Napoleon turned down Davout's plan. A major effort to the south would have seen the right divided from the centre right by the massive Utitza wood. This given Napoleon's method was a major obstacle and most likely the cause of his preference for a focused and visually accessible attack towards the fleches.

The wood would have prevented close coordination with the other parts of the army and the plan he went with allowed an integral relationship at least to some degree.

However that said even the attack on the Raevski redoubt is a major issue as there is a large wood between the French right centre and centre left and then rising ground up to the fortification. How they managed to get the mass cavalry and batteries into position still makes me scratch my head. It would be fascinating to see the actual deployments on one of our maps at the mid point of this battle.

On the Russian side the roads and open ground allow interior lines and ease of communication.
Overall Kutusov/Barclay picked some great ground to defend on.

So all in all I think Jim raises a crucial point that influenced the battle. The ability to command and control without the benefit of modern communcations perhaps greatly effected the approach Napoleon went for.

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Marechal Knox

Prince d'Austerlitz et Comte d'Argentan
Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur

"What is history but a fable agreed upon"

Well said, Colin, but I believe Davout would have been capable of making the maneuver himself. He was an excellent, independent commander, and the movement upon the Russian left could have been very decisive given their initial deployment. It should have been simple enough to fix the Russian army in a frontal assault, or at least a believable feint against the fleches and redoubt, the presence of which already indicated the Russian intention to stand in defense of this ground. Napoleon had set up the envelopment with the deployment of his army as compared to the Russians. He just did not complete the thought.

I have read that the Utiza Wood may have been particularly dense as well, which would have been another detriment to a coordinated, flanking maneuver, but I believe Davout would have been singularly capable of pulling it off. I suspect the failure to authorize the attempt speaks more to Bonaparte's extreme need for personal control, not necessarily the actual necessity of command and control over a most capable, independent commander.

And regarding Ed's comments about clear direction, this was actually more to Berthier's credit than Napoleon's. It was the combination of the two that was singularly effective, but both the master's mind and the staff officer's pen were essential to success.

Regarding the commitment of the Imperial Guard, you should never stop short of crushing your enemy when you have him in your grasp. Never, not for any reason in warfare. You either fight, or don't fight. You should never fight half way.